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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The intellectual foundation
In order to facilitate trade between two parties, the seller must be able to convince the
buyer that the good up for sale has no hidden defects that will reduce the value of the good
when they surface. However, in many situations the seller is unable to give a guarantee
about the quality of the good, and the only way to create a trade is to reduce the price
dramatically. A well known example of this problem is the puzzling fact that used cars
sell at a huge discount relative to new cars. In one of the first formal discussions of this
problem, Akerlof (1970) illustrates his results with the following intuitive explanation of the
used car discount: The seller of a used car is likely to have more information about the true
quality of the car than potential buyers. To capture this, assume that buyers only know the
distribution of used car quality and that sellers know the quality with certainty. As soon
as a buyer is offered a car, he should infer that the quality is below average, otherwise it
would not have been offered in the market. Thus, it is only the cars with below the average
quality ("lemons") that is offered in the market, and the price is updated to reflect this fact.
Repeating this story, Akerlof came to the strong conclusion that asymmetric information
between seller and buyer, creating an effect also known as adverse selection, may cause
markets to shrink severely.'
Adverse selection obviously imposes a serious problem on the sellers with good cars.
However. the nature of this problem is very general, and there exists several classic arti-
cles that explore the implications of adverse selection in different situations. Looking at
lThe reason for why markets do not break down entirely, is that there willalways be someone (with a
fairly good car) who derives a very low utility from owning the car-and therefore finds it optimal to incur
the cost of selling it below the price that would have prevailed with symmetric information.
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workers trying to signal their abilities to the jobmarket as an example, Spence (1974) de-
rives conditions that must be satisfied in order to make high-quality workers able to send
a trustworthy signal of their quality to the jobmarket. In a related study, Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) look at how contracts can be designed to have insurance clients voluntarily
and truthfully reveal their "quality". Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how adverse selection
may cause credit to be rationed, and Myers and Majluf (1984) show how a company may
forgo a project even if it has positive net present value.
The "underinvestrnent" result in Myers and Majluf (1984) rests on the same intuition
that explains the used car discount. If company insiders know more about the true value of
the firm than outsiders, then insiders will be reluctant to issue risky securities when the firm
is undervalued. For the same reason, they will have an incentive to issue securities when
the firm is overvalued. The security market is aware of these incentives, and will regard an
issue as a signal of overvaluation. For the same reason as good cars drop out of the market,
leaving relatively more lemons for sale-the high-value firms in Myers and Majluf's model
do not issue securities.
Capital market participants react to security issue announcements by revaluing the is-
suer's stock price. This revaluation depends in part on the market's perception of the issuing
firm's objectives and in part on the nature of the information asymmetry between investors
and the firm concerning the true value of its securities. Holding fixed the perception of
issuing firm's objectives, the arguments in Myers and Majluf (1984) imply that the stock
price should drop on the announcement of an equity issue. Based on U.S. data, Asquith
and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find that
the average abnormal (market model) return to firm commitment underwritten seasoned
equity offerings (SEOs) over the two-day period ending with the first Wall Street Journal
announcement of the issue is about -3%, a value-reduction equal to approximately 20% of
the proceeds of the average issue.e However, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and
Affieck-Graves (1995) report that common stock returns of industrial firms making SEOs
tend to substantially underperform those of a control group of non-issuing firms over the
five-year period following the offering date. More specifically, Loughran and Ritter find
that the average five-year stock return following SEOs is 60 percentage points below that
of non-issuing firms of the same size. Their evidence suggests that the market reaction to
2See Eckbo and Masulis (1995) for a review. International evidence is more mixed. The announcement of
equity offerings often produce a positive announcement period abnormal return. However, the international
evidence is frequently based on the announcement of rights offerings, and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) provide
an equilibrium argument (based on adverse selection) that is consistent with a positive announcement period
effect for rights offerings.
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SE~ announcements is informationally inefficient: " if the market fully reacted to the
information implied by an equity issue announcement, the average announcement effect
would be -33%, not -3%." (Loughran and Ritter, 1995, p.48).3 If true, this "new issues
puzzle" constitutes a serious challenge to the presumption of rational pricing in security
markets.
The main goal of this study is to explore whether or not short- and long-horizon market
reactions to seasoned security issue announcements are consistent with rational pricing in
security markets.
1.2 Organization and main results
Chapter 2 reviews some of the studies that have looked at long-horizon abnormal stock
returns. The main conclusion from the review is that the techniqe of measuring long-horizon
abnormal returns using a control group of non-issuing firms, matched on for example size,
suffers from serious methodological deficiencies.
The extant literature on long-run performance following corporate events assumes that
equilibrium expected returns are constant over the portfolio holding period. However, as
surveyed by Ferson (1995), and consistent with dynamic asset pricing models, there is em-
pirical evidence that changes in security risk levels and factor risk premiums (and therefore
expected returns) have predictable components related to publicly available information on
economic fundamentals. For example, if current corporate yield spreads indicate that a
certain stock will .iave a relatively high expected return over t:. ~ next period, failure to
condition on this information will lead the econometrician to falsely identify "abnormal
performance". Chapter 3 provides a discussion of methodological issues, and show how to
avoid confusing true abnormal performance with the effect of time-varying expected returns.
Chapter 4 employs some of the methods discussed in chapter 3 on a large number of
seasoned security offerings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American
Stock Exchange [Amex}." As noted in the previous section, Loughran and Ritter (1995)
and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms making seasoned equity offerings sys-
tematically underperform a control group of non-issuing firms. This finding is part of what
has become known as the "new issues puzzle". In addition to the use of time-varying ex-
pected return benchmarks in the estimation of long-run performance, chapter 4 provides
3If correct, this argument implies that equity issues are characterized by severe adverse selection, requiring
a value-reduction of the average issuer by an amount more than twice the size of the equity issue!
4Chapter 4 is joint work with B. Espen Eckbo and Ronald W. Masulis.
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
two additional contributions to the debate on this puzzle. First, contrary to the literature,
our long-run performance estimates are linked to the initial issue announcement effect. As
a result, it is possible to make in-sample inferences concerning whether the -3% market
reaction to equity offerings represents an unbiased estimate of the future. Second, the
chapter examines a range of issue and issuer characteristics not presented in earlier papers,
including convertible and straight debt in addition to equity, rights versus lwJei writing as
the flotation method, and whether the issuer is an industrial firm or a public utility. Repli-
cation of the conventional matching procedures yields similar evidence of long term stock
return underperformance. However, this evidence of underperformance disappears when
employing time-varying multifactor expected return benchmarks. This finding is robust
across type of security (equity or debt), and across issuer types (industrial firms and public
utilities). The main finding is that it cannot be rejected that the -3% average equity issue
announcement effect is unbiased and consistent with informationally efficient markets.
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) develop a model framework for firm's equity flotation method
choice under adverse selection which captures a number of empirical regularities. Chapter 5
formalizes and extends the Eckbo-Masulis model to include private placements as an alter-
native to rights and underwritten offerings, and to allow the possibility of issue rejection by
either the private placement investor or the underwriter. The model is specifically designed
to explain the choice among private placements, standby rights offerings, and uninsured
rights offerings-which represent the complete range of flotation methods used on the Oslo
Stock Exchange, the empiricallaboratory for the model. In the model, private investors and
investment banks (underv-riters) perform a private inspection of the companies that seek
project financing. The knowledge about firm quality acquired during the inspection allows
a credible quality certification of high-value firms. Thus, these firms can raise funds at more
favorable conditions than would have been possible without the inspection. Firms that are
rejected by a private investor, may withdraw the issue or use uninsured rights or rights with
standby underwriting. Since the rejection by the private investor is based on an informa-
tive inspection, the expected issuer-value for private placements exceeds that for uninsured
rights and standby rights. An event study of the market reactions to announcements of
private placements. standby rights, and uninsured rights largely produces results that are
consistent with the model. As in and Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) announcing a
standby rights offering gives a negative market reaction, while announcements of uninsured
rights are regarded as good news. Consistent with the findings ofWruck (1989) and Hertzel
and Smith (1993) on U.S. private equity offerings, and Kang and Stulz (1996) on Japanese
offerings, the announcement of private placements on the OSE produces positive abnormal
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announcement period returns.
While chapter 4 looks at insufficient control for risk as a potential explanation for the
"new issues puzzle" , chapter 6 explores the timing hypothesis and the underreaction hypoth-
esis as alternative explanations. The timing-hypothesis builds on the notion that investors
are are overly optimistic about the prospects of issuing firms, and as a consequence do
not fully incorporate into prices managers incentive to time an equity issue. This results
in initial overpricing of issuing firms and a subsequent long-run underperformance when
investors correct this initial mispricing over time. The overconfidence hypothesis of Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) is closely related, but is derived in a formal model
and carries some explicit empirical predictions. The overconfidence hypothesis is based on
the assumption that investors are overconfident about the precision of their private informa-
tion, but not about the precision of public information. Overweighting private information
relative to public information causes underreaction to new public information. Thus, the
theory predicts that discretionary corporate events (such as equity issues) associated with
abnormal announcement period returns, on average should be followed by long-run abnor-
mal performance of the same sign as the average announcement period abnormal return.
The empirical predictions of these hypotheses are tested using data on Norwegian private
and public equity offerings. Neither the timing-hypothesis nor the underreaction hypothesis
receive convincing support by the reported evidence.
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Long-run stock return
performance: A review
This chapter reviews some of the studies that have looked at long-horizon abnormal stock
returns. In most cases, the horizon is defined to be from three to five years. When estimating
long-run abnormal stock returns, one needs to make three major methodological choices:
How to model stocks' expected return, how to cumulate returns over the long-run period,
and how to obtain a test statistic that is unbiased and that exhibits good power properties.
Section 2.1 looks at the different choices that has been made in the literature. Section 2.2
reviews and discusses the empirical evidence on long-run abnormal performance for a wide
range of corporate events-however, with emphasis on long-run abnormal stock returns
after security offerings. Section 2.3 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Methodology
This section reviews the wide range of different methods used to estimate and statistically
evaluate abnormallong-run stock returns. The difference between the methods lies in how
expected returns are modeled, in how the returns are cumulated over time, and finally
in what test statistic that is used to evaluate the statistical significance of the abnormal
performance.
7
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2.1.1 Expected return
Let abnormal performance over period t be defined as
(2.1)
where Rit is the realized return on asset i during period t, and E (Rit) is the expected return
on asset i formed at the beginning of period t. In order to measure ARit empirically, one
needs an empirical model of E (Rid. Table 2.1lists four classes of expected return measures
that subsume the majority of specific measures (benchmarks) used in the literature.
Table 2.1
Empirical measures of expected stock return
(a) Market index E (Rid == Rmt where Rmt is a market index. Among the indices used are the
equally and value weighted NYSE/ Amex/Nasdaq CRSP indices .
.(b) Reference portfolio E (Rot) == Rpt where Rpt is a reference portfolio chosen based on some charac-
teristic of the event firm. A widely used procedure is to partition the universe
of listed firms into groups based on market capitalization (size) and book-to-
market ratio. With, say 10 size groups and 5 book-to-market group, one gets
50 reference portfolios. The reference portfolio containing a given event firm is
then used to measure the expected return.
(c) Matching firm E (Rid == Rjt where Rjt is the return for a matching firm. The matching firm is
chosen based on one or several firm characteristics such as market capitalization,
book-to-market ratio, industry, pre-event stock return performance, stock price,
and dividend yield. The firm in the set of eligible matching firms closest to the
event-firm is chosen as the matching firm.
(d) Factor model E(Rit) is measured using an empirical asset pricing model. Models that have
been used include the CAPM, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model,
and various multifactor models.
The benchmarks in table 2.1 are different when it comes to explicitly accounting for the
idiosyncratic risk of the event firm's stock return. When using a market index, a benchmark
portfolio. or a matching firm as the return benchmark, one implicitly assumes that event
firms on average have the same risk as the market, as the group of firms in the benchmark
portfolio, or the class of eligible matching firms, respectively. A factor model, on the other
hand, makes an explicit attempt to control for the degree of risk through event-firm specific
factor betas.
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2.1.2 Long-run abnormal returns
To assess the average long-run abnormal performance in a sample of event firms, the lit-
erature has used cumulative abnormal return (CAR), average excess buy-and-hold return
(BHAR), and various versions of Jensen's alpha (Jensen, 1968). Let Ti and Ti denote the
starting and ending months of the return cumulation (holding period), respectively, and let
T be the number of months between Ti and Ti (including both the start and end month).
The cumulative abnormal return for event-firm i is:
Ti
CARiT = LARit.
t=Ti
(2.2)
With N event-firms in sample, the average cumulative abnormal return is:
l N
CART = N LCARiT, (2.3)
Abnormal buy-and-hold return for event firm i is defined as:
Ti Ti
BHA~T = IT (1 + Rid - IT (1+ E(Rid)· (2.4)
The average abnormal buy-and-hold return is then:
l N
BH ART = N L BH ARiT.
i=l
(2.5)
A factor model procedure assumes that the expected returns are generated by a set of K
risk factors. Following the idea originally developed by Jensen (1968), the abnormal return
on a portfolio p is estimated by regressing the returns on portfolio p on a constant ap and
the K risk factors:
K
Rpt - RIt = ap +L f3pkApt + Ept
k=l
(2.6)
where Rpt is the return on a portfolio constructed using the sample of event-firms, Rft is the
riskfree rate of return, f3pk is the event-firm portfolio's sensitivity to risk factor k, and Apt
the excess return on risk factor k. The estimate for the constant term is the "Jensen's alpha"
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and represents the average monthly abnormal return for the event-firms over the estimation
period. An alternative factor-model approach is also commonly used. Instead of regressing
the factors on a portfolio of event-firms, the factors are regressed on the excess return of
individual event-firms. This gives N firm specific alphas over which we can compute the
average abnormal performance. This approach is the same as computing CART using a
factor model to measure expected returns. Frequently used factor models are the CAPM:
(2.7)
and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model:
where Rmt is the return on the market portfolio, 8MBt is the difference in return between
small and large firms, and HM Lt is the difference in return between high and low book-to-
market firms.
Since abnormallong-term stock return is the difference between realized and expected
returns, the natural choice of a test statistic is the conventional t-statistic. In most ap-
plications this statistic is computed using the cross-sectional sample standard deviation.
This statistic is applicable for CART and BH ART. For CART, an alternative test statistic
may be formed by computing a t-statistic based on the time-series standard deviation of
abnormal returns from a pre-event testing period. This approach is followed by Kothari
and Warner (1997).
2.1.3 Evidence from simulations
Since all the expected return benchmarks can be paired with any of the methods to compute
the long-run abnormal returns. the array of abnormal long-run performance measures is
quite large. Several recent papers use simulations in order to explore the the statistical
properties of the different measures. In sum, the studies of Kothari and Warner (1997),
Barber and Lyon (1997), Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999), and Cowan and Sergeant (1997)
conclude that most measures of abnormal long-run stock returns are biased or have low
power.
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Measurement biases
The sources of measurement biases vary between models, but the following five sources seem
to be important:
New listing/survival ship bias When the long-run stock returns of an event firm are
compared with the returns on an index or benchmark portfolio that includes new firms
as they are listed, one effectively compares a firm which typically has a long post-event
history of returns with firms that begin trading after the event date. Based on the finding
that newly listed firms (IPOs) underperform relative to the average firm (Ritter, 1991),
Barber and Lyon (1997) conjecture that the new listing bias is positive. Moreover, if the
event-firm selection procedure requires event-firms to have pre-event return history, the
new listing bias is exacerbated. Simulation studies confirm the conjecture that the new
listing bias is positive. Barber and Lyon (1996) find that adding a 24 month pre-event
return requirement to a simulation of three-year BH ART using the NYSE/ Amex/Nasdaq
equally weighted index as the return benchmark, increases the average BH ART from -0.1%
without the pre-event return requirement to 1.18% with this requirement. The new listing
bias will only affect long-run performance measures that compute expected returns using
an index or benchmark portfolio. Thus, expected returns computed using matching-firms
or a factor model with macro economic factors will not contain a new listing bias.
Rebalancing bias The monthly rebalancing implicitly assumed when compounding the
return on an equally weighted index or benchmark portfolio will create a negative bias in
long-run performance measures. The source of this bias is the negative autocorrelation in
periodic returns, created by bid-ask jumps and non-synchronous trading. l In order to main-
tain equal portfolio weights, one have to sell stocks that have high prior-month returns and
buy stocks that have low prior month returns. Due to negatively autocorrelated returns,
this means purchasing firms that subsequently perform well and selling firms that subse-
quently perform poorly. Consequently, the monthly returns on equally weighted indices
or benchmark portfolios are inflated relative to the returns of event firms, resulting in a
negative rebalancing bias. The bias is more pronounced for daily returns than for monthly
returns, and the bias becomes more severe when monthly returns are compounded (as with
BHART) rather than added (as with CART). Canina et al. (1998) conduct an interesting
simulation that document this bias. They compare the returns on the CRSP equally weight-
lThe effect of bid ask-jumps on returns are analyzed in Blume and Stambaugh (1983), while Roll (1983)
analyzes the effect of non-synchronous trading.
12 CHAPTER 2. LONG-RUN STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
ed monthly index (the equally weighted average of monthly individual stock buy-and-hold
returns) with a monthly index created by compounding the returns of the equally weighted
CRSP daily index. Over the 1964-1993 period, the index using compounded daily returns
had an average monthly return of 1.72% compared with a monthly return of 1.23% for the
CRSP equally weighted monthly index. On average this amounts to a 6.04% difference in
annual returns.
Skewness bias The skewness bias arises when the return of a single event-firm is com-
pared to the return on an index or a benchmark portfolio. The bias is caused by the
fact that single-firm stock returns are positively skewed, while the return on a portfolio of
several firms are not. Using a X2 distribution with one degree of freedom as an example
distribution, Barber and Lyon (1997) show that a positively skewed distribution tends to
create a negative bias in long-run abnormal returns. Like the rebalancing bias, the skew-
ness bias is inflated by compounding, hence, it is a more serious problem for BH ART than
for CART. Moreover, the sample variance underestimates the true variance, such that
t-statistics become too large-causing overrejection of the null hypothesis of no abnormal
long-run performance.
Cross-sectional dependence bias When using conventional t-statistics to evaluate the
statistical significance of abnormal long-term returns, one assumes that abnormal returns
are independently distributed. This assumption does not hold in most studies since cor-
porate events, for example equity issues or stock splits, tend to cluster in certain time
periods, and it is common to see a corporate event repeatedly during the period of return
calculation. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Brav (1998) study the importance of this
cross-sectional dependence bias. For example, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) find pervasive
test misspecifications in non-random samples using both holding buy-and-hold returns and
calendar time portfolios of event firms.
Bad model bias The bad model bias occurwhen event-firms have systematically different
return generating characteristics than what is captured by the expected return model.
Kothari and Warner (1997) focus on this type of bias. Based on simulation evidence using
CART and several different benchmark models.f they find that all models are severely
2Their study includes the following models of abnormal returns: a market adjusted model (Rit - Rmt), a
market model (Rit - ai - {3iRme}, the CAPM (Rit - Rft - (3;[Rmt - Rfd), and the Fama and French (1993)
three factor model (Rt! - Rft - {3idRmt - Rftl - {3i2HMLt - (3i3SMBt)). Where Rit it the period treturn
of event-firm i, Rft is the riskfree rate of return. Rmt is the return on the market portfolio, SM Bt is the
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misspecified, and that the degree of misspecification is not sensitive to the choice of model.
Using a 36-month return cumulation period, they find rejection frequencies ranging from
18.4% to 34.8% when the nominal rejection level is 5%. That is, the models show abnormal
performance too often. Other authors have found that different benchmark models can
lead to different conclusions about the long-run performance in specific samples. In a
study of postm=rger performance of acquiring firms, using four different expected return
benchmarks, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) find significantly negative, non-significant,
and significantly positive abnormal 36-month returns-using the same set of event-firms.
Table 2.2 contains some of the simulation based evidence reported by Kothari and
Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997). The table reveals that the results for BHART
reported by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Kothari and Warner (1997) are inconsistent. While
Barber and Lyon find that BH ART tend to give negatively biased test-statistics, Kothari
and Warner find positively biased test-statistics for BH ART. However, the buy-and-hold
returns computed in these two papers are not directly comparable. Barber and Lyon use
the model in (2.5) while Kothari and Warner use the model:
Ti
Il(1+ ARit) - l.
t='i
Nevertheless, Barber and Lyon (1996) find that the simulation results are sensitive to the
period from which event-months are drawn, whether or not Nasdaq firms are included in
the simulations (dropping Nasdaq firms tends to reduce the negative bias in BHART), and
whether or not sample selection and abnormal return computation require pre-event return
history for either event-firms or benchmark firms (the new listing bias).
Another interesting result to note from table 2.2 is that using the equally weighted mar-
ket index or reference portfolios as expected return benchmarks gives highly misspecified
tests for abnormallong-run performance. The reason is that these benchmarks suffer from
the new listing bias, the rebalancing bias, the skewness bias, and the cross-sectional depen-
dence bias-and most likelyalso from the bad model bias. The CAPM and the Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model seem to do a little better than the equally weighted market
index or reference portfolios, but these factor models also overreject the null hypothesis of
no abnorm al lang-run performance estimates. The only test statistic that performs reason-
ably well is the buy-and-hold return using a size-land book-to-market matched control firm
as the expected return benchmark. At a 5% theoretical level of significance, Barber and
difference in return between small and large firms, and HM Lt is the difference in return between high and
low book-to-market firms.
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Table 2.2
Empirical rejection levels of three-year abnormal returns in random samples
under the null of no abnormal performance
Barber and Lyon (1997) draw 1000 random samples of 200 event months without replacements. Each event-
month is associated with a firm drawn at random with replacement. Kothari and Warner (1997) draw firms
first, then they draw a random event month. Kothari and Warner use 250 samples of 200 firms. Denote
the number of simulations by S, then a well specified one-sided test with a nominal level of significance
given by a should reject the null in Sa samples. Column "5.0" contains the empirical rejection rates of
the hypothesis that abnormal returns are negative, when the nominal rejection level is set to 5%. Column
"95.0" contains the empirical rejection rates of the hypothesis that abnormal returns are positive, when the
nominal rejection level is set to 5%.
Barber and
Lyon (1997t
Kothari and
Warner (1997b)
5.0 95.0 Mean 5.0 95.0 Mean
(a) CART
.Equally-weighted market index
Fifty sizejbook-to-market portfolios
Size-matched control firm
Sizejbook-to-market matched control firm
CAPM
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
(b) BHART
Equally-weighted market index
Fifty sizejbook-to-market portfolios
Size-matched control firm
Sizejbook-to-market matched control firm
CAPM
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model
1.4 15.8 3.5
4.6 6.9 0.7
6.0 6.1 -0.6
6.0 4.4 -0.6
6.9 4.1 -0.9
8.4 35.2 3.7
2.8 28.4
6.4 34.0
3.3
3.9
10.0 2.4 -0.1 0.0 91.2 27.8
20.1 0.5 -5.2
5.4 5.7 -0.2
5.0 5.1 -0.9
1.2 30.8 5.48
0.8 34.0 6.13
"Barber and Lyon (1997) use the cross-sectional sample standard deviation of abnormal returns to com-
pute the t-statistics for CART and BHART.
bKothari and Warner (1997) compute the t-statistic for CART based on the time-series standard deviation
of abnormal returns from a 24-month pre-event testing period. They define buy-and hold returns in a different
way than the one normally used. Instead of cumulating returns and then take the difference, they cumulate
the difference:
TiIT (1+ .4R,t) - 1.
t=Ti
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Lyon (1997) document empirical rejection levels of 5.0% and 5.1% for the null of negative
abnormal performance and positive abnormal performance respectively. However, the use-
fulness of these simulations is highly questionable. Remember that the event-firm sample is
drawn at random. Thus, even if size and book-to-market ratio are totaly unrelated to stock
returns, matching on these characteristics should produce a sample with the same mean
buy-and-hold return-producing a zero bias. The only useful information that this type
of simulation might provide is on the variability of the mean bias when the simulation is
repeated several times. Interestingly, simulation error (variability in the simulations) seems
to be non-neglectable. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) use the same simulation setup and
find empirical rejection rates of 5.5% and 3.0% respectively.
Alternative test statistics
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) identify two approaches to long-run performance measure-
ment that yield well specified test statistics in randomly drawn samples of event-firms.
The first approach is based on buy-and-hold returns together with reference portfolios
carefully constructed to avoid the rebalancing bias and new-listing bias. The universe
of NYSE/ Amex/Nasdaq listed firms are partitioned into 70 reference-containers based on
firm size and book-to-market ratio.i' The buy-and-hold return on the reference portfolio for
event-firm i with event-month s is calculated as:
where ns is the number of firms in event-firm i's reference-container in month s, T is the
number of months in the cumulation period, and Rjt is the monthly return on reference firm
j. Since no new firms are added to the reference portfolio after month s, the new-listing bias
is avoided. Moreover. since the buy-and-hold returns are first computed for each reference
firm and then averaged, the rebalancing bias is avoided. In the second approach, a calendar
time portfolio of event-firms is compared to the expected return benchmark." If a factor
model is used as the benchmark, inference is based on the t-statistic of the added constant
term (the Jensen's alpha). The advantage of the latter approach is that a factor model easily
can be set up to avoid the new-listing and rebalancing bias. Moreover, the skewness-bias is
eliminated since event-firm returns are measured as a time-series of portfolio returns.
3To be more precise, they use all firms on CRSP with share codes 10 and 11.
4This approach was first employed by Loughran and Ritter (1995), using the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model as the benchmark.
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Returning to the reference-portfolio approach, the skewness-bias still remains, and will
cause a bias in test statistics if not taken care of. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) explore
several methods that handle the inherent skewness in the abnormal performance measure.
They identify two methods that both yield tests that are well specified in random samples
and have good power propertiesP a bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic and boot-
strapped empirical p-values." Of these methods, the latter is the most widely used in the
existing long-run performance literature. The idea is to create the empirical counterpart of
the distribution of event-firm abnormal returns. The steps needed to create this empirical
distribution, is first to draw a random "pseudo-sample" of event-firms: For each firm in the
original event-sample another firm from the same reference-container is drawn at random.
This gives one "pseudo-sample", for which abnormal returns are computed using matching
firms or reference-portfolios. The average abnormal return for the "pseudo-sample" gives
one point on the empirical distribution of abnormal returns. The process is repeated S
times to map out the whole empirical distribution of abnormal returns. Denote the average
abnormal return in the original event-sample by ar. The null hypothesis of no abnormal
performance against the alternative of negative abnormal performance is rejected at the a
percent level if the number of abnormal returns in the empirical distribution that is less
than ar does not exceed o.S,
Test statistics in non-random samples
The typical long-run performance study selects event-firms based on the occurrence of a cer-
tain corporate event. Consequently, event-firms share an important common characteristic.
If this characteristic is correlated with expected returns, either directly or through other
firm characteristics that are correlated with expected returns, simulations that draw event-
samples at random may understate test misspecification. Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999)
recognize this problem and report the behavior of test-statistics in non-random samples.
Table 2.3 provides some of the evidence reported by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) on biases
in non-random samples.
The evidence in table 2.3 is rather discouraging. It shows that test-statistics that were
well specified in random samples, turn out to be severely misspecified when used to evaluate
long-run performance in samples that are not drawn at random. This raises a serious concern
5The power of a test is the ability to reject an incorrect null hypothesis. The power is evaluated by
adding a known level of abnormal returnto the calculated abnormal return in the randomly drawn samples.
6Bootstrapped empirical p-values were first employed in the long-run performance literature by Ikenberry,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995)
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Table 2.3
Empirical rejection levels of five-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns in
non-random samples under the null of no abnormal performance using
reference portfolios constructed to avoid new listing and rebalancing bias
(Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999»
Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) draw 1000 non-random samples of 200 event months without replacements.
Each event-month is associated with a firm drawn at random with replacement. Large and small firms are
firms from the largest and smallest market capitalization deciles. Firms with high and low book-to-market
ratios are firms from the highest and lowest book-to-market ratio deciles. Firms with high and low pre-
event six month returns are firms from the highest and lowest pre-event six month return deciles. Industry
clustered samples are drawn by making sure that the 200 firms in each of the simulation is drawn from the
same randomly drawn two-digit SIC code. Calendar clustered samples are drawn by making sure that the
200 firms in each of the simulation has the same randomly drawn event-month. Overlapping returns are
created by a first draw of 100 randomly selected event firm-months, then for each of these 100 firms, a new
event-month is selected within T months of the first event-month, where T is the long-run horizon. Denote
the number of simulations by S, then a well specified one-sided test with a nominal level of significance
given by a should reject the null in Sa samples. Column "2.5" contains the empirical rejection rates of the
hypothesis that abnormal returns are negative, when the nominal rejection level is set to 2.5%. Column
"97.5" contains the empirical rejection rates of the hypothesis that abnormal returns are positive, when the
nominalrejection level is set to 2.5%. The calendar time portfolio of event-firms used to compute Jensen's
alpha is equally weighted. Results are similar with value weighting (See Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999).
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped Fama and
skewness-adjusted empirical French (1993)
t-statistic p-values Jensen's alpha
Non-random sample 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5 2.5 97.5
Large firms 2.3 2.6 3.6 2.1 0.7 2.9
Small firms 2.8 3.3 3.4 3.5 0.2 3.1
Firms with high book-to-market ratio 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.6 0.0 15.0
Firms with Low book-to-market ratio 4.0 1.2 6.7 1.3 16.8 0.0
Firms with high six-month pre-event returns 9.1 0.4 14.8 0.3 1.0 1.0
Firms with low six-month pre-event returns 1.6 3.0 3.4 3.8 1.2 0.2
Industry clustering 10.5 15.9 14.2 12.9 3.9 7.5
Calendar clustering 3.1 2.5 2.8 2.8 3.1 7.8
Overlapping returns 6.1 6.7 5.1 4.8 0.2 2.2
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about the validity of the evidence we have so far on long-run abnormal performance after
corporate events. The problem may even be exacerbated by the fact that firms selected
based on certain corporate events are likely to be similar on several of the characteristics
listed in table 2.3. For example, we know that firms performing a seasoned equity offering
(SEO) typically have a significant pre-announcement run-up in stock prices, that SEOs tend
to cluster in time ("hot issue markets"), and that several SEOs by the same firm during a
relatively short period are not unusual.
One potential explanation for the misspecifications in table 2.3 is that self-selection by
event-firms (most corporate events studied in the literature are voluntary actions taken by
the company) results in cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns. Brav (1998) sug-
gests a testing methodology that is tailored to handle this potentially important problem.
Moreover, it is robust with respect to the non-normalities observed in abnormal return es-
timates. The suggested method goes under the general heading of Markov Chain Monte
Carlo techniques. The basic idea is to take a Bayesian approach by specifying prior distri-
butions for all random variables in the model, then use an iterative simulation procedure to
arrive at the posterior distribution, given the data, for the variables that we are interested
in. In short, the methodology involves the following steps: First, a null-model for asset
returns is specified. In general, any type of model is applicable-and Brav (1998) uses the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. Since the main goal is to take care of potential
cross-sectional correlation, all the individual firm Fama-French regressions are stacked in a
Seemingly Unrelated Regression setup:
R=FB+E,
where R is the vector of stacked event-firm returns, F is a block diagonal matrix of the
factors in the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, B is the corresponding matrix of
factor loadings, and E is a vector of residuals. Denote the variance-covariance matrix of E by
~. Second, the posterior distribution of {B, ~} given {R,F} is constructed using a method of
iterative simulations known as the Gibbs sampler. When convergence is attained, the Gibbs
sampler deliver draws of B and ~ from the posterior distribution. Third, using S draws on
B and ~ and the actual factors F. one can obtain a set {RI, R2, ... , Rs} of simulated event-
firm returns. Finally, the simulated event-firm returns are used to compute the distribution
of average abnormal returns. As opposed to the empirical p-values suggested by Ikenberry,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995), this distribution is generated under the restriction that
event-firm abnormal returns are cross sectionally related. The hypothesis of no abnormal
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performance is rejected at the O:' level of significance if the average abnormal return of the
original event-firms sample is below the 0:'/2-percentile or above (1 - 0:'/2)-percentile.7
In a sample of initial public offerings (IPOs) Brav (1998) finds that accounting for
the cross-sectional correlation tends to stretch out the empirical distribution of abnormal
returns. In other words, tests that ignores the cross-sectional correlation will reject the
null hypothesis of no abnormal return too often. This result is consistent with the findings
reported in table 2.3. Although the testing methodology advanced by Brav (1998) suggests
a solution to the cross-sectional dependence bias, the size (degree of misspecification) and
power properties of the test-statistic is not known. Thus, it is not possible to say how good
the test is relative to the other tests discussed in this chapter.
2.2 Empirical evidence
Since Ritter's (1991) study of the long-run stock returns after initial public offerings (1-
POs), there has been a large number of other studies looking at the long-run stock return
performance of listed firms after specific corporate events such as seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs), debt offerings, share repurchases, spin-offs, proxy contests, exchange listings, an-
alyst recommendations, and earnings announcements. The majority of these studies find
evidence of either abnormally high or abnormally low long-run stock returns. However, the
long-run performance is in general sensitive to the methodology used. The next sections
review some of these studies in more detail.
2.2.1 Security offerings
Long-run performance has been studied for unlisted firms that go public, for listed firms
that season equity, and for listed firms that issue straight or convertible debt.
Initial public offerings
Ritter (1991) was the first large sample study of long-run post event stock returns after se-
curityofferings. In a sample of 1526 IPOs on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and Nasdaq over the period 1975-1984 he found a remarkable
underperformance over the three years following the IPO. Using a size/industry matched
company as the benchmark, the average abnormal buy-and-hold return is -27.4% over the
10 sample years. However, it is the bad performance of IPOs during the period 1980-1984
7The distribution is by construction centered at zero.
20 CHAPTER 2. LONG-RUN STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
that drives the negative average abnormal buy-and-hold returns. Almost 73% of the firm-
s in the sample went public during this "hot-issue" period. The underperformance also
varies considerably between industries. Some industries, like oil and gas, underperform
substantially compared to their benchmark firms, while other industries, such as financial
institutions, show large overperformance. Ritter views this evidence as support for the
hypothesis that firms are timing IPOs to peaks in industry specific fads. In other words,
to periods where firms in a specific industry are overvalued by the market. However, he
recognizes that the results also are consistent with chance--i.e., just bad luck.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) revisit the long-run performance of IPOs using an extended
sample of 4,753 NYSEjAMEXjNasdaq companies going public during 1970 to 1993. Using
several of the methods described in the methodology section, they confirm the findings of
Ritter (1991). On average IPOs underperform relative to a size matched control firm by
-27% over a three-year period after the IPO. Extending the three-year post IPO period to
a five-year period, they find that IPOs continue to perform worse than the benchmark for
another two years, resulting in an abnormal five-year buy-and-hold return of approximately
-51 %. Also in this larger sample, the underperformance is concentrated in "hot-issue"
periods during the beginning of the 1970's and 1980's.
Motivated by a large number of empirical studies showing that that size and book-to-
market ratio are important determinants of stock returns, Loughran and Ritter (1995) run
monthly cross-sectional regressions over the period 1973-1992 to control for this. For two
of the model specifications used, the average coefficients for 240 cross-sectional regressions
are:
v« = 1.42 -0.49 x ISSit +Eit,
r« 1.70 -0.05 x InMVit +0.30 x In(BVjMV)it -0.38 x ISSit +Eit
(2.9)
where InMV is the natural logarithm of market capitalization (size), In(BVjMV) is the
natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, and ISS is a dummy variable that takes
on the value one if company i has issued equity during the five years prior to t. The
authors interpret these regressions as evidence of a size/book-to-market effect in the long-
run stock return performance of issuing companies, but that it only accounts for about 22%
(the drop in the coefficient on ISS). Loughran and Ritter (1995) interpret their evidence
as a reinforcement of the conclusion from Ritter (1991):firms go public when they are
substantially overvalued.
Brav and Gompers (1997) perform a more detailed analysis of the underperformance of
IPOs based on different firm characteristics, with main focus on whether or not the firm
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is taken public with the help of a venture capitalist, and using size/book-to-market based
benchmarks. Compared to the Loughran and Ritter (1995) sample, Brav and Gomper's
sample excludes unit offerings.f and is restricted to the period 1975-1992. This gives a
total sample of 4,341 IPOs, of which 934 is backed by a venture capitalist. Brav and
Gompers (1997) also point out that these IPOs typically are made by small firms with low
book-to-market ratio (growth firms). About 43% of the venture-backed and 32% of the
non-venture backed companies are found in the intersection between the lowest size decile
and the lowest book-to-market quintile.
Using a wide range of different indices as benchmarks, Brav and Gompers (1997) find
IPO underperformance in the nonventure-backed IPO sample similar to Ritter (1991) and
Loughran and Ritter (1995). However, the venture-backed IPOs does not underperform the
benchmarks to the same extent. Using industry portfolios as the benchmark, nonventure-
backed IPOs underperform the benchmark by -33.8% while venture-backed IPOs only
underperform by -4.4%. Brav and Gompers (1997) also document two other interesting
results. First, using a set of 25 size/book-to-market reference portfolios purged of firms
conducting IPOs or SEOs, they do not find long-run abnormal performance in neither of
the two IPO sub-samples. They interpret this as evidence that the underperformance is not
an IPO effect, but a size/book-to-market effect-small firms with low book-to-market ratio
tend to underperform relative to market wide or industry wide indices. Second, they show
that underperformance is sensitive to the weighting scheme used to aggregate individual
firm performance. If value weights are used instead of the equal weights implied by the
buy-and-hold abnormal performance used by for example Loughran and Ritter (1995), the
abnormal performance becomes much less pronounced. This is, of course, related to the
finding that underperformance is concentrated among small firms.
The results from the cross-sectional regressions in Loughran and Ritter (1995) may seem
to contradict the results of Brav and Gompers (1997). This is not necessarily true. Consider
the regressions reported in table 2.4. The table report results from an experiment similar
to the one used by Loughran and Ritter (1995), but with the difference that in some model
specifications the issue dummy is replaced by a size/book-to-market dummy.
In table 2.4 each monthly regression uses all firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq
with common stocks that have returns and market values on CRSP, and book values on
COMPUSTAT. For months January through June, book-to-market ratios (BV jMV) are
8A unit offering isa combined offering containingone share and one warrant. Unit offerings are ex-
cluded because only the share trade publicly such that calculating the return to investors becomes difficult.
Moreover, unit offerings tend to be issued by very small and risky companies.
22 CHAPTER 2. LONG-RUN STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
Table 2.4
Monthly cross-sectional regressions of stock return on size, book-to-market
ratio, new issue dummy and size dummy, 1970-1993
The population is all firms listed with common stocks on NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq. For each monthly
regression, the sample firms are required to have returns and market values on CRSP, and book values
on COMPUSTAT. For months January through June, book-to-market ratios (BV/MV) are from the fiscal
year two years back, for July through December book-to-market ratios are from the last fiscal year. Market
value of equity (MV) is from the last June before the estimation month. The issue dummy takes on the
value of one if a company issued equity during the five year period preceding the estimation month, and
zero otherwise. The size/book-to-market dummy takes on a value of one if a company's size is in the
first or second size quintile and in the first or second book-to-market quintile, and zero otherwise. The
quintiles are created using NYSE breakpoints. The coefficients reported are the average values of all the
cross-sectional regressions. Parentheses contain t-values computed using the coefficient time-series and the
number of positive coefficients.
Model specifications
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept 1.37 1.52 1.72 1.83 1.88(3.80; 61) (4.36; 62) (3.69; 59) (4.07; 60) (4.20; 60)
In(l\H') -0.07 -0.10 -0.10(-1.24;48) (-1.76; 47) (-1.82; 48)
In(BV/MV) 0.47 0.41 0.44(5.75; 66) (5.42; 65) (5.89; 68)
Issue dummy -0.50 -0.27(-4.02; 42) (-2.90; 43)
Size/book-to-market dummy -0.65 -0.25 -0.20(-4.84; 34) (-3.02; 40) (-2.40: 40)
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computed using book value of equity and market value of equity from the fiscal year two
years back, for months July through December book-to-market ratios are computed using
information from the last fiscal year. Market value of equity (MV) is from the last June
before the estimation month. The issue dummy takes on the value of one if a company issued
equity during the five year period preceding the estimation month, and zero otherwise. The
IPO data of Ritter (1991) and the SEO data of Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (1999) is used
to determine if a company issued equity. The size/book-to-market dummy is created by
first assigning all firms in the sample to 25 size/book-to-market portfolios based on the
intersection of size and book-to-market quintile portfolios. The size/book-to-market dummy
takes on a value of one if a company is in any of the four portfolios created by intersecting
the two smallest size portfolio with the two smallest book-to-market portfolios, and zero
otherwise.
Model specification (1) and (3) in table 2.4 replicate the cross-sectional regressions re-
ported in equation 2.9 above. As should be expected, the results are close to the ones
reported by Loughran and Ritter (1995). However, comparing specification (1) with speci-
fication (2) and (3) with (4), we see that the results using the size/book-to-market dummy
is indistinguishable from the results using the issue dummy. In order to handle the close
correspondence between the issue dummy and the size/book-to-market dummy, model spec-
ification (5) excludes all issuers from the sample. The results are virtually unchanged with
this modification. Thus, one cannot conclude (as do Loughran and Ritter (1995)) that the
issue dummy picks up a separate issue effect. It could be part of a more general size/book-
to-market effect.
Explaining IPO underperformance
Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that firms are timing their decision to
go public in order to take advantage of temporary overvaluations. Timing and subsequent
underperformance implies that markets are inefficient. Loughran and Ritter (1995) suggest
that investors are betting on long-shots, and that they are overestimating the probability of
picking a big winner. Brav and Gompers (1997) view the documented underperformance,
not as a IPO phenomenon, but as more general size/book-to-market phenomenon. They
suggest three possible explanations for this more general view. First, the "bad luck" ex-
planation mentioned in Ritter (1991). Since underperformance is concentrated in certain
periods. the underperformance may be due to unexpected shocks hitting small firms in these
periods. If this is the case, the cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns can cause
inflated standard test statistics, and consequently supporting the hypothesis of abnormal
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performance. However, using the cross-sectional-dependence robust Markov Chain Monte
Carlo techniques described in section 2.1.3, Brav (1998) cannot support the hypothesis that
the observed abnormal returns for IPOs are consistent with the Fama and French (1993)
three factor model. Second, underperformance of small, low-book-to-market firms could be
explained by investor sentiment. Since large institutional investors tend to avoid investing
in very small firms, small firm's equity are primarily held by individuals.P If individual
investors are less sophisticated than institutional investors, small firms are more easily sub-
jected to fads. Third, individual investors may buy small, low book-to-market firms because
they value them as lottery tickets-which are not bought at their expected value, but rather
for their huge upside potential.
A few studies have explored other potential explanation for the IPO underperformance.
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) look at earnings management in the year before and in the
year of the IPO. If investors are unable to fully understand the extent to which IPO firms
engage in earnings management, reporting high earnings before the IPO will transfer into
an increased offering price. One way to inflate earnings is to aggressively report current
discretionary accounting accruals. Using a wide range of specifications, they find that
aggressive reporting of current accruals is followed by a larger post IPO underperformance.
Using cross-sectional regressions, they report the following average coefficients:
r« = +0.86 +0.16 x In(BVitiMVid +0.07 x InMVit
-0.03 x lnMVit x Dit -0.85 x InDC Sit x Ieo;
-0.77 x InDCSit +Xit/3 + fit,
(2.10)
where ru is a monthly return from the 6th to the 17th month after the IPO, DSC is
discretionary current accruals, IPO is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if
the relevant financial statement is the one immediately following the IPO and zero otherwise,
D = 1 if MVit >$100 millions and zero otherwise, and X is other accrual variables with
corresponding coefficients /3. The other variables are defined above. The regressions show
that increasing discretionary current accruals tend to lower the monthly return for all firms.
However, the interaction variable InDC Sit x IPOit shows that managing earnings before
an IPO has an additional strong effect. They view this as evidence that part of the IPO
underperformance is explained by investors inability to fully understand managers incentive
9The costs of gathering information on small firms cannot be recouped without buying a large proportion
of the firm. Institutional investors avoid this for two reasons: First, buying a large fraction of the firm
without bidding up the price is difficult. Second, owning more than 5% is avoided by many institutions due
to regulatory reasons.
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to manage earnings in order to obtain a higher offering price.
Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) look at IPO underperformance conditional on the reputa-
tion of the underwriter that assists in taking the firm public. Using three different measures
of underwriter reputation, but focusing on the Carter-Manaster index, they find that the
better the reputation of the underwriter the less the long-run underperformance.l''
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) seem to document
an IPO effect in their data. However, neither of the papers make appropriate control for
the size/book-to-market effect documented in Brav and Gompers (1997) and in table 2.4.
We know that most IPOs are concentrated in the lowest size decile and the lowest book-to-
market quintile measured using NYSE breakpoints. Thus the IPO dummy variable used by
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) proxy well as a small-firm dummy variable. Consequently,
their results are consistent with the view that discretionary accruals by small firms have an
additional negative impact on returns. The Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) result could also
be a size effect. They report a correlation between the Carter-Manaster index and the size
of the offering of about 0.6. Hence, grouping firms according to this variable and computing
group averages should give similar results as grouping on size.
In sum, the current evidence seems to indicate that small firms with low book-to-market
ratios underperform a wide range of different indices. Whether the data also shows a
separate IPO effect is less clear. If the IPO effect is just a sub-effect of a more general
size/book-to-market effect, the IPO evidence discussed in this section cannot support the
view that firms go public when they are temporarily overvalued.
Seasoned equity offerings
The remarkable stock return underperformance for IPOs found by Ritter (1991), lead to the
question of whether this is a particular IPO phenomenon, or whether it is a more general
equity issue phenomenon. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995)
explore this question by looking at the long-run stock return performance of companies after
SEOs. They find underperformance of SEOs similar to that of IPOs. Using size-matched
control firms as the benchmark and a sample of 3,702 SEOs during 1970-1990, Loughran and
Ritter find a five-year average underperformance of about 60 percentage points. In a shorter
sample period, 1975-1989, excluding all offerings with a secondary component, and using a
lOCarter and Manaster (1990) develop and index of underwriter reputation based on the relative place-
ments in stock offering "tombstone" advertisements. By comparing the relative positions of investment banks
in the advertisements, they place underwriters in one of ten categories, where nine is the most prestigious
and zero is the least prestigious.
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size/industry matched control firm as the benchmark, Spiess and AfReck-Graves (1995) find
an average underperformance of about 42%. As for IPOs, the underperformance of SEOs
varies with the year in which the stocks were issued-with small or no underperformance in
years with few offerings and larger underperformance in years with many offerings. Spiess
and AfReck-Graves (1995) find that all firms, independent affirm characteristics such as age,
size, book-to-market ratio, and trading system-seems to underperform relative to similar
non-issuing firms. However, Nasdaq listed, young, and small firms with low book-to-market
ratio seems to underperform more than other issuers.
Several papers have examined the robustness of the SEO underperformance using other
benchmarks. Brav, Geczy and Gompers (1995) use a sample of 3,931 NYSE/ AMEX/Nasdaq
listed SEOs from 1975-1992. Using buy-and-hold returns and a wide range of different in-
dices as benchmarks they find results similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess
and AfReck-Graves (1995). However, when the average buy-and-hold return are computed
weighting each issuer by its market capitalization, the average long-run underperformance
is significantly reduced. The reason for this finding is that the underperformance is con-
centrated among small firms. Similar results are found using a portfolio of SEOs and the
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model as the benchmark. Regressing the Fama-French
factors on the returns on an equally weighted SE~ portfolio produces a significantly neg-
ative Jensen's alpha. When the portfolio includes SEOs with value weights, the Jensen's
alpha is closer to zero and becomes statistically insignificant. However, Jensen's alpha for a
portfolio of small issuers are significantly negative regardless of the weighting scheme. In a
sample of more than 6,000 SEOs during the period 1961-1993, Mitchell and Stafford (1997)
largely confirm the findings of Brav, Geczy and Gompers (1995).
Loughran and Ritter (1999) criticize the use of the Fama-French three-factor model
as benchmark when evaluating long-run performance. According to Loughran and Rit-
ter (1999), the reduction in abnormal performance typically obtained with value-weighted
event-firm portfolios and the Fama-French model as benchmark, is caused by the inability of
this setup to detect abnormal performance when events occur as a result of behavioral tim-
ing. Their main arguments are based on the notion that small firms typically are missvalued
by more than large firms, that missvaluations are time-varying, and that there are periods
where a lot of firms take some action to exploit this (for example, issue equity in periods of
overvaluation). If we accept these assumption, it is clear that regressing a value-weighted
portfolio of event firms on the Fama-French factors, or any other set of factors for that
matter, will have less power to detect the abnormal performance following missvaluation.
Moreover, they point out that the factors in the Fama-French model include issuers, and is
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therefore a "contaminated" benchmark with less ability to detect abnormal performance.
The latter is potentially an important concern, however, in practice it turns out not to be
important. The studies of Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (1999) and Brav, Geczy and Gom-
pers (1998) show that excluding issuers from the benchmarks makes little difference in the
performance of SEOs.
The use of size and book-to-market ratio as matching criteria when selecting a control
firm is motivated by empirical evidence showing a relationship between these firm character-
istics and stock returns. Jegadeesh (1997) takes this idea further and selects matching firms
based on other firm characteristics such as 6-month and 36-month pre-issue returns, stock
price, and dividend yield. One of the main findings is that as long as one match on book-to-
market ratio, the long-run underperformance of SEOs are relatively insensitive to matching
on other firm characteristics. Using a sample of 3,174 NYSE/ AMEX/Nasdaq listed SEOs
over the period 1977-1994, Jegadeesh (1997) finds long-run buy-and-hold underperformance
between -16.5 and -21.7 percent. Jegadeesh also documents that the size effect found by
Brav, Geczy and Gompers (1995) disappears when matching firms are selected based on
size and book-to-market ratios.
Explaining SEO underperformance
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) suggest that the long-
run underperformance of SEOs can be explained by overoptimistic investors and timing of
the SE~ to a period where the issuing firm is overvalued. Several papers have explored
different aspects of this view. Rangan (1995) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) look
at discretionary accruals in the years around the offering. The idea is that if investors
are overly optimistic about the prospect of firms that issue equity, the optimism could
potentially have been induced by inflated earnings. Both papers find evidence of earnings
management prior to the SE~. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) find that although cash flows
from operations are declining prior to the issue, the reporting of discretionary accruals cause
earnings to peak around the issue. Moreover, discretionary accruals prior to the SE~ is
negatively related to the post-issue long-run stock return performance. The authors view
this as evidence in favor of timing and overly optimistic investors. However, the method
used is the same as in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) (see equation (2.10)), thus the results
are subject to the same criticism. That is, to the extent that an SE~ dummy in the cross-
sectional regressions proxy as a size-dummy, the results are also consistent with the view
that all firms that manage their earnings experience subsequent declining stock returns, and
that this effect is stronger for small firms.
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Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) employ a more direct test of the timing hypoth-
esis. They study a sample of 150 SEOs by commercial banks over the period 1983-199l.
Capital regulations in the banking industry state that a bank is not allowed to have a total
capital ratio below a certain level. If the total capital ratio falls below the regulated lower
bound, the bank may need to issue new equity in order to meet the requirement. Cornett,
Mehran and Tehranian (1998) define an involuntary SEO as an issue performed by a bank
with capital ratio close to or below the required minimum ratio. Their sample contains
80 involuntary issues, with the remaining 70 issues defined to be voluntary. If timing is
driving the long-run underperformance of SEOs, we should expect to see less or no under-
performance for involuntary issues. The results support the timing hypothesis, showing no
abnormal three-year post issue stock return performance for the involuntary issues, while
the voluntary issues show significant underperformance.
Another direct test of the timing hypothesis is done by Brous, Datar and Kini (1998).
They argue that if the long-run underperformance by SEOs are due to timing by managers
and the inability of investors to fully understand the implications of managers incentive to
manage earning prior to the issue, we should expect to see that investors get disappointed
when firms convey their post-issue earnings. That is, post-issue earnings announcement
should on average be associated with negative stock price reactions. Using a sample of 1486
SEOs over the period 1977-1990, they study about 21,000 earnings announcement in the
five-year period subsequent to the issue. The results show no evidence of abnormal stock
price reactions to the earnings announcements.
The major competing hypothesis in explaining the long-run underperformance of SEOs
is methodology based. Recall that SEO underperformance measured using a size-matched
benchmark or the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model mainly is driven by small
firms. Fama and French (1993) document that small firm stock returns are low during the
post-1963 period, and Fama (1998) use this to argue that the SEO underperformance is
explained by the non-existence of an asset pricing model that properly describe the pricing
of small stocks during this period. In particular, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model overestimate the returns on small firms during this period.
In sum. SEO underperformance measured using size-matching or the Fama and French
(1993) three-factor model seem to be concentrated among small firms. However, when a
control firm is selected based on both size and book-to-market ratio, the underperformance
seems to exist in all size and book-to-market quintiles. As for the causes of the SEO
underperforrnance, the timing hypothesis of Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and
Affleck-Graves (1995) has received a lot of attention. However, the evidence is mixed and
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it would be premature to conclude whether or not timing and investor overoptimism are
the real reasons behind the week post SEO performance. On the other hand, there exists
no convincing evidence that the performance is just a matter of econometrics. As stated in
the introductory chapter, the main purpose of this study is to look further into this as a
possible explanation.
Debt offerings
Compared to the number of studies that have looked at long-run stock return performance
after equity issues, there are only a few studies that have explored the long-run performance
after debt issues. This is probably related to the fact that the performance of debt issuing
companies is normal in the post issue period. In a sample of 1,533 straight bond offerings
over the period 1971 to 1991, Hansen and Singal (1997) find no evidence of post-issue
abnormal five-year stock returns. This result is confirmed by Cheng (1994). Using a sample
of 662 bond issues over the period 1977 to 1988, Cheng (1994) finds an abnormal post-issue
three-year abnormal return of 3.1 percent. In a sample of 1557 straight debt issues over the
period 1975-1989, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1996) report a five-year post-issue abnormal
performance of -7.94 percent (using size/book-to-market matched control firms). This is
significantly different from zero using a Wilcoxon signed rank test. In a subsample of 292
straight debt issuers that have not issue debt or equity in the five years before or five years
after the debt issue (called an "independent" sample), they find a five-year abnormal stock
return of about -21 percent. From these results they conclude that firms issuing bonds also
underperform in the five-year after the issue. Given the results reviewed in the methodology
section, the -7.94 abnormal performance in the full sample is hardly statistically significant
using any methods that takes cross-sectional dependence among issuers into account. Thus,
their conclusion must rest on the fact that the independent subsample shows a reasonably
large underperformance. However, this subsample is selected using hindsight (no issues
in the five years after the bond issue), and as such cannot be part of an implementable
investment strategy. Thus, choosing an appropriate benchmark, using information that is
only available at the time of the issue, is not possible for this subsample. In sum, it seems
safe to conclude that there are no long-run abnormal performance after straight bond issues.
For convertible bond issues the results are similar to the results after equity issues. In a
sample of 672 convertible bond offerings, and using sizejbook-to-market matched control
firms as the benchmark, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1996) find a five-year abnormal stock
return performance of -39 percent.
30 CHAPTER 2. LONG-RUN STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
2.2.2 Other corporate events
An extensive review of the evidence on long-run performance after other corporate events
than security issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, table 2.5 lists some of
the studies in this area.
One thing to keep in mind when looking at the table, is that results tend to be very
sensitive to the applied benchmark. Abnormal returns tend to increase when a broadly
based market index is used to measure abnormal performance. Lakonishok and Vermae-
len (1990) find almost three times larger overperformance in their repurchase tender offer
sample when using the value weighted market index as benchmark instead of the size based
reference portfolio. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) report about twice as large over-
performance for the dividend initiation sample using the equally weighted market index as
the benchmark. Finally, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) report significant positive, non-
significant, and significant negative long-run abnormal returns after mergers using different
benchmarksl!
In the two stock repurchase samples studied by Mitchell and Stafford (1997), they find
insignificant underperformance when value-weighting. Thus, the small firm effect found in
the IPO and SEO samples seems to exist in these samples as well. For the open market
share repurchase sample, the size-effect is confirmed by Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermae-
len (1995) who find no abnormal return for value stocks (high book-to-market) and large
overperformance for glamour stocks (an average monthly abnormal return of 0.43 over a
4-year post-event period.)
A concern that applies to all studies that use buy-and-hold returns, is that one will find
long-run abnormal performance even if the abnormal performance only is concentrated in,
say, the first few months of the holding period.P Two examples of this is Ikenberry, Rankine
and Stice (1996) and Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) who both report a three-year
12.1 percent abnormal performance after stock splits and dividend initiations respectively.
However, for the stock split sample 7.92% was generated the first year while the same
period for the dividend initiation sample showed 6.0% abnormal return. Compounding
these numbers over two years (at normal returns) brings us close to the abnormal three-
year performance for these samples.
A final point to consider is the use of bootstrapped p-values to evaluate statistical
significance. Several studies generate an empirical distribution of abnormal return using
Il Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) argue that this is an artifactofthesample period used by Franks,
Harris and Titman (1991).
12This is also pointed out by Mitchell and Stafford (1997) and Fama (1998).
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Table 2.5
Monthly post-event abnormal return for corporate events
The table reports benchmarks used in the studied cited in the following way: Upper case letters 'S', 'B', 'M',
and 'I' refer to Size, Book-to-market, Momentum, and Industry matching respectively. Lower case letters
'p' and 'f" refer to the use of matching portfolios and matching firms respectively. For example, 'SBp' means
that the study used a size/book-to-market reference portfolio as benchmark. 'FF93' refer to the Fama-French
three-factor model, 'DM86' refer to the Dimson and Marsh (1986) benchmark (a market model with a size
factor appended), and 'MF' refer to a multifactor benchmark. A " indicates that the results are statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Monthlv
Sample Sample
Return Average
Horizon Bench- Abnormal
Size Period (Months) mark Return
Repurchase tender offer
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) 221 1962-86 24 Sp 0.36"
Mitchell and Stafford (1997) 448 1959-93 36 FF93 0.15
Open market share repurchase
Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) 1,239 1980-90 48 SBf 0.25"
Mitchell and Stafford (1997) 2,432 1959-93 36 FF93 0.17"
Dividend initiations (increases)
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) 561 1964-88 36 Sp 0.34
Chemmanur and Liu (1995) 2,230 1965-92 36 Sp 0.34*
Dividend omissions (decreases)
Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) 887 1964-88 36 Sp -0.54"
Chemmanur and Liu (1995) 1,001 1965-92 36 Sp -0.17"
Stock splits
Desai and Jain (1997) 5,596 1976-91 36 SBMp 0.33"
Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) 1,275 1975-90 36 SBp 0.34"
Proxy Contests
Ikenberry and Lakonishok (1993) 97 1968-88 56 DM86 -0.24
Wahal (1996) 119 1987-93 12 Ip -0.37
Exchange Listing
Dharan and Ikenberry (1995) 2,889 1962-90 36 SBp -0.20
Announcement of positive unexpected earnings
Bernard and Thomas (1989) 1,630 1974-86 2 Sp LO"
Announcement of negative unexpected earnings
Bernard and Thomas (1989) 1,630 1974-86 2 Sp -1.0'
New Analyst Buy Recommendation
Womack (1996) 694 1989-90 6 Sp 0.3
New Analyst Sell Recommendation
Womack (1996) 209 1989-91 6 Sp 1.52-
Mergers and Acquisitions (performance for buyers)
Rau and Verrnaelen (1998) 3,169 1980-91 36 SBp -0.42-
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) 937 1955-87 60 m.186 -O.lT
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 399 1975-84 36 ~IF -0.08
Loughran and Vijh (1997) 947 1970-89 60 Sf -0.11
Mitchell and Stafford (1997) 2,906 1959-93 36 FF93 -0.22-
32 CHAPTER 2. LONG-RUN STOCK RETURN PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW
the procedure described in section 2.1. However, when computing the p-value, several
studies count the number of observations that are of the same sign but are more extreme
than the observed abnormal performance in the actual event-sample under study. In other
words, a one-sided statistical test. Regardless of the null hypothesis lined up for the study,
choosing a one-sided test based on the sign of the sample mean, results in inflated statistical
significance. If the null hypothesis is that there are no abnormal performance (as it would
be under the market efficiency hypothesis) the test should be two sided.
2.3 Conclusion
Under the efficient market hypothesis, security prices reflect the information that is available
to market participants, implying that it should be impossible to obtain abnormal returns
from an investment strategy that only exploits public information. Thus, the results re-
ported in table 2.5 seem to be a serious blow to the efficient market hypothesis. Fama
(1998) makes two arguments against this interpretation of the results from the long-run
performance literature. First, he points out that abnormal performance is sensitive to the
method used to evaluate performance. In particular, abnormal performance tends to be re-
duced when applying the Fama-French three-factor model as benchmark for value-weighted
event-firm portfolios. Second, abnormal performance after specific events may exist even
if markets are efficient-a random split between underperformance and overperformance
is consistent with market efficiency. Counting the number of events that is followed by
stock price underperformance and the number of events that is followed by stock price
overperformance, Fama (1998) points out that overperformance is about as common as
underperformance.
Although the above argument obviously is correct, market efficiency also requires that
any abnormal performance is not persistent over time. However, it is difficult to assess
the persistence of, say five-year abnormal returns, when the time-series used to estimate
the performance is less than 20 years (as it is in most studies). Thus, as is apparent from
the review in this chapter, the focus of the debate on long-run abnormal performance have
been on the quality of the benchmark used to estimate abnormal returns. This is also
the approach taken in the rest of this study. In particular, the main analysis of long-
run performance is going to rest on a benchmark constructed using an approach similar
to the one that uses the Fama-French model, however, the factors are constructed using
prespecified macroeconomic variables known from previous studies to be related to security
returns.
Chapter 3
Conditional long-run stock return
performance
3.1 Introduction
The extant literature on long-run performance following corporate events assumes that e-
quilibrium expected returns are constant over the portfolio holding period. However, as
surveyed by Ferson (1995), and consistent with dynamic asset pricing models, there is em-
pirical evidence that changes in security risk levels and factor risk premiums (and therefore
expected returns) have predictable components related to publicly available information
on economic fundamentals. For example, if current corporate yield spreads indicate that
a certain stock will have a relatively high expected return over the next period, failure to
condition on this information willlead the econometrician to falsely identify "abnormal per-
formance". This chapter discuses how to avoid confusing true abnormal performance with
the effect of time-varying expected returns by explicitly conditioning abnormal performance
on a set of prespecified information variables.
3.2 Asset returns with time-varying expectations
Assume that the asset return generating process is:
(3.1)
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where ~t is return on asset i between time t - l and time t (t = 1,2, ... ,T), Et-l(·) is a
conditional expectation using information that is available at time t - l, the (K x l) vector
f3it-l contains conditional factor sensitivities which measure the systematic risk of security
i relative to the factors, ft is a (K x l) vector of random risk factors with Et-dft) = O,
and eit is idiosyncratic risk with Et-l (eid = O.
Given that factor risk is pervasive and that idiosyncratic risk can be eliminated by
holding well diversified portfolios, the arbitrage pricing theory (APT) first developed by Ross
(1976) and later extended to an intertemporal version (that allows time-varying betas and
time-varying risk-premiums) by Connor and Korajczyk (1990), implies that the conditional
expected return on asset i is approximately linear in their sensitivities to factor risk. Assume
that conditional expected return on asset i is exactly linear in the sensitivities:
(3.2)
where >'Ot-l is the conditional expected risk-premium on a "zero-beta" portfolio, l and >'t-l
is a (K x l) vector containing expected factor risk-premiums. The "t-l" subscript indicates
that expectations about risk premiums for period t (the period starting at t - l and ending
at t) are formed using information available at time t - 1. Substituting equation (3.2) into
(3.1) gives the asset return generating process:
(3.3)
The maintained hypothesis throughout this chapter is that equation (3.3) represents the
true asset return generating process.
However, in order to facilitate the econometric specification of the asset return gen-
eration process we need to put structure on the time-variation in factor sensitivities and
risk-premiums and define risk factors. When risk factors are defined so that (ft + >'t-l)
represents portfolio returns, we implicitly impose further restrictions on the asset return
generating process. We follow Shanken (1992) and define the K-vector ft as composed
of two subvectors ht = Rmt - Et-dRmd and ht = M, - Et-dMt) with dimension kl
and k2 respectively. The kl-vector Rmt represent risk factors as factor mimicking portfolio
returns.? while the k2-vector M, represents risk factors as macroeconomic variables.
The factor mimicking portfolios must satisfy the expected return relation (3.2), thus,
lThe zero-beta portfolio has zero sensitivity to all risk factors
2The j'th factor mimicking portfolio has unit sensitivity to risk-factor j and zero sensitivity to all other
risk factors.
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the following restriction applyr'
(3.4)
where lkl is a (kl x l) vector of ones and Alt-l is the first kl elements of At_I.4 Using
this restriction and the definition of h together with (3.1) and (3.2) gives the asset return
generating process:
where (3jit-1 (j = 1,2) are the two kl and k2 subvectors of (3it-l.
3.3 Conditional Jensen's alpha
When factor mimicking portfolios are the sole representation of risk factors (k2 = O), taking
the conditional expectation of both sides of equation (3.5) generates equation (3.2). Thus,
monthly conditional expected returns may be estimated by regressing Rmt on Rit. However,
when some factors are not portfolio returns (k2 > O), the monthly conditional expected
returns are not identified unless we specify a model for the conditional expectations of the
macro economic variables used to represent risk factors. This has often been solved by
subtracting out the time-series mean or taking the first difference of the macro economic
variable. This approach is clearly not in the spirit of a model of conditional expected returns.
Instead, and in order to avoid setting up a parametric model of the time-series behavior of
macro economic variables, we follow an approach used by for example Ferson and Korajczyk
(1995), and construct stock portfolios that mimic the macro economic variables. The precise
nature of the construction of these portfolios will be made clear in the empirical chapters.
However. the implication of the approach is that k2 is zero, and the asset return generating
3This follows from:
Et-I(Rkt) =o AOt-l + Bkt-IAlkt-l, '<I k =o 1, ... kl.
which, using the fact that element j in Bkt-l equals 1 for j =o k and zero otherwise, reduces to
4Throughout the chapter a "I" with a subscript is used to denote a column vector of ones with number
of rows equal to the subscript.
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process becomes:
(3.6)
This restricted model is analogous to the restriction implied by the "zero-beta" version of
the Sharp-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) tested by Gibbons (1982).
In order to estimate the model in (3.6) using a time-series of observed returns, we must
specify a model for the time-variation in the factor loadings and make further assumptions
about >'Ot-l. Following for example Ferson and Schadt (1996), it is assumed that factor
loadings are linearly related to a set of L information variables Zt-l:
(3.7)
where biD is a K-vector of "average" factor loadings that are time-invariant and Bil is a
(K xL) coefficient matrix. The product Bil Zt-l captures the predictable time variation in
the factor loadings.
The expected return on the zero-beta portfolio can either be assumed to be a constant
that must be estimated (i.e., >'Ot-l = >'0 V t), or made observable by assuming that a
risk free asset exist, in which case >'Ot-l equals the risk free rate of return over the period
starting on t - 1 and ending on t (the risk free rate of return is known at the beginning of
this period.) In the rest of this chapter, it is assumed that a risk free asset exists. Under
this assumption, and using (3.7), the return generating processes in (3.6) becomes:
(3.8)
where Tit and Trnt are asset return and returns on factor mimicking portfolios in excess of
the return on the risk free asset, the KL-vector bil is vec(Bid, and the symbol ® denotes
the Kronecker product." To test for abnormal performance, we follow the tradition started
by Jensen (1968), and append a constant term ai to the model. Taking the conditional
expectation of both sides in (3.8) shows that the model implies that ai should be zero.
Moreover, the constant term is a measure of the average monthly abnormal return." If we
assume that bil is zero, the model reduces to a constant beta model such as the CAPM or
SThe operator vecf-) vectorizes the matrix argument by stacking each column starting with the first
column of the matrix. The Kroneckerproduct of two matrices (A 0 B) multiplies B with every element in
.4.
6Ferson and Schadt (1996) use the model in (3.8) to evaluate mutual fund performance.
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the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. 7
To estimate the conditional Jensen's alpha, the returns on a portfolio of issuing firms are
used as the dependent variable in a time-series regression. Monthly return on this "issuer
portfolio" is computed as the weighted sum of the returns on the stocks of firms that have
issued equity within the last five years. The time-series series regression can be written as:
(3.9)
where rp is a (T x 1) vector of issuer portfolio excess returns, IT is a (T x 1) vector of
ones, Tm. is a (T x K) matrix of excess returns on factor mimicking portfolios with typical
row r~t, Z is a (T x LK) matrix of information variables multiplied by excess returns
on factor mimicking portfolios with typical row (Zt-l ® rmd, and ep is a (T x 1) vector
of idiosyncratic risk. The components of the coefficient vector have been defined above
except that the previously used subscript i is replaces by p to indicate that the returns
in rp are portfolio returns. Since the firms in the issuer portfolio change frequently, the
assumption that betas are time-varying seems particularly appropriate. Moreover, since
the number of firms in the portfolio also varies considerably over the sample period, the
covariance matrix of the error term ep is likely not to satisfy the assumption cov(ep) = (12 fr
which is required to make OLS the Best Linear Unbiased Estimator (BLUE). It is more
likely that the variance of the error term is different between months due to the changing
number and identity of firms in the issuer portfolio. To allow for this, and still use OLS to
estimate the coefficients, we estimate the covariance matrix of the coefficient vector using
the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980).
3.3.1 The Fama-French three factor model
Under the assumption that expected returns are time-varying in the sense defined by (3.2),
it becomes interesting to explore the implications for the long-run stock return performance
measures discussed in chapter 2. A widely used abnormal performance measure is based
on the Fama-French three-factor model which assumes that expected returns are constant
through time. The abnormal return of a portfolio p is estimated by regressing the portfolio-
returns on a constant term ap and the three Fama-French risk-factors. Given the model
7In the CAPM rmt is the excessreturn on the portfolio of aggregated wealth. In the Fama-French three-
factor model rmt contains the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio, and two zero-investment
portfolios constructed based on market capitalization and book-to-market sorted portfolios.
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assumptions underlying the Fama-French model, the estimated constant term measures the
average abnormal return of portfolio p over the estimation period. Assume that the true
model of asset returns is (3.9). Estimating abnormal performance using the Fama-French
model implies running the following regression:
The OLS estimate for the coefficient vector is:
[t; l= ([ IT Tni I [ IT Trn. l) -1 [ IT Tm ]' rp
Replacing rp with the true model and taking the expected value of the OLS estimate gives:
The only case in which this OLS estimator is unbiased is when all the elements in the vector
bpl is zero. Equation (3.7) shows that this implies an asset return generating model with
constant betas. This should not be surprising since the Fama-French regression is based on
this assumption, and OLS estimates will be unbiased when the model estimated is the true
model.
The derivation used to compute the bias in the OLS estimates of the coefficients in
the Fama-French model also highlights the isomorphic relationship between a model with
time-varying betas and K risk factors and a model with constant betas and more that K
risk factors. The model in equation (3.8) was derived using time-varying betas. However, a
non-zero bil is also consistent with the existence of additional risk-factors that are correlated
with the predetermined information variables in Zt-l. Thus, even if the Fama-French model
is estimated using time-varying betas, but the Fama-French factors only capture a subset of
the K risk factors, an omitted variable bias similar to the above bias will occur in the OLS
estimates. This is, of course, not just a potential problem for the Fama-French model. Any
empirical specification of the return generating process will suffer from the same problem if
the specification only includes a subset of the relevant risk factors.
Chapter 4
SEO performance: The U.S.
evidencet
There is substantial evidence that news of seasoned equity offerings are associated with
an average two-day announcement period abnormal stock return of -3%. However, recent
studies of the long-run performance of issuing firms question whether this market reaction
to issue announcements is indeed rational. In particular, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms making seasoned equity offerings system-
atically under perform a control group of non-issuing firms. This finding is coined "The
new issues puzzle" by Loughran and Ritter (1995). This chapter provides three primary
contributions to the debate on this puzzle. First, contrary to the literature, our long-run
performance estimates are linked to the initial issue announcement effect. As a result, we
are in a position to make in-sample inferences concerning whether the -3% market reac-
tion to equity offerings represents an unbiased estimate of the future. Second, we examine a
range of issue and issuer characteristics not presented in earlier papers, including convertible
and straight debt in addition to equity, rights versus underwriting as the flotation method,
and whether the issuer is a industrial firm or a public utility. Finally, we draw on recen-
t asset pricing econometrics to generate time-varying expected return benchmarks in the
estimation of long-run performance. Replication of the conventional matching procedures
tThis chapter is jointwork with B. Espen Eckbo at the Amos Tuck School of Business Administration,
Dartmouth College, and Ronald W. Masulis at the Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt
University.
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yields similar evidence of long term stock return underperformance. However, this evidence
of underperformance disappears when employing time-varying multifactor expected return
benchmarks. This finding is robust across type of security (equity or debt), and across issuer
types (industrial firms and public utilities). We cannot reject the hypothesis that the -3%
average equity issue announcement effect is unbiased and consistent with informationally
efficient markets.
4.1 Introduction
Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) report that common stock
returns of industrial firms making seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) tend to substantially
underperform those of a control group of non-issuing firms over the 2-5 years following
the offering date. More specifically, Loughran and Ritter find that the average five-year
stock return following SEOs is 60 percentage points below that of non-issuing firms of the
same size. Their evidence suggests that the market reaction to SE~ announcements, which
averages -3% for industrial firm-commitment offerings by firms listed on the New York-
(NYSE) and the American (Amex) stock exchanges, l is informationally inefficient: "... if
the market fully reacted to the information implied by an equity issue announcement, the
average announcement effect would be -33%, not -3%." (Loughran and Ritter (1995),
p.48). If true, this "new issues puzzle" constitutes a serious challenge to the presump-
tion of rational pricing in security markets. Not surprisingly, these studies have generated
substantial interest among empirical researchers in corporate finance.
However, there is growing evidence that long-run performance estimates are highly sen-
sitive to the econometric methodology used. For example, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995),
Jegadeesh (1997), as well as our results, indicate that stock price underperformance follow-
ing security offerings is substantially reduced when both size and book-to-market factors are
used to select matching firms. Furthermore, the matching procedure is ineffective at creating
portfolios of like risk or expected returns to the event portfolios of security issuers. More-
over. when employing the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and value-weighting
portfolio returns, Brav, Geczy and Gompers (1995) and Mitchell and Stafford (1997) re-
port statistically insignificant long-run abnormal performance following SEOs.2 This study
ISee Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986), and Eckbo and Masulis (1992). The -3%
represents the average abnormal (market model) return to firm commitment underwritten SEOs over the
two-day period ending with thefirst Wall Street Journal announcement of the issue.
2Fama (1998) presents a discussion of these and other long-run performance studies in light of their
implications (or lack thereof) for market efficiency.
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draws a similar conclusion when estimating long-run performance using either the Fama-
French modelor a model where factors are constructed from macroeconomic variables.
The extant literature on long run performance following corporate events assumes that
equilibrium expected returns are constant over the portfolio holding period. In this study,
we show that the use of conditional (time-varying) expected return benchmarks also drives
estimated long-run underperformance to statistical insignificance. As surveyed by Ferson
(1995), and consistent with dynamic asset pricing models, there is empirical evidence that
changes in security risk levels and factor risk premiums (and therefore expected returns)
have predictable components related to publicly available information on economic funda-
mentals. For example, if current corporate yield spreads indicate that a certain stock will
have a relatively high expected return over the next period, failure to condition on this
information will lead the econometrician to falsely identify "abnormal performance". Thus,
our conditionallong-run performance estimates reduce the risk of confusing true abnormal
performance with the effect of time-varying expected returns.
The evidence derived from our multifactor model is also of particular interest in light of
the ongoing debate over whether risk factors based on predetermined attributes of common
stocks, such as those in the Fama-French model, are themselves proxies for market mispric-
ing. For example, the covariance between stock returns and a book-to-market factor may
be driven either by exposure to underlying macroeconomic risk factors or by mispricing.
As pointed out by Ferson and Harvey (1998), a factor model containing macroeconomic
risk factors avoids this ambiguity.I A somewhat related argument is made by Loughran
and Ritter (1999) who warn that the Fama-French factors may be "contaminated" by a
disproportionate number of equity issuing firms.! With these econometric issues in mind, it
is interesting that our conditional multifactor model, which uses macroeconomic risk factors
and is free of factor contamination, yields SEO long-run abnormal return estimates close to
zero.
We estimate long-run performance using a sample of seasoned security offering announce-
ments consisting of 2327 security offerings (1620 equity and 707 debt) on the NYSE and
Amex over the 1963-1983 period. Our sample excludes security offerings whose announce-
ments go unreported in the Wall Street Journal Index and Dow Jones New Retrieval System
over this period, by NASDAQ issuers, as well as issues occurring during the "hot issue mar-
kets" in the mid to late 1980s. We also provide long-run performance estimates across
3See also the discussion in Berk (1995) on the role of equity market capitalization (size) as a risk factor.
4Specifically, they report that the small-firm- (S) and-low-book-to-market (L) portfolios used to generate
the Fama-French size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) factors contain a disproportionallyhigh number
of issuing firms. See Fama and French (1993) for a further description of the 5MB and HML risk factors.
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subsamples classified by issuer type (industrial vs. public utility), by security type (com-
mon stock, straight debt, and convertible debt), and by equity flotation method (right vs.
underwritten offerings).
Initially, when using the Loughran and Ritter (1995) average holding period procedure,
and matching stocks on size (equity capitalization) only, we document substantial SEO
underperformance much like that reported in the extant literature from different sample
periods.P However, this long-run underperformance disappears economically and statisti-
cally when using time-varying expected return benchmarks in the context of a portfolio
investment strategy." This conclusion is robust with respect to the SEO flotation method
and whether the issuer is an industrial firm or public utility. Moreover, we also report
statistically insignificant long-run abnormal performance following debt issues using several
alternative estimation procedures. Our evidence on debt issues, as well as on issuer type and
flotation method, further supports the view that the "new issues puzzle" is about proper
risk adjustment rather than about market underreaction to the news released in security
issue announcements.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the econometrics
of long-run performance estimation, and it details how our methodology differs from the
earlier literature. Section 3 describes the data selection and main sample characteristics.
Section 4 discusses the empirical results using matching-sample techniques, while section 5
shows empirical estimates using factor model procedures. Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Long-run abnormal performance estimators
The empirical analysis in section 4 and 5 implements two procedures for estimating long-
run abnormal performance. First, under the matched control firm procedure (discussed in
section 2.1 in chapter 2), abnormal returns are estimated using the realized stock return
to a non-issuing firm matched to have similar risk characteristics as that of the issuer.
Second, under the factor model procedure (see chapter 3), a multi-factor return generating
process is used to form expected one-period returns for both issuing firms and non-issuing
matched-firms.
5In their procedure, common stocks that are listed on a major exchange and have not undertaken an
SEQ or an IPQ within the last five years become eligible to be a matching firm.
6The strategy consists of continually taking long positions in non-issuing matched firms, and offsetting
short positions in issuers, using either equal- or value-weighting of returns.
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4.2.1 Matched control firm procedures
Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiessand Affleck-Graves (1995) all estimate
the long-run (up to five year) return to issuers and to a matched control sample of non-
issuers following the offering date. Under the assumption that the issuer and the non-issuing
match have identical risk characteristics, the expected value of the long-run buy-and-hold
return difference between issuers and matching firms equals zero." This null hypothesis is
rejected by both Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). With a
sample of 3,702 SEOs on the NYSE/ Amex/NASDAQ exchanges over the period 1970-1990,
Loughran and Ritter (1995) estimate this average difference in holding period returns to be
-60% for five-year holding periods. Similarly, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) estimate the
average difference to be -42% in a sample of 1,247 SEOs from 1975-1989 (627 NYSE/ Amex
issues and 620 NASDAQ issues). Both results raise the question of whether the matching
procedure adequately controls for risk.
We implement a number of modifications to the standard matching procedure in this
literature for selecting non-issuing control firms and for computing the relative performance
of portfolios of issuers and matched firms. Loughran and Ritter (1995) select a non-issuing
match based on equity capitalization at the prior year-end.f and Spiess and Affleck-Graves
(1995) control for size and the two-digit industry SIC code of the issuer. In contrast, we
match on size and book-to-market ratio at the prior month-end, i.e., two of the risk factors
in the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and we separate industrial firms from
public utilities.? In each month t, size and book-to-market matching is accomplished by
first identifying all companies with an equity capitalization in the interval [(vd1.3), 1.3vil,
where Vi is the market value of the issuer's common stock at the end of month t.lO The
company within this size-interval with the closest book-to-market ratio to the issuer is then
selected as the matching firm for month t + 1.Il Moreover, as discussed in the empirical
section below, we also examine the effect of the prior listing requirements, as well as the
effect of updating the list of matching firms monthly in response to delistings and security
7We are unaware of any long-run performance studies using the matched control firm procedure that
reports evidence to support this critical assumption.
8They select the non-issuing firm with the closest but greater size than the SEO firm.
9Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) state that their industry matching procedure leads to results that are
indistinguishable from a match based on book-to-market. Brav, Geczy and Gompers (1995) and Jegadeesh
(1997) also analyze the effect of size vs. sizejbook-to-market matching. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) exclude utilities from their analysis. )
10A similar sorting rule is used by Barber and Lyon (1997).
llLoughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) match on the closest but larger firm
measured by equity capitalization when employing the size-matching procedure.
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issues by these firms.
4.2.2 Factor model procedures
Factor model procedures assume that expected returns are generated by a set of K pre-
specified risk factors. Following a tradition started by Jensen (1968), the abnormal return
of portfolio p is estimated by regressing the returns of portfolio p on a constant term ap
and the K risk factors. The estimated constant term is "Jensen's alpha" and represents
the average abnormal return of portfolio p over the estimation period. The expectation of
Jensen's alpha equals zero for passively held portfolios provided the specified factor model
adequately captures the pervasive risk factors underlying the economy.
We employ two alternative factor model specifications in this investigation. The first
model we use is the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model:
(4.1)
where rpt is the one-period (monthly) return on a portfolio of issuing firms in excess of the
one-month Treasury bill, MRt is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio of all
NYSE/ Amex/NASDAQ stocks, 5MBt is the return on a portfolio of small firms minus the
return on a portfolio of large firms, HMLt is the return on a portfolio of firms with high
book-to-market values minus the return on a portfolio of firms with low book-to-market
values, and the slope coefficients (3pj represent portfolio p's exposures to each of the three
risk factors (p's systematic risks). The constant term a: is port.olio p's Jensen's alpha, i.e.,
the monthly average abnormal performance over the estimation period. Equation (4.1) is
estimated over the 1963-1988 period.
Second, we estimate Jensen's alpha using the K-factor model (from equation (3.8) in
chapter 3):
(4.2)
where ru and Tmt are asset return and returns on factor mimicking portfolios in excess of
the return on the risk free asset, the K-vector biDmeasures average factor loadings, the K L-
vector bil is designed to pick up predictable time-variation in factor loadings. As indicated in
chapter 3 and in the introduction to this chapter, the motivation for the conditional model
framework is the growing evidence that expected returns are predictable using publicly
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available information.l/ In the presence of time-varying expected returns, an estimate of
Jensen's alpha derived from an unconditional model is a biased measure ofthe true abnormal
performance, and our conditional factor model estimation represents an attempt to correct
for this bias.
4.3 Sample characteristics and two-day announcement ef-
fects
This section explains the sample selection procedure and provides descriptive statistics of
the issuer sample. We also provide estimates of the two-day announcement effect for the
various security offering categories. At the heart of the" new issues puzzle" is the question of
whether the two-day announcement effect represents an unbiased estimate of the subsequent
long-run performance of the issuing firms' shares.
4.3.1 Sample characteristics
The sample of SEOs used in this paper is drawn from Eckbo and Masulis (1992) with the
addition of the years 1982 and 1983 following a similar sampling process. The sample of
debt offerings are from Eckbo (1986). The two samples reflect the following restrictions:
(l) The common stock of security issuers is listed on either the NYSE or the Amex at
the time of the offering.P Moreover, all issuer stocks are found on the University of
Chicago CRSP monthly stock return file, and all debt issuers are in the 1982 COM-
PUSTAT Annual Industrial (Primary, Secondary, Tertiary, and Historical Research)
files as well. When book-to-market ratios are used, all stock issuers need to have book
equity figures reported by COMPUSTAT.
(2) The issues are publicly announced prior to the offering date. The debt issues are all
announced in the Wall Street Journal Index, while the source of the SEO announce-
ments also includes the Investment Dealer's Digest, Moody's Industrial and Utilities
12Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Evans (1994) argue that time-variation in conditional betas for passive
portfolios is economically and statistically small in the u.S. However. Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that
time-varying betas are important in their measurement of the performance of managed U.S. mutual funds.
Moreover, it is commonly accepted that conditional expected risk premiums tend to vary with economy-wide
factors such as the business cycle.
13More specifically, the stock must be listedbetween the initial announcement date and the public offering
date of the security issue. Approximately half of the industrial offers are by NYSE-listed firms and the other
half by Amex-listed companies. Almost all the utilities are NYSE-listed reflecting their typically large size.
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Manuals, Dow Jones News Retrieval Service, LEXIS, and the SEC Registered Offer-
ings Statistics (ROS) tape.
(3) For debt issuers, all issues are for cash, there are no simultaneous offers of equity
instruments, and overseas issues are excluded. For SEas, there are no simultaneous
offer of debt, preferred stock or warrants. Moreover, combination primary jsecondary
stock oEnrs, canceled or postponed offers, and non-U.S. offers and non-U.S. issuers
are excluded.
(4) All offers permit classification as to the flotation method. Information on the flotation
method is found in offering prospectuses, in the Investment Dealer's Digest's Corpo-
rate Financing Directory, in the "Rights Distributed" section of Moody's Dividend
Record, as well as other Moody's manuals.
The data base further reflects a minimum size restriction on debt issues as well as on the
debt issuer's leverage change. The size restriction eliminates the possibility that the firm's
overall leverage ratio decreases over the year of the debt issue( s):
(5) A debt issuer is included in the sample only in years where the firm increased its book
value of long-term debt by a minimum amount (with no offsetting reduction in short-
term liabilities). The minimum leverage increase is $50 million in 1964 and increases
by 5% a year to $114 million in 1981. Moreover, a debt offering in year t is included
in the sample only if its size is greater than or equal to the minimum leverage increase
for year t.14
This selection procedure produces a total of 1,620 SEas and 707 corporate debt offers
over the period 1963 through 1983. The 1,620 SEas are by 761 separate firms, i.e., an
average of 2.1 SEa per issuer over the observation period. The bond offerings are made by
208 different companies, with an average of 3.4 offerings per firm.
Table 4.1 shows the annual distribution of seasoned public offerings classified by: issuer
type (industrial firm vs. public utility), equity flotation method (preemptive rights vs. firm
commitment underwriting), and debt type (straight vs. convertible). Public utility issuers
represent 51% (830 cases) of the equity issue sample and 35% (249 cases) of the debt issue
sample.IS Utility issuers are examined separatelyas their investment and financing policies
14Eckbo (1986) reports that, in a typical year, the ratio of the number of annual debt issues to the number
of debt retirements by the sample firms is approximately 45 to 2. Overall, one can confidently argue that
the debt offerings in our sample represent leverage-increasing events.
15Utilities are defined as firms with CRSP SIC codes in the interval [4910,4939]. This classification differ
slightly from the one used originally by Eckbo and Masulis (1992).
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Table 4.1
Number of seasoned equity and debt issues by NYSE- and Amex-listed firms
in the sample, 1963-1983
The sample period for Seasoned Equity Offerings is 1963-1983,which is slightly different from the sample
period for debt offerings 1964-1981.The sample only contains issuers with common stock listed on NYSE or
Amex (CRSP share code 10 or 11). Utilities (Uti) are defined as firms with CRSP SIC codes in the interval
[4910,4939].
Seasoned Equity Issues Bond Issues"
Firm-
Rightscommitment Straight Convertible
offers offers" debt offers" debt offers
Year Tot Tot Ind Uti Tot Ind Uti Tot Tot Ind Uti Tot Ind Uti
1963 12 2 2 O 10 7 3
1964 17 8 4 4 9 6 3 5 4 4 O 1 O
1965 20 5 5 O 15 11 4 16 10 3 7 6 4 2
1966 25 12 9 3 13 12 1 29 23 15 8 6 6 O
1967 26 12 9 3 14 11 3 46 31 17 14 15 13 2
1968 44 26 20 6 18 12 6 24 18 9 9 6 5
1969 39 24 13 11 15 7 8 38 33 11 22 5 4 1
1970 49 36 17 19 13 4 9 61 55 34 21 6 6 O
1971 82 63 41 22 19 6 13 50 40 18 22 10 10 O
1972 79 66 27 39 13 3 10 29 28 13 15 1 1 O
1973 56 48 9 39 8 3 5 20 18 7 11 2 2 O
1974 53 47 8 39 6 2 4 54 53 37 16 1 1 O
1975 88 79 22 57 9 1 8 47 46 33 13 1 1 O
1976 92 88 31 57 4 1 3 31 31 24 7 O O O
1977 65 62 4 58 3 O 3 28 28 18 10 O O O
1978 90 86 24 62 4 3 1 35 35 26 9 O O O
1979 85 81 24 57 4 2 2 48 44 29 15 4 4 O
1980 160 155 85 70 5 3 2 69 65 44 21 4 3
1981 151 148 68 80 3 2 1 77 70 48 22 7 7 O
1982 130 130 64 66 O O O
1983 257 257 208 49 O O O
Sum 1620 1435 694 741 185 96 89 707 632 390 242 75 68 7
"This category represents firm-commitment underwritten offerings.
bThis category represents uninsured rights and rights with standby underwriting.
"Straight debt includes non-convertible bonds, notes and debentures.
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are highly regulated. The regulatory policy is public knowledge and thus makes it less likely
that a utility announcing a stock offer is attempting to take advantage of temporary market
overpricing. For example, stock offers often require state utility commission approval or SEC
approval for utility holding companies. In other instances, an equity offer is mandated if a
utility rate increase is to be approved. This further lowers the probability that the utility
is "timing" the equity market.
In the SEO sample, 11% (185 cases) are floated using preemptive rights, while the
remaining issues are sold using firm commitment underwriting. As pointed out by Eckbo
and Masulis (1992), rights offers virtually disappeared during the seventies for large U.S.
corporations. In light of the theoretical and empirical results in that paper, equity rights
offers are examined separately from firm commitment underwritten offerings. In an equity
rights offering, the issuer employs short-term warrants which give current shareholders the
right to purchase the new issue on a pro rata basis. There are two types of rights offers
in our sample: "uninsured rights" where the issuer bears the risk that shareholders do not
fully subscribe to the issue, and "rights with standby underwriting" (or simply" standby
rights") where the issuer insures that any unsubscribed portion of the rights offer is take
up or purchased by an investment bank. In contrast, a firm commitment underwritten offer
does not employ rights, and the investment bank guarantees the sale of the entire issue at
a fixed price.!"
In the debt sample, 11% (75 cases) are convertible debt instruments, while the remaining
are straight debt (non-convertible bonds, notes and debentures}!" Convertible debt issues
are singled out due to their hybrid debt-equity nature. If the probability of market mispric-
ing increases with the idiosyncratic risk of the security, then convertibles rank somewhere
between straight debt and equity in terms of potential adverse selection. The convertibles
are almost exclusively issued by industrial firms (91% or 68 of the 75 cases). In addition
to the 75 convertibles, there are 632 issues of straight debt, of which 189 are mortgage
bonds (173 issued by public utilities). As reported by Eckbo (1986), the sample captures
on average 68% of all announced offerings made by the sample firms during the 18-year
sample period and, due to the minimum offer size requirement, a much greater proportion
of the total dollar amount raised through new public debt offers.
16Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report that direct flotation costs for industrial issuers average 6%, 4%, and
1% of the offering proceeds for firm commitment offers, standbys and uninsured rights offers, respectively.
See also Eckbo and Masulis (1995).
17Lewis and Seward (1997) observe an increased use of convertibles in the 1980s, following our sample
period.
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Table 4.2
Descriptive statistics of U.S. equity and debt issuers, 1963-1983
Seasoned Equity Offerings Bond Offerings"
Firm-
commitment Rights Straight Convertible
Tot Ind Uti Ind Uti Tot Ind Uti Ind Uti
Number of 1609 687 739 94 89 707 390 242 68 7observations b
Amount offered
($ millions) 48 44 48 80 49 158 194 113 118 85
Market value of
equity ($ millions) 664 713 554 1203 625 3285 4867 1237 1720 1090
Amount offered divided
by market value of equity 0.16 0.21 0.12 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.10
Proportion of offers
intended for 0.42 0.53 0.11 0.56 0.59 0.38 0.27 0.48 0.41 0.29
capital investments
Book-to-market 0.81 0.62 0.99 0.75 0.74 0.81 0.86 0.82 0.50 0.55
ratio c (1333) (564) (638) (42) (89) (636) (354) (219) (57) (6)
"Public offers of debt are sold by firm commitment underwriting contracts.
bThe stated purpose of the equity offerings was to reduce debt in 426 cases, to fund capital expenditures
in 219 cases, and both to reduce debt and fund capital expenditures in 587 cases. The remaining equity
offerings could not be classified. The stated purpose of the debt offering was to reduce debt in 390 cases and
to fund capital expenditures in 216 cases. The remaining debt offerings could not be classified.
"The source of this information is COMPUSTAT. The numbers in parentheses are sample sizes for the
book-to-market ratio, which are lower than the total number of observations due to missing COMPUSTAT
book values.
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Table 4.2 lists sample statistics describing issue frequencies, issuer equity capitalization
(size), the frequency with which the issues are intended to finance investments (as reported
in the Wall Street Journal), and the book-to-market ratio. The average debt issue is typical-
ly three times the average SE~, causing approximately a 16% increase in equity and a 13%
increase in debt. The average book-to-market ratio ranges from 0.50 for convertible debt
issuers to 0.86 for industrial issuers of straight debt. For SEOs, the average book-to-market
ratio ranges from 0.62 for firm commitment offers by industrials to 0.99 for firm commit-
ment offerings by utilities. In the debt sample, the Wall Street Journal announcements
indicate that the proceeds of 216 issues are earmarked for capital expenditure (investment)
programs, another 390 issues are made to refund old debt, while the remaining 101 offerings
lack information to classify them. In the SE~ sample, the proceeds of 806 issues are used
to finance capital expenditures and investments, 426 are used to finance debt reductions,
while 388 offers cannot be classified.
4.3.2 Average two-day announcement effects
Eckbo (1986) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) report two-day announcement effects for the
debt and most of the equity issues in our sample. Both papers use a market model regression
of the type
(4.3)
where ru and Fmt. denote the continuously compounded daily rates of return to issuer i
and the value weighted market portfolio of all NYSE/ Amex/NASDAQ stocks, fit is a mean
zero error term, and dt is a dummy variable which takes on a value of one during the two-
day event period [day -1, day O] and zero otherwise. Thus, the parameter "fi measures
the average daily announcement-induced abnormal return for stock i, so that the two-day
abnormal return equals 2"fi.
Table 4.3 lists the average values of the two-day announcement effect, (2/N) I:~l"fi,
reestimated for various subsamples of SEOs and debt offerings of size N. The estimation
period is one year (252 trading days) on each side of the two day announcement period,
starting on trading day -253. The table also reports the test statistic
N
z = (l;'/N) 2)1'j/a,,;),
i=l
(4.4)
where the "hat" denotes an OLS estimate and a"i is the estimated standard error of 1'i.
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Table 4.3
Average pre-announcement date run-up and announcement-day abnormal
returns to NYSE- and Amex-Iisted issuers of seasoned equity and debt, using
a market model as the returns benchmark, 1963-1983
One year run-up and announcement day abnormal returns for issuer i are computed using the following
market model:
2
Tit = Oi + /3iTmt + L "fijd)t + E,t,
j=1
where Tit is dailyexcess return on issuer i, Tmt is dailyexcess return on a value weighted market portfolio
of all NYSE-, Amex-, and NASDAQ-listed firms. The estimation period is a total of two years, starting
on trading day -253 relative to the announcement date and ending on trading day +253 relative to the
announcement date. The dummy variable dlt takes on a value of one on trading days -253 through -2. The
dummy variable dz« takes on a value of one in a two-day window starting the day before the announcement
day. The percentage abnormal return for the 252-day run-up period is 252 x "fil x 100, and the abnormal
return over the two-day announcement window is 2 x "fi2 X 100. Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal
return, the following test statistic converge in distribution to the standard normal
IN.
'"' "fijZj = r;;; L -'-.."
vN i=1 (1'j
Where "Yij is the OLS estimate of "fij, and fTij is the standard error of this estimate. Returns are continuously
compounded. The parentheses contain number of observations and p-values. The p-values are for two-sided
tests.
Seasoned Equity Offerings
Firm- Standby Uninsured
commitment rights rights
Bond Offerings
Straight Convertible
(a) Industrial issuers
One-year 37.6 20.4 7.3
runup (687; .000) (46; .005) (50; .133)
Two-day announce- -2.3 -1.9 -0.8
ment return (687; .000) (46; .000) (50; .238)
(b) Utility issuers
One-year 2.0 2.2 -6.3
runup (729; .006) (84; .285) (5; .595)
Two-day announce- -0.5 -1.1 -0.2
ment return (729; .000) (84; .000) (5; .790)
5.3
(390; .003)
-0.0
(390; .810)
20.6
(68; .000)
-1.1
(68; .000)
-1.2
(242; .674)
-0.0
(242; .960)
17.2
(7; .055)
-0.1
(7; .640)
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Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return, z is approximately standard normal for
large samples.
Table 4.3 summarizes several stylized facts about the market reaction to seasoned secu-
rity offerings. First, the average market reaction to firm commitment SEOs is significantly
negative (-2.3% for industrial issuers and -0.5% for utility issuers). Second, the market
reaction is significantly negative but smaller for rights offers with standby underwriting
(-1.9% for industrials and -1.1% for utilities), and insignificantly different from zero for
uninsured rights. The relative magnitude of the market reaction across flotation methods
is predicted by the adverse selection model of Eckbo and Masulis (1992).18 Moreover, the
generally smaller reaction to utility issuers is also consistent with the lower adverse selection
risk for this issuer category.
Third, the average market reaction to convertible debt offerings is significantly negative
(-1.1 %) while the reaction to straight debt offerings is insignificantly different from zero.
Thus, there is an inverse relationship between the idiosyncratic risk of the security issued
and the market reaction to the issue-announcement. As pointed out by earlier studies, this
result conforms to the predictions of the Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection model
and the Myers (1984) pecking order hypothesis.
Alternatively, the Loughran-Ritter 'new issues puzzle' suggests that the market sys-
tematically underreacts to security offering announcements. The underreaction hypothesis
does not predict the differences in market reactions across security types, issuer types and
flotation methods shown in Table 4.3. The rest of this paper is devoted to the question of
whether the security offering categories listed in Table 4.1 are systematically followed by
negative long-ru.. abnormal performance, as suggested by the u.iderreaction hypothesis.
4.4 Performance estimates using the matching procedure
4.4.1 Sample-wide averages
We begin our estimation using the particular matching firm procedure in Loughran and
Ritter (1995). For the sample period 1970 to 1990, Loughran-Ritter report an average
five-year holding period return of 33.4% for seasoned equity offerings by industrial firms.
The average size-matched control firm yields 92.8% over the same five-year holding period,
indicating a 59.4% underperformance by industrial SEOs. The first row of panel (a) of Table
4.4 reports our corresponding numbers. The average five-year holding period return for
1BSeealso Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) for further evidence on this model.
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industrial issuers is 52.1%, and for the size-matched control sample it is 84.3%, representing
32.2% underperformance by issuing firms. Thus, using the size-matching procedure, we
obtain results qualitatively similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-
Graves (1995) in our observation period.
In panel (a) of Table 4.4 where we replicate the Loughran-Ritter procedure, a matching
firm is selected from a list of size-ranked firms generated in December ~rior to the year
of the issue. If a matched firm delists or itself becomes an issuing firm some time during
the five-year holding period, the firm is replaced by another match from the original list.
To illustrate, suppose that a matching firm delists four years into the return cumulation,
and that the initial equity capitalization of the issuer was $100 million. According to this
procedure, a new match with a size of $100 million is selected from the original list. This,
of course, does not ensure that the issuing firm and the new match have the same size four
years later, at the time of the rematch. In panel (b) of Table 4.4, we ensure a similar size
match by the following modification to the sampling procedure: Whenever there is a need
to replace a matching firm, the new match is selected using information in the month prior
to the replacement month, constraining the size of the matching firm to equal (or be as
close as possible to) that of the issuer in that month. Furthermore, the initial matching
firm is selected in the month prior to the month of the issue. As shown in panel (b), these
changes reduce the average long-run buy-and-hold return to matching firms by 6.4% (from
84.3% to 77.9%), with a corresponding reduction in the negative long-run abnormal return
to issuing firms.
Comparing the industrial issues in the first rows ofpanels (a) and (b) of 4.4, only 6.7% of
the matching firm samples used in the two panels overlap. This lack of overlap is primarily
driven by changing the month of the initial matching process from the calendar year-end
prior to the issue in panel (a) to the month-end prior to the issue in panel (b). Of the
782 industrial equity issuers in the first row of panel (a), 576 require no rematches over
the five-year holding period, 176 have a single rematch, 34 have two rematches, and 5 have
three rematches over the period.l'' Alternatively, one could perform a systematic monthly
rematching of all issuing firms for the entire five-year holding period. Such a procedure,
which is likely to generate substantially greater differences than those implied by panels (a)
and (b) is close in spirit to our conditional factor model approach described below and is
therefore not included here.
Table 4.4 also shows the effect of using a five-year pre-event return requirement in the
19There is a similar frequency of rematches for the issues in panel (b).
54 CHAPTER 4. SEO PERFORMANCE: THE U.S. EVIDENCW
Table 4.4
Five-year buy-and-hold returns (%) to firms undertaking seasoned public
offerings on the NYSE and Amex, and their matched control sample,
1963-1983
The matches are chosen using size- and book-to-market matching. The size-matching is done using the equity
market value of the issuer. Book-to-market matching is done by first selecting all companies that have an
equity market value within 30% of that of the issuer. Then the company with the closest book-to-market
value is chosen as the matching firm. Monthly book-to-market rankings in year t are created by dividing
the end-of-year book-value from year t - 1 with monthly market capitalizations for year t. The pre-event
return requirement means that a match is required to have a five-year return history on CRSP prior to the
announcement date. Numbers in the columns marked "issuer" and "match" are computed using:
1 N [Ti ]
N {; I!.(1 + Rid - 1 x 100
The p-values in the column marked p(t) are p-values of the t-statistic using a two-sided test of no difference
in average five-year buy-and-hold return for issuer and matching firms. The p-values in the column marked
p(N) are bootstrapped p-values of a two-sided test.
Matching
procedure
Seasoned Equity Offerings Bond Offerings
Industry N Issuer Match p(t) p(N) N Issuer Match p(t) p(N)
(a) Match drawn from year-end-ranking prior to the first year of return cumulation
Size and pre-event Ind 782 52.1 84.3 .000 .000 453 36.5 38.8 .652 .511
return requirement Uti 805 33.4 41.7 .017 .038 220 26.0 26.2 .968 .868
Size but no pre-event Ind 782 52.1 82.5 .000 .000 453 36.5 39.3 .601 .816
return requirement Uti 827 32.5 37.6 .131 .118 247 23.7 22.9 .883 .939
Size, book-to-market, Ind 595 49.0 56.7 .287 .520 371 38.4 43.5 .382 .592and pre-event return
Uti 697 33.9 48.8 .000 .003 194 24.4 28.5 .475 .908requirement
Size, book-to-market, Ind 605 48.2 60.7 .088 .251 395 36.6 41.8 .342 .677but no pre-event return
Uti 718 32.9 46.0 .000 .010 216 21.7 24.8 .557 .968requirement
(b) Match drawn from month-end-ranking prior to the first month of return cumulation
Size and pre-event Ind 790 51.3 77.9 .000 .005 453 36.5 40.5 .452 .483
return requirement Uti 806 33.3 46.2 .000 .017 220 25.9 24.5 .799 .991
Size but no pre-event Ind 790 51.3 77.4 .000 .012 453 36.5 38.6 .692 .903
return requirement Uti 828 32.4 42.8 .003 .043 247 23.6 21.8 .705 .947
Size, book-to-market, Ind 609 47.2 55.1 .237 .578 391 36.8 39.3 .662 .849and pre-event return
Uti 703 33.8 51.0 .000 .002 195 25.6 31.6 .353 .295requirement
Size, book-to-market, Ind 610 47.3 56.0 .203 .504 404 35.7 39.5 .482 .862but no pre-event return
Uti 724 32.8 49.1 .000 .000 217 22.8 27.9 .382 .389requirement
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selection of matching firms.2o The five-year listing requirement (which is implemented
by both Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and AfHeck-Graves (1995)) builds in a
survivorship bias in the matched sample which, according to the simulations in Kothari
and Warner (1997) and Barber and Lyon (1997), can induce an underperformance effect
in the issuer returns of approximately 4% for a 3-year holding period. However, the effect
appears to be much smaller in our sample. For example, comparing rows one and three
in column five of panel (b), the effect of the five-year prelisting requirements for matching
firms is to reduce the buy-and-hold return by only 0.5% for industrial firms.
We next modify the matching procedure by selecting matching firms based on both size
and book-to-market ratio. Without the five-year pre-event return requirement and using
size and book to market ratios from the month prior to the first month of return cumulation,
the average difference in size between industrial SEO issuers and their matching firms is
1.37%. The average difference in book-to-market ratios is 2.93%.21 When using only size
matching the corresponding numbers are 0.5% and 227%.22 These numbers indicate that
it is the book-to-market ratio that is the binding constraint in the size and book-to-market
matching procedure. Comparing the third and fourth rows of panel (b) in Table 4.4 with the
last two rows of the same panel, we see that 180 industrials and 104 utilities are excluded
from the sample due to missing COMPUSTAT equity book values. To ensure that our
bootstrapped p-values are unbiased when we match on size- and book-to-market ratios, all
stock returns on the CRSP tape with missing book-values are excluded.
Without the five-year pre-event return requirement, the average five-year buy-and-hold
return for industrial SEOs is 47.3%, while the average return for the size- and book-to-
market matched control firms is 56.0%. The difference, 8.7 percentage points, is not sig-
nificantly different from zero using either a standard t-test or the bootstrapped p-values
(neither using a one-sided nor a two-sided test).23 This result differs from the results of
20Loughran and Ritter (1995) require issuing firms to have at least a five-year history of returns on CRSP.
There is no such prior return history requirement in our sample of issuers.
21The issuers have larger market capitalization than their matching firms in 52% of the cases. Issuers have
larger book-to-market ratios than the matching firms in 49% of the cases.
22The huge average percentage difference in book-to-market ratio is caused by a few outliers. The most
extreme case is an issuer with a book-to-market ratio of 0.01 while the matching firm has a book-to-market
ratio of 1.47. The average book-to-market ratio for issuers when matching firms are selected based on size
only is 0.52 and for matching firms 0.88.
23The bootstrapped p-values reported in Table 4.4 are for the hypothesis that the sample mean is equal to
the mean of the empirical distribution, {L, against the alternative hypothesis that sample mean is different
from {L. That is, we employ a two-sided test. Given an observed sample mean of BH, the two-sided p-
value is one minus the probabilitymass between BH and 2{L - BH. One-sided p-values for the alternative
hypothesis that five-year buy-and-hold returns for issuers are less than for matching firms are constructed
as the probability mass below BH. The empirical distributions are roughly symmetric, and for distributions
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the existing literature. Loughran and Ritter (1995) control for book-to-market effects us-
ing cross sectional- and time series regressions. They identify a book-to-market effect in
returns. However, it does not eliminate their estimates of SEO underperformance. Spiess
and Affleck-Graves (1995) control for the book-to-market effect using a method somewhat
similar to the one used here.24 Although they do not report the buy-and-hold returns based
on size- and book-to-market matching, they state that the results are similar to size- and
industry based returns which they report to be on average 55.7% for SEOs and 98.1% for
the average matching firm. Using a standard t-test, the difference of -42.4% is significantly
different from zero.
The long-run performance literature employ samples which exclude regulated utilities.
Interestingly, as shown in the last row of Table 4.4, utility SEOs underperform size- and
book-to-market matched firms by a statistically significant 16.3 percentage points, which
is almost twice the 8.7% underperformance estimated for industrial issuers. This result
should be evaluated in light of the fact that there is a difference in the quality of the
matching procedure for utilities and industrials. The difference arises because utilities are
both relatively high frequency equity issuers and they represent a small proportion of all
NYSE-j Amex listed firms. As a result, a small number of utilities are sampled frequently as
matching firms, which exposes the portfolio of matching firms to excessive non-systematic
risk.25 Moreover, utility issuers and their matches tend to exhibit a greater disparity (in
term of size and book-to-market ratio) relative to the industrial issuers and their matches.P"
Table 4.4 also reports the long-run performance of firms that issue debt. Again using
size- and book-to-market matching and no pre-event return requirements, the average in-
dustrial debt issuer has a five-year buy-and-hold return of 35.7%, which is 3.8% lower than
the 39.5% return to the average matching control firm. The corresponding numbers for
utilities are 22.8% and 27.9%, respectively, i.e., an underperformance of 5.1%. These levels
of underperformance are significantly different from zero at 10% significance level using a
t-test, but are insignificant at conventionallevels when we use the more appropriate boot-
using many observations, centered close to zero. Thus, one-sided p-values are about half their two-sided
counterparts. The one-sided p-value for the hypothesis that -8.7% is less than the mean of the empirical
distribution is 0.257.
24Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) choose the matching firm that minimize the sum of the absolute
percentage difference between sizes and book-to-market values.
25To illustrate, in order to generate the set of matching firms for the 724 utility issues in the last row
of Table 4.4, we need a total of 929 matching firms (due to deJistings or equity issues by matching firms).
This set of 929 matching firms turns out to contain only 118 different utilities, or 13%. The corresponding
percentage of different matching firms used for industrial issuers is 77%.
26This concern favors the use of a factor model as return benchmark for the estimation of long-run
abnormal returns for the sample of utility issuers.
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strapped p-values. Note that Table 4.4 shows that p-values based on the t-statistic tend to
overstate the level of statistical significance compared to the bootstrapped p-values. Thus,
our inferences are primarily based on the bootstrapped p-values.27
Table 4.5 shows the means of the five-year abnormal returns for SE~ and bond offer
samples, grouped on an annual basis. The annual p-values are constructed by simulating the
empirical distribution of average long-run abnormal performance using the same number
of stocks as contained in our issuer samples for a given year. For example, there are 181
industrial SEOs in our sample for 1983. To construct the empirical distribution for SEOs
in 1983, we draw (with replacement) 1000 samples of 181 stocks. For each firm in each of
the 1000 samples, we select a size- and book-to-market matched control firm and compute
the post-1983 five year abnormal stock performance level. Finally, an average abnormal
performance level is computed over the 181 stocks in each sample. This generate the
empirical distribution of five-year abnormal buy-and-hold returns.
The annual p-values for SEOs show that the performance of industrial issuers are indis-
tinguishable from the performance of the control firms in all but two years (1969 and 1971)
and we expect on average to find one significant case in twenty by chance. For utilities,
we see that the underperformance documented in Table 4.4 is concentrated in the second
half of the sample period. The average abnormal performance of utility SEOs is -23.8%
over the 1975-1983 period. The pattern for bond offerings is much the same as that for
industrial SEOs. With the exception of utilities in 1981, neither industrial nor utility debt
issuers exhibit abnormal performance in any of the years.
4.4.2 Subsample results
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show long-run abnormal returns for SEOs and bond offerings classified
by flotation method and security type. Table 4.6 reports the long-run abnormal returns for
firm-commitment underwritten offerings and rights offerings of common stock for industrials
and utilities. Interestingly, although the abnormal returns in Table 4.6 are computed relative
to size- and book-to-market matched control firms, panel (a) shows a mean one-year pre-
announcement stock price run-up that is similar to the run-up documented in Table 4.3.
The mean one-year stock price run-up for industrial issuers is 28.1% for firm-commitment
underwritten offerings and and 8.8% for pure rights and standby offerings, where the latter
is indistinguishable from zero based on conventional t-values.
27In the contextof buy-and-holdabnormal returns, Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon, Barber and Tsai
(1999) provide substantial evidence that bootstrapped p-values have better power than p-values based on
conventional t-statistics.
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Table 4.5
Annual means of five-year abnormal returns (%) to firms undertaking
seasoned public offerings on the NYSE and Amex, using matching firm
returns as the returns benchmark, 1963-1983
Abnormal returns for SEOs and public debt offerings classified as industrials and utilities. The abnormal
returns are the difference between the five-year buy-and-hold returns for issuers and matching firms, denoted
BH. The matching firms are chosen using size and book-to-market matching and without the five-year pre-
event return requirement. The size and book-to-market rankings are from the month prior to the start date
of return cumulation. The figures reported below are for BH x 100, where
IN 1N[T; Ti ]
EH = N f;BHi = Nf; I!i(l+ Rit)- II(l + R7t')
Numbers in parentheses are bootstrapped p-values for a two-sided test of the hypothesis that BH equals
the mean of the empirical distribution.
Seasoned Equity Offerings Bond Offerings
Year N Industrials N Utilities N Industrials N Utilities
1963 3 46.2 (.774) 3 -13.6 (.622)
1964 3 4.9 (.906) 6 7.0 (.460) 3 10.9 (.925) O
1965 4 -23.2 (.695) 4 -2.4 (.841) 7 15.1 (.991) 7 1.7 (.868)
1966 9 -31.8 (.552) 4 -4.0 (.840) 7 -0.3 (.937) 7 -0.9 (.811)
1967 8 -31.0 (.521) 5 2.8 (.754) 20 -31.9 (.398) 13 1.0 (.599)
1968 21 -7.9 (.730) 12 -12.9 (.162) 14 2.7 (.963) 8 -1.3 (.930)
1969 16 -44.9 (.040) 18 11.5 (.193) 15 29.2 (.184) 21 -4.0 (.497)
1970 18 -12.8 (.524) 28 -3.8 (.446) 40 -6.8 (.624) 20 1.1 (.653)
1971 38 -59.4 (.000) 32 7.1 (.246) 26 -4.2 (.982) 21 -4.6 (.770)
1972 25 10.5 (.601) 46 -2.8 (.601) 12 -11.7 (.804) 13 -5.8 (.978)
1973 11 14.8 (.730) 41 -8.0 (.280) 9 -15.9 (.694) 11 7.3 (.465)
1974 7 27.1 (.711) 39 0.7 (.940) 37 14.1 (.735) 16 10.5 (.462)
1975 20 14.7 (.805) 63 -13.6 (.201) 32 3.6 (.807) 12 2.5 (.857)
1976 27 9.0 (.865) 53 -22.2 (.042) 22 -6.6 (.773) 5 18.9 (.426)
1977 3 -30.9 (.659) 51 -11.4 (.134) 17 -17.4 (.777) 9 -7.1 (.589)
1978 23 -44.8 (.647) 56 -21.1 (.078) 24 -45.1 (.566) 8 -7.7 (.371)
1979 19 -31.1 (.585) 47 -31.2 (.007) 29 -16.5 (.800) 12 -17.5 (.320)
1980 71 -18.5 (.604) 59 -29.5 (.006) 42 3.2 (.861) 17 4.4 (.938)
1981 54 -0.2 (.991) 63 -24.0 (.168) 48 8.0 (.957) 17 -58.6 (.125)
1982 49 31.0 (.276) 54 -22.2 (.196)
1983 181 -6.1 (.648) 40 -46.8 (.031)
1963 -74 163 -19.8 (.127) 238 -1.1 (.719) 190 -0.9 (.972) 137 0.2 (.663)
1975 -83 447 -4.7 (.876) 486 -23.8 (.000) 214 -6.4 (.828) 80 -14.1 (.222)
1963 -83 610 -8.7 (.534) 724 -16.4 (.003) 404 -3.8 (.862) 217 -5.1 (.389)
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Table 4.6
Mean long-run abnormal returns (%) for seasoned equity issuers classified by
issuer type (industrials/utilities) and flotation method (firm commitment vs.
rights offers), using matching firm returns as the returns benchmark,
1963-1983
The matches are chosen using size- and book-to-market matching and without the five-year pre-event return
requirement. The size-matching is done using the equity market value of the issuer. Book-to-market matching
is done by first selecting all companies that have an equity market value within 30% of that of the issuer. The
company with the closest book-to-market value is chosen as the matching firm. The size rankings are from
the month-end prior to the start date of return cumulation. The figures reported below are for BH x 100,
where
IN 1N[Ti Ti ]
BH = N ~ BH, = N ~ II (1+ R,t) - I!i(1+ R7!)
Numbers in parentheses are number of observations and p-values derived from t-statistics. The p-values are
for a two-sided test of the hypothesis that BH equals zero.
-Period
[a ± months]"
Industrials
Firm-
commitment Rights
Utilities
Firm-
commitment Rights
(a) 12-months performance intervals during five years prior to issue announcement
[a - 60, a - 49]
[a - 48, a - 37]
[a - 36,a - 25]
[a - 24, a - 13]
[a - 12, a-I]
-1.37 (459; .697)
-4.19 (486; .233)
-1.10 (513; .738)
2.29 (539; .332)
28.11 (569; .000)
1.48 (26; .890)
-1.22 (30; .953)
0.55 (36; .934)
-2.38 (36; .688)
8.77 (41; .289)
-4.47 (578; .000)
-7.96 (597; .000)
-6.48 (620; .000)
-3.00 (629; .001)
-1.79 (636; .082)
-3.33 (75; .026)
-3.70 (76; .039)
-4.32 (80; .009)
-2.39 (85; .138)
-2.56 (88; .193)
(b) 12-months performance intervals during five years after issue announcement
[a,a + 11]
[a + 12, a + 23]
[a + 24, a + 35]
[a + 36, a + 47]
[a + 48, a + 59]
1.08 (569; .668)
-4.61 (522; .047)
-2.67 (474; .353)
-1.40 (430; .597)
1.62 (404; .547)
-2.54 (41; .670)
4.77 (40; .414)
-13.67 (38; .044)
-3.40 (33; .615)
11.45 (29; .362)
(c) One-year to five-year performance intervals
[a,a+11]
[a,a + 23]
[a,a + 35]
[a,a+47]
[a,a + 59]
1.08 (569; .668)
-2.23 (569; .505)
-8.45 (569; .104)
-9.71 (569; .112)
-8.70 (569; .192)
-2.54 (41; .670)
-0.26 (41; .978)
-14.14 (41; .286)
-12.18 (41; .322)
-9.13 (41; .611)
-5.69 (636; .000)
-5.36 (356; .000)
-2.67 (213; .146)
-3.34 (152; .133)
-1.23 (132; .585)
-5.69 (636; .000)
-9.76 (636; .000)
-12.54 (636; .000)
-14.85 (636; .000)
-17.50 (636; .000)
-0.20 (88; .890)
-4.03 (68; .067)
-3.60 (34; .484)
-0.94 (25; .884)
7.25 (16; .072)
-0.20 (88; .890)
-3.67 (88; .081)
-5.19 (88; .101)
-7.48 (88; .168)
-8.20 (88; .266)
"a is the announcement month of an issue.
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Table 4.7
Mean long-run abnormal returns (%) to public debt issuers classified by issuer
type (Industrials /uttlities] and flotation method (straight/convertible), using
matching firm returns as the returns benchmark, 1964-1981
The matches are chosen using size- and book-to-market matching and without the five-year pre-event return
requirement. The size-matching is done using the equity market value of the issuer. Book-to-market matching
is done by first selecting all companies that have an equity market value within 30% of that of the issuer. The
company with the closest book-to-market value is chosen as the matching firm. The size rankings are from
the month-end prior to the start date of return cumulation. The figures reported below are for BH x 100,
where
IN 1N(Ti Ti ]
BH = N 8 BHi = N 8 I!i(1+ Rid - II (1+ R'!:)
Numbers in parentheses are number of observations and p-values derived from t-statistics. The p-values are
for a two-sided test of the hypothesis that BH equals zero.
Period
[a ± months]"
Industrials Utilities
Straight Straight
-2.48 (328; .191)
-6.55 (335; .000)
-1.95 (339; .273)
-0.14 (346; .944)
0.22 (347; .910)
-2.78 (347; .114)
-2.98 (244; .180)
3.54 (207; .145)
1.86 (183; .442)
-1.00 (163; .728)
-2.78 (347; .114)
-4.72 (347; .063)
-3.48 (347; .243)
-1.42 (347; .698)
-1.70 (347; .706)
Convertible
(a) 12-months performance intervals during five years prior to issue announcement
-0.89 (45; .857)
10.37 (50; .023)
9.08 (55; .185)
5.92 (57; .230)
7.25 (57; .214)
0.03 (194; .977)
-2.74 (202; .008)
-0.72 (209; .477)
-2.47 (211; .015)
-1.71 (211; .098)
[a - 60, a - 49]
[a - 48,a - 37]
[a - 36, a - 25]
[a - 24,a -13]
[a - 12, a-l]
(b) 12-months performance intervals during five years after issue announcement
[a,a + 11]
[a + 12, a + 23]
[a + 24, a + 35]
[a + 36, a + 47]
[a + 48, a + 59]
-6.12 (57; .137)
-8.85 (47; .105)
-9.40 (40; .154)
0.97 (32; .894)
2.08 (29; .830)
-0.87 (211; .391)
1.01 (102; .621)
-7.08 (68; .006)
1.12 (51; .732)
3.29 (45; .376)
(c) One-year to five-year performance intervals
[a,a + 11]
[a,a + 23]
[a,a + 35]
[a,a + 47]
[a,a + 59]
-6.12 (57; .137)
-15.92 (57; .022)
-17.01 (57; .067)
-19.26 (57; .059)
-16.57 (57; .119)
-0.87 (211; .391)
-0.47 (211; .702)
-3.27 (211; .075)
-4.66 (211; .053)
-4.67 (211; .097)
"a is the announcement month of an issue.
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Panel (a) also documents that utilities making SEOs using a firm commitment under-
writing performed negatively relative to the control firms in each of the five years prior to the
issue announcement. While statistically significant, the magnitude of the underperformance
is relatively small, ranging from -7.96% to -1.79%. Moreover, the underperformance con-
tinues in the three to four years after the offering date (see panel (b)), resulting in the
overall underperformance of 17.5% (panel (c), last row), consistent with thp f''1rlier tables.
Table 4.7 classifies the long-run performance following bond offerings by whether the
debt is straight or convertible. As was shown earlier in Table 4.3, panel (a) shows that
industrial issuers of convertible debt are associated with a stock price run-up prior to the
announcement, while there is no prior run-up for straight debt issuers. More important-
ly, shifting focus to industrial issuers, panels (b) and (c) fail to indicate any abnormal
performance for straight debt offerings on any of the one-to-five-year horizons. However,
convertible debt issuers exhibit more negative performance, showing statistically significant
(at the 5% level) two-year stock return underperformance. This result differs from that of
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1996). Using a later sample period, they report that firms mak-
ing debt offerings where straight and convertibles are combined underperform relative to a
set of size- and book-to-market matched control firms. Their results appear to be driven
by the convertible issues, which are more prevalent in recent years.
In order to determine whether the lack of underperformance in our sample of issuing
firms is caused by a confounding effect between size or book-to-market groups, Table 4.8
reports abnormal performance for size and book-to-market quartiles. The table provides no
indication that our overall sample results "hide" significant abnormal performance in any
of the size or book-to-market quartiles. For industrial issuers, none of the quartiles show
significant performance at the 5% level or better. Moreover, utility issuers underperform
the matching firms in all the quartiles.
4.5 Performance estimates using factor models
In this section we present results from tests of abnormal long-run performance using the
two alternative multifactor asset pricing models explained in section 2.
4.5.1 Construction of portfolio returns
The dependent variables in the factor model regressions are the monthly returns to equal-
and value-weighted portfolios of security issuers, respectively. To illustrate, the value-
weighted industrial SEO portfolio is constructed as follows: Invest one dollar in the first
62 CHAPTER 4. SEO PERFORMANCE: THE U.S. EVIDENCFJt
Table 4.8
Mean five-year buy-and-hold returns (%) in size and book-to-market quartiles
for issuers of seasoned equity offerings and their matching firms on the NYSE
and Amex, 1963-1983
The matching firms are selected to have similar size and book-to-market ratios. The size and book-to-market
rankings are from the month prior to the start of the return cumulation. Monthly book-to-market rankings in
year t are created by dividing the end-of-year book-value from year t -1 with monthly market capitalizations
for year t. The p-values are computed using the t-statistic for the stock return difference between issuer and
matching firm. The buy-and-hold returns are computed using:
1 N [Ti ]
N {; II(1+ Rit) - 1 x 100
The p-values in the column marked p(t) are p-values of the t-statistic using a two-sided test of no difference
in average five-year buy-and-hold return for issuer and matching firms.
Industrial issuers Utility issuers
Issuer- Issuer-
Quartile" N Issuer Match Match p(t) N Issuer Match Match p(t)
(a) Size-quartiles
Q1 28 -8.9 15.7 -24.6 .358 66 55.9 66.8 -10.9 .235
Q2 105 46.0 39.7 6.3 .695 155 42.9 62.4 -19.5 .000
Q3 198 49.2 52.3 -3.1 .776 232 32.1 50.4 -18.3 .000
Q4 279 52.0 68.7 -16.7 .073 271 21.9 36.2 -14.3 .000
(b) Book-to-market-quartiles
Q1 305 42.5 42.3 0.2 .979 155 29.6 44.3 -14.6 .007
Q2 175 48.0 71.2 -23.2 .072 199 28.7 51.0 -22.2 .000
Q3 99 54.9 67.1 -12.2 .371 195 39.5 55.3 -15.8 .000
Q4 31 65.1 69.3 -4.2 .857 175 32.6 44.6 -11.9 .002
aQ1 is the quartile with smallest firms and lowest book-to-market ratios, Q4 is the quartile with largest
firms and highest book-to-market ratios.
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industrial firm's stock that announces a seasoned equity offering. At the beginning of the
first month after the second equity announcement, the portfolio is rebalanced to include
the new company using current value-weights. This process is continued as additional firms
issue securities, until the first firm reaches its five-year anniversary or an issuing firm's stock
in the portfolio is delisted, at which point it is removed and the portfolio is again rebalanced
using value-weights.
There is a total of eight such "issuer portfolios" when classified by security type (eq-
uity/debt issue) and issuer type (industrial/utility). Similarly, we construct eight "match-
portfolios" using the corresponding set of size- and book-to-market matched firms identified
in the preceding analysis, and eight "zero-investment portfolios" where the issuer-portfolio
is sold short to finance a long position in the match-portfolio.
Table 4.9, Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show the raw returns to portfolios of industrial
firms making SEOs (Table 4.9 and Figure 4.1) and bond offerings (Figure 4.2). Referring
to the figures, notice that it makes a difference whether the portfolios are value-weighted or
equally-weighted. With equal-weights the raw return on issuer and match portfolios move
together closely, while with value-weights there are more pronounced differences between the
pairs of portfolios. Moreover, returns to the equally-weighted issuer and match portfolios
substantially underperform relative to the returns on the equally weighted market index,
while the value-weighted issuer and match portfolios outperform the value-weighted market
index (except for early in the observation period). As shown in Table 4.9, over the total
sample period, the average equal-weighted five-year stock return for issuers is 5.1 percent less
than the average five-year stork return for the control sample of matches. This relationship
changes with value-weights, where issuers outperform matching firms by 4.5 percent. It is
noteworthy that the underperformance is more severe in the earlier 1963-74 subperiod for
both equal weighted and value weighted portfolios.e''
4.5.2 Risk factors and information variables
The Fama and French (1993) model contains three risk factors. The stock market risk
factor is the return difference between the value-weighted CRSP-index of all NYSE, Amex
and NASDAQ firms and the return on a l-month Treasury bill, while the other two (SMB
and HML) are the returns on zero-investment portfolios. Motivated by the cross-sectional
relationship between returns and size (market capitalization) and book-to-market ratio,
the 5MB and HML portfolios are constructed to be a "size" factor and a "book-to-market"
28There is actually overperformance for the issuer value weighted portfolio in the 1975-1983 period.
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Table 4.9
Mean buy-and-hold returns (%) over five-year intervals for industrial issuers
of seasoned equity classified by portfolio weighting (equal- and value-weights)
The matching firms are chosen using size- and book-to-market matching and without the five-year pre-event
return requirement. The portfolio return in month t is w;Rt, where Wt is the vector of weights and R, is
the vector of monthly raw returns. The buy-and-hold return in a five-year subperiod starting in month T is
computed using:
r+59 ]II (1 +w;Rt) -1 x 100
Equal-weighted portfolios Value-weighted portfolios
Year N Issuers Matches Issuers Matches
1963 - 67 10 119.0 65.3 55.3 20.2
1964 - 68 15 152.9 138.7 61.6 38.4
1965 - 69 24 42.3 60.9 16.6 33.1
1966 - 70 34 8.0 19.9 11.7 31.0
1967 - 71 48 38.9 84.7 38.8 117.0
1968 - 72 65 3.7 42.4 44.8 116.1
1969 - 73 79 -46.7 -32.2 17.9 41.4
1970 - 74 88 -51.6 -31.8 2.6 11.0
1971 - 75 93 -7.8 19.3 61.5 64.0
1972 - 76 92 10.5 26.1 79.7 57.9
1973 - 77 84 5.2 8.0 43.6 18.9
1974 - 78 76 81.5 60.8 75.7 65.2
1975 -79 73 245.8 188.6 175.0 143.3
1976 - 80 75 189.0 147.8 120.1 90.1
1977 - 81 85 84.2 86.2 67.0 54.6
1978 - 82 100 109.4 130.9 108.1 118.6
1979 - 83 137 149.2 188.8 143.5 159.2
1980 - 84 179 78.1 97.2 130.2 143.0
1981 - 85 209 54.8 90.0 141.8 166.7
1982 - 86 223 86.2 104.0 194.8 178.6
1983 - 87 226 61.7 59.5 184.0 117.8
1984 - 88 188 68.4 40.6 203.2 91.9
1963 - 74 29.7 38.5 42.5 51.2
1975 - 88 112.7 113.4 146.8 126.4
1963 - 88 67.4 72.5 89.9 85.4
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Figure 4.1
Value of $1 invested in CRSP indices, industrial issuer-portfolios, and
matching-firm portfolios for the sample of seasoned equity offerings
A. Equally-weighted portfolios
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Figure 4.2
Value of $1 invested in CRSP indices, industrial issuer-portfolios, and
matching-firm portfolios for the sample of debt offerings
A. Equally-weighted portfolios
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factor respectively. Using size sorted portfolios with the same average book-to-market ratio,
the 8MB portfolio is long in a portfolio of small stocks and short in a portfolio of big stocks.
Similarly, the HML portfolio is constructed from portfolio sorted on book-to-market ratio
but with the same average size, and is long in a portfolio of stocks with high book-to-
market ratio and short in a portfolio of stocks with low book-to-market ratio. Thus, the
5MB factor is constructed to be orthogonal to HML and vice versa. Panel (d) of Table 4.10
shows that the procedure succede in making the 5MB and HML factors orthogonal in that
the correlation between the factors is only -0.08.
The five risk factors used in the conditional expectation models are described in panel
(b) of Table 4.10.29 The stock market risk factor is the same as in the Fama-French model.
The bond market risk factor is the return spread on lov-grade and high-grade corporate
bonds. We use data from Ibbotson Associates, and high grade bonds are bonds rated AAA
by Moody's and low grade bonds are bonds with grading below BAA or that are ungraded.
As a term structure factor we follow Ferson and Korajczyk (1995) and use the difference
in return on Treasury bonds with 20 years to maturity and 30-day Treasury bills. We also
include the real per capita growth rate in personal consumption expenditures for nondurable
goods. This proxy should be inversely related to the marginal utility of wealth.i'" Both
Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Ferson and Korajczyk (1995) include unanticipated inflation
as a risk factor. Let Rft be the yield on a l-month Treasury bill. Let it be inflation during
period t. Model inflation as it = i~+ ir where i~ is expected inflation and ir is unexpected
inflation. Let realized real return on the l-month T-bill be TIt = Rlt - it. Consider a
regression of real return on a constant and 12 of it's past lagged values:
where the (r x 13) matrix X(r) contains a constant and 12 lagged values of TIt for the
period starting at t = 1 and ending at t = r , and b( r) is the coefficient vector. Let X, be a
row in X (r),and define
where b(t - 1) is the estimate of b(r) for r = t -1. We follow Ferson and Korajczyk (1995)
and use k; as an estimate the expected real return. Since unanticipated inflation is expected
to be zero by definition, expected inflation for period t may be proxied by i~= Tt - Rt.
29See Ferson and Harvey (1991) for a thorough motivation for the inclusion of each of these risk variables.
30The time series of the real per capita growth rate in personal consumption expenditures for nondurable
goods are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis' FRED database.
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Table 4.10
Summary statistics on risk factors and information variables used in the
Fama-French and the conditional factor models of expected returns
5MB is the difference in stock returns between a portfolio of small firms and a portfolio of large firms, where
size is measured using market capitalization, HML is the difference in stock returns between portfolios
of firms with high and low book-to-market ratio (See Fama and French (1993) for the details on how to
compute 5MB and HML.) The market portfolio excess return (MR) is computed as the difference between
the CRSP value weighted index of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a l-month Treasury
bill. LG-HG is the return difference between high-grade corporate bonds and low-grade corporate bonds
from the Ibbotson Associate Corporate Bond Module. tl.RPC is real per capita growth rate of personal
consumption of nondurable goods. Ul is unanticipated inflation measured as the difference between realized
inflation and expected inflation. The expected inflation is modeled by running a regression of real returns
(returns on 30-day Treasury bills less inflation) on a constant and 12 of it's lagged values. Tspread is the
return difference between Treasury bonds with 20 years to maturity and 30-day Treasury bills. tl.RPC
and Ul are converted into excess returns using Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) factor-mimicking
portfolios. The numbers in panel (a) and (b) are in percentages.
Mean Min Std.
(a) Fama-French model risk factors
MR
5MB
HML
0.38
0.27
0.43
-22.85
-10.09
-9.75
(b) Risk factors in the conditional factor model
MR
LG-HG
tl.RPC
ur
Tspread
Max
15.99
11.05
8.92
4.57
2.93
2.56
0.38 -22.85 15.99 4.57
-0.02 -12.24 9.67 2.45
0.86 -32.26 42.83 8.54
1.24 -47.91 59.12 14.79
0.02 -9.37 13.95 3.02
(c) Information variables Zt-l
Nominal yield on l-month Treasury bill
Dividend yield
3-month/l-month Treasury bill spread
BAAl AAA corporate bond yield-spread
0.52
3.88
0.04
0.08
0.20
2.60
-0.05
-0.08
(d) Correlation matrix for Fama-French model factors
~IR
:\-IR
5MB
HML
5MB
1.00
0.30
-0.40
HML
1.00
-0.08 1.00
(e) Correlation matrix for risks in the conditional factor model
MR LG-HG tl.RPC
MR 1.00
LG-HG 0.20 1.00
tl.RPC 0.71 0.18 1.00
ur 0.51 0.16 0.52
Tspread 0.29 -0.11 0.11
1.35
6.03
0.26
0.28
0.23
0.86
0.04
0.06
ur Tspread
1.00
0.16 1.00
4.5. PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES USING FACTOR MODELS 69
Unexpected inflation is measured as the difference between realized inflation and expected
inflation.
Since the real per capita growth rate of personal consumption of nondurable goods and
unanticipated inflation are not measured as portfolio returns, they are converted into excess
returns using Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) factor-mimicking portfolios. Using
unanticipated inflation as an example, this involves a regression of the time-series of unan-
ticipated inflation on equally-weighted decile portfolios and the set Zt-l of predetermined
information variables. The regression coefficients on the decile portfolios are used to form
portfolio weights by dividing each portfolio's coefficient by the sum of all the coefficients.
The factor mimicking portfolio is the time-series of return constructed from the decile port-
folios using the weights constructed from the regression coefficients. Simple correlations of
the risk factors are reported in panel (e) of Table 4.10.
The predetermined information variables that we use have all been shown in the litera-
ture to have predictive power for future stock and bond returns.P Panel (b) of Table 4.10
summarizes the information variables. The nominal one-month and three-month Treasury
bill returns are from the CRSP-Fama files. The monthly dividend yield is computed as the
aggregate cash dividends paid in the current month and the previous eleven months divided
by the value of the index (without dividends reinvested) in the month before the start month
of dividend summation. As a proxy for the slope of the near-maturity term structure, we
follow Ferson and Harvey (1991) and use the difference in monthly returns on a 3-month
Treasury bill and a 1-month Treasury bill. To capture corporate default risk, we use the
Ibbotson Associates' yield spread between corporate bonds rated BAA and corporate bonds
rated AAA. The short (one-month T-bill) rate is included as a current information variable
since it is highly correlated with expected inflation, which in turn is negatively correlated
with future expected stock returns (Fama and Schwert (1977)). There is also evidence that
T-bill rates are related to the conditional second moments of stock returns (e.g., Camp-
bell (1987)). Furthermore. both the dividend yield and the near-maturity term structure
slope are shown in prior studies to have predictive power for future stock returns and are
consequently included as information variables (e.g., Fama and French (1988), Ferson and
Harvey (1991)). Finally, the default-related yield spread variable captures changes in risk
premiums and in market expectations of losses on risky bonds, where both effects are driven
by changes in economic conditions (e.g., business cycles). This variable is also documented
to be positively related to future stock returns (e.g., Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama
31See Ferson and Harvey (1991), Evans (1994), Ferson and Korajczyk (1995), Ferson and Schadt (1996),
and Chen and Knez (1996) among others.
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and French (1989)).
4.5.3 Risk adjustment using the Fama-French three-factor model
Under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for the constructed portfolios, the
constant term in equation (4.1) should be indistinguishable from zero. Tests of this predic-
tion are found in Table 4.11. The estimated constant term is found in the second column of
this table marked &ff. Looking at industrial firms in panel (a), the alphas are significantly
negative for equally-weighted matching firms but not for issuers. This suggests that only
the matching firms underperform relative to the three-factor model when aggregated into
portfolios with equal weights. When using value-weights, however, the alpha estimates in-
dicate that both issuers and matching firms signifiantly overperform by approximately .3
percent per month.
Statistically significant values of &ff for the matching firm portfolios potentially reflec-
t model misspecification or market mispricing. Model misspecification can be caused by
omitted factors and/or violation of the assumption of constant expected returns. Suppose
that the modelomits factor Ft and that the issuing firms and their matches have similar
exposures to this factor. In this case, market efficiency implies that a self-financing invest-
ment strategy of shorting issuers and going long in the matching firms generates zero values
of &ff. As shown in Table 4.11 for industrial issuers, the alpha values for the difference
portfolio (zero investment strategy) are insignificantly different from zero at conventional
levels.
Turning to utility issuers, there is no evidence in panel (b) of Table 4.11 of significant
alphas for either issuers or matching firms. However, the difference portfolios (long in
matching firms and short in issuers) generate significant positive alphas. These results are
largely consistent with the evidence of underperformance found earlier for utility issuers
using the matching-firm procedure (Table 4.4). Thus, the Fama-French model is not able
to explain the negative return difference between utility SEOs and utility matching firms.
Turning to bond issuers, panel (a) of Table 4.12 presents evidence of statistically signif-
icant alphas for value-weighted portfolios of industrial issuers and matching firms, similar
to the SE~ issuer evidence. Again, for industrial issuers, the alphas for the difference port-
folios (long in matching firms and short in issuers) are not significant. Furthermore, the
pattern of abnormal returns for utility bond issuers is similar to the pattern observed earlier
for utility SEOs in Table 4.11. That is, utility issuers seems to underperform relative to
their benchmark firms. In panel (b) ofTable 4.12 this show up asa negative and significant
(at the 6% level) alpha for the equally-weighted issuer portfolio and positive alphas for the
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Table 4.11
Jensen 's alpha for SE~ issuer and match portfolios using the Fama-French
three-factor model as an expected return benchmark
The risk factors are the difference in return between small and large firms (SMB), where .izc :s measured
using market capitalization, the return difference between high and low book-to-market firms (HML), and
the excess return on a value weighted index (MR). See Fama and French (1993) for the details on how to
compute 5MB and HML. The excess return is computed as the difference between the CRSP value weighted
index for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a I-month Treasury bilI. The Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model is:
rpt = a:+ {3plMR! + {3p2SMBt + {3p3HMLt+ e:t
where rpt is portfolio return. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using
the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Portfolio" aJf MR 5MB HML R2 F(Zt-d
(a) Industrials
Issuing firms, EW -0.14 1.15 0.61 -0.04 0.927 0.031(.174) (.000) (.000) (.466)
Matching firms, EW -0.18 1.08 0.63 0.02 0.930 0.314(.058) (.000) (.000) (.523)
Issuing firms, VW 0.37 1.02 -0.09 -0.06 0.853 0.004(.002) (.000) (.022) (.246)
Matching firms, VW 0.24 1.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.866 0.014(.035) (.000) (.819) (.023)
Match-issuer, EW -0.03 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.028 0.269(.767) (.004) (.645) (.187)
Match-issuer, VW -0.13 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.009 0.009(.387) (.514) (.144) (.446)
(b) Utilities
Issuing firms, EW -0.20 0.74 -0.15 0.59 0.536 0.000(.215) (.000) (.032) (.000)
Matching firms, EW 0.08 0.81 -0.12 0.42 0.629 0.002(.570) (.000) (.032) (.000)
Issuing firms, VW -0.13 0.77 -0.24 0.55 0.511 0.002(.465) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Matching firms, VW 0.29 0.86 -0.27 0.31 0.570 0.030(.115) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Match-issuer, EW 0.28 0.07 0.03 -0.17 0.071 0.000(.046) (.096) (.590) (.038)
Match-issuer, VW 0.42 0.09 -0.03 -0.24 0.073 0.000(.024) (.092) (.673) (.030)
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('EW') orvalue-weighted ('VW'). The 'Match-issuer' is a zero-
investment portfolio with a long position in the matching firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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Table 4.12
Jensen's alpha for bond issuer and match portfolios using the Fama-French
three-factor model as an expected return benchmark
The risk factors art the difference in return between small and big firms (SMB), where size is measured
using market capitalization, the return difference between high and low book-to-market firms (HML), and
the excess return on a value weighted index (MR). See Fama and French (1993) for the details on how to
compute 5MB and HML. The excess return is computed as the difference between the CRSP value weighted
index for NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a I-month Treasury bill. The Fama and
French (1993) three-factor model is:
rpt = a:+ (3pl MRt + (3p2SMBt + (3p3HMLt + e:t
where rpt is portfolio return. The coefficients are estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using
the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Portfolio" o,!f MR 5MB HML R2 F(Zt-d
(a) Industrials
Issuing firms, EW -0.15 1.15 0.03 0.22 0.836 0.730(.264) (.000) ( .447) (.000)
Matching firms, EW -0.09 1.08 -0.06 0.15 0.890 0.587(.368) (.000) (.136) (.000)
Issuing firms, VW 0.30 1.06 -0.20 0.17 0.824 0.477( .012) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Matching firms, VW 0.43 1.03 -0.34 -0.16 0.803 0.703(.003) (.000) (.000) (.008)
Match-issuer, EW 0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 0.028 0.966(.673) (.036) (.052) (.254)
Match-issuer, VW 0.13 -0.03 -0.14 -0.32 0.086 0.887(.483) (.478) (.021 ) (.000)
(b) Utilities
Issuing firms, EW -0.36 0.84 -0.13 0.55 0.547 0.005(.060) (.000) (.072) (.000)
Matching firms, EW -0.04 0.84 -0.33 0.38 0.513 0.170(.852) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Issuing firms, VW -0.19 0.83 -0.20 0.56 0.540 0.006(.304) (.000) (.004) (.000)
Matching firms, VW 0.08 0.85 -0.40 0.33 0.458 0.165(.728) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Match-issuer. EW 0.32 0.00 -0.20 -0.16 0.074 0.000(.034) ( .977) (.003) (.054)
Match-issuer, VW 0.28 0.01 -0.21 -0.22 0.083 0.001(.094) (.809) (.005) (.013)
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('EW') or value-weighted ('VW'). The 'Match-issuer' is a zero-
investment portfolio with a long position in the matching firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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both the equal- and value weighted difference portfolios.
In sum, the evidence in this section indicates some abnormal performance in the utility
samples. However, the abnormal performance may very well be caused by a misspecification
of the factor model used to control for risk. This suspicion is supported by the F-tests in the
last column of table 4.11 and 4.12. These columns report the p-values of a null hypothesis
that the betas in the Fama-French model is not time-varying. The test is constructed by
augmenting the Fama-French model with the following model for time-variation in factor
betas:
{3pj = bpoj + b~ljZt-i' j = 1,2,3.
The F-test is for the null hypothesis that all the elements in the L-vector bpij is zero. For
the utility portfolios, the null is rejected for ten out of twelve portfolios. This support that
the Fama-French three-factor model with constant betas is misspecified. Further evidence
of misspecifiaction appear in separate regressions of size-decile portfolio returns against the
Fama-French factors, which produces significant constant terms for some portfolios (not
reported in tables).
We now turn to a different specification of the factor model, namely one which allows
expected returns to be time varying based on various macroeconomic risks identified in the
empiricalliterature on arbitrage pricing.
4.5.4 Risk adjustment using a conditional four-factor model
The null hypothesis underlying the analysis in this section is thatrz, in equation (4.2) is
zero conditional on the current information variables in Zt-i.
In order to check the robustness of the model, we first estimate alphas using size decile
portfolios. Under the null hypothesis that the model captures all priced risk factors, the
alphas for each of the decile portfolios should be indistinguishable from zero. Table 4.13
contains the coefficients from these estimations. Only one of the portfolios (Decile 8) has
an alpha that is different from zero at the 10% level, and none of the decile portfolios have
alphas that are different from zero at the 5% level of statistical significance. Column 3
through 7 report the estimated betas at the mean level of the information variables, that is
where Zt-i is a L-vector containing the time-series mean of the information variables. The
market index (MR), the real per capita growth rate of personal consumption of nondurables
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Table 4.13
Jensen's alpha for portfolios of equally-weighted size dee iles using a
multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
The market portfolio excess return (MR) is computed as the difference between the CRSP value weighted
index of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a I-month Treasury bill. LG-HG is the return
difference between high-grade corporate bonds and low-grade corporate bonds from the Ibbotson Associate
Corporate Bond Module. ~RPC is real per capita growth rate of personal consumption of nondurable goods.
Ul is unanticipated inflation measured as the difference between realized inflation and expected inflation.
The expected inflation is modeled by running a regression <Jf real returns (returns on 3D-day Treasury bills
less inflation) on a constant and 12 of it's lagged values. Tspread is the return difference between Treasury
bonds with 20 years to maturity and 3D-day Treasury bills. ~RPC and Ul are converted into excess returns
using Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) factor-mimicking portfolios. The information variables in
Zt-l are listed in table 4.10. The model
rit = Ol' + b:ormt + b:1 (Zt-l ® rmd + eit
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of
White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt-l
Port folio a iiI' MR LH-HG ~RPC Ul Tspread R2 F(Zt-d
Decile l 0.10 0.48 0.17 0.44 0.11 0.04 0.000 0.787(0.643) (0.000) (0.134) (0.000) (0.000) (0.631)
Decile 2 0.06 0.58 0.08 0.33 0.11 0.01 0.003 0.909(0.632) (0.000) (0.578) (0.000) (0.000) (0.772)
Decile 3 -0.00 0.55 0.07 0.36 0.10 0.00 0.001 0.966(0.979) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.000) (0.920)
Decile 4 0.07 0.66 0.03 0.30 0.07 0.05 0.339 0.963(0.329) (0.000) (0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.623)
Decile 5 -0.01 0.75 0.07 0.17 0.11 -0.02 0.676 0.952(0.893) (0.000) (0.419) (0.000) (0.000) (0.732)
Decile 6 0.06 0.74 0.04 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.032 0.966(0.255) (0.000) (0.313) (0.000) (0.000) (0.628)
Decile 7 0.05 0.86 -0.02 0.10 0.08 -0.00 0.006 0.974(0.277) (0.000) (0.802) (0.000) (0.000) (0.802)
Decile 8 0.10 0.91 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.008 0.963(0.075) (0.000) (0.527) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023)
Decile 9 0.05 0.97 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.08 0.000 0.981(0.246) (0.000) (0.282) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Decile 10 0.01 1.09 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.000 0.982(0.706) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
"Decile l is the portfolio with the smallest equity capitalization stocks while Decile 10 contain the largest
equity capitalization stocks.
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(.6.RPC), and unanticipated inflation (Ul) are all associated with statistically significant
betas for all the portfolios. The measure of corporate default risk (LG-HG) and the term-
structure factor (Tspread) also appears as a relevant risk factor for some of the portfolios.
However, note that the reported p-values are for the joint hypothesis of relevance of the
factor (the "average" beta biD is different from zero) and the time-varyation in the factor
loadings (the effect of b~lZt-l is different from zero). The last column in Table 4.10 reports
p-values for the null hypothesis that betas are constant. For all but two portfolios, this
hypothesis is rejected.
Tables 4.14 and 4.15 present the conditional factor model results for the issuer-, matching
firm-, and zero-investment portfolios for the samples of SEOs and bond offerings. The tables
show that the alpha estimates tend to be smaller and less significant than the alpha estimates
in Fama-French three-factor model reported above.
Panel (a) of Table 4.14 presents the results for industrial SEOs. Except for the value-
weighted issuer portfolio, none of the alphas are distinguishable from zero. The estimate
ap for the value-weighted issuer portfolios are positive and significant. However, as with
the Fama-French regressions (Table 4.11), the alpha estimates for the value-weighted zero-
investment portfolio are again statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Panel (b) of Table 4.14 contains the corresponding results for SEOs by utilities. The
table shows insignificant alphas for both equal- and value-weighted issuer portfolios. How-
ever, the utility matching firm portfolios have statistically significant alphas, implying over-
performance relative to the benchmark. Also the difference (match-issuer) portfolios for
utilities produce positive and significant alphas. However, what earlier appeared as un-
derperformance of issuers relative to the matching firms now shows up in Table 4.14 as
overperformance of the matching firm portfolios relative to the benchmark.
Table 4.15 reports the corresponding alpha values for portfolios of debt issuers. The table
shows significant and positive alphas for the value-weighted portfolios of industrial issuers
and matched firms. However, none of the alphas for the difference portfolios (match-issuer)
are statistically distinguishable from zero. For utility issuers there are no clear pattern, only
one alpha is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Given the number of alphas
that are estimated, this could easily occur by chance.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is consistent with the hypothesis that
market reactions to security issue announcements are unbiased. That is, using a time-
varying expected return framework, we fail to document significant abnormal returns from a
self financing investment strategy involving shorting issuing firms and going long in matching-
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Table 4.14
Jensen's alpha for SEO issuer and match portfolios using a conditional
multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
Themarket portfolio excess return (MR) is computed as the difference between the CRSP value weighted
index of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a l-month Treasury bill. LG-HG is the return
difference between high-grade corporate bonds and low-grade corporate bonds from the Ibbotson Associate
Corporate Bond Module. ~RPC is real per capita growth rate of personal consumption of nondurable goods.
Ul is unanticipated inflation measured as the difference between realized inflation and expected inflation.
The expected inflation is modeled by running a regression of real returns (returns on 30-day Treasury bills
less inflation) on a constant and 12 of it's lagged values. Tspread is the return difference between Treasury
bonds with 20 years to maturity and 30-day Treasury bills. ~RPC and Ul are converted into excess returns
using Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) factor-mimicking portfolios. The information variables in
Zt-l are listed in table 4.10. The model
rit = Ol' + b:ormt + b:1 (Zt-l ® rmt) + eit
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of
White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt-l
Portfolio" Gp MR LH-HG ~RPC Ul Tspread R2 F(Zt-d
(a) Industrials
Issuing firms, EW -0.06 0.99 0.05 0.14 0.08 -0.10 0.924 0.406(0.549) (0.000) (0.205) (0.000) (0.000) (0.066)
Matching firms, EW -0.11 0.93 0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.09 0.908 0.996(0.318) (0.000) (0.808) (0.000) (0.000) (0.169)
Issuing firms, VW 0.30 1.06 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.868 0.000(0.003) (0.000) (0.228) (0.068) (0.011) (0.009)
Matching firms, VW 0.08 1.11 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.872 0.007(0.448) (0.000) (0.385) (0.087) (0.005) (0.907)
Match-issuer, EW -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.042 0.425(0.693) (0.218) (0.136) (0.273) (0.095) (0.198)
Match-issuer, V\V -0.21 0.05 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.079 0.006(0.152) (0.041) (0.355) (0.063) (0.270) (0.022)
(b) Utilities
Issuing firms, EW 0.02 0.41 0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.45 0.597 0.000(0.920) (0.000) (0.503) (0.164) (0.000) (0.000)
Matching firms, EW 0.29 0.55 0.10 -0.02 0.05 0.28 0.631 0.065(0.055) (0.000) (0.047) (0.112) (0.000) (0.000)
Issuing firms, VW 0.08 0.47 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.47 0.566 0.000(0.632) (0.000) (0.499) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000)
Matching firms, VW 0.49 0.69 0.13 -0.08 0.03 0.27 0.594 0.001(0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Match-issuer, EW 0.28 0.15 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.17 0.330 0.000(0.013) (0.000) (0.185) (0.744) (0.003) (0.000)
Match-issuer, VW 0.41 0.22 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 -0.20 0.332 0.000(0.005) (0.000) (0.069) (0.275) (0.002) (0.000)
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('EW') or value-weighted ('VW'). The 'Match-issuer' is a zero-
investment portfolio with a long position in the matching firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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Table 4.15
Jensen's alpha for bond issuer and match portfolios using a conditional
multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
The market portfolio excess return (MR) is computed as the difference between the CRSP value weighted
index of NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms and the return on a l-rnonth Treasury bill. LG-HG is the return
difference between high-grade corporate bonds and low-grade corporate bonds from the Ibbotson Associate
Corporate Bond Module. ~RPC is real per capita growth rate of personal consumption of nondurable goods.
Ul is unanticipated inflation measured as the difference between realized inflation and expected inflation.
The expected inflation is modeled by running a regression of real returns (returns on 3D-day Treasury bills
less inflation) On a constant and 12 of it's lagged values. Tspread is the return difference between Treasury
bonds with 20 years to maturity and 3D-day Treasury bills. ~RPC and Ul are converted into excess returns
using Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) factor-mimicking portfolios. The information variables in
Zt-I are listed in table 4.10. The model
nt = Gp + b:ormt + b:1 (Zt-I ® rmt) + eit
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator of
White (1980). The numbers in parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt-I
Portfolio" ap MR LH-HG ~RPC Ul Tspread R2 F(Zt-d
(a) Industrials
Issuing firms, EW -0.06 1.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.824 0.880(0.678) (0.000) (0.797) (0.910) (0.381) (0.897)
Matching firms, EW -0.04 1.04 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.883 0.453(0.694) (0.000) (0.540) (0.726) (0.583) (0.431 )
Issuing firms, VW 0.30 1.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.803 0.904(0.034) (0.000) (0.912) (0.710) (0.606) (0.975)
Matching firms, VW 0.35 1.19 0.02 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.808 0.647(0.015) (0.000) (0.102) (0.023) (0.000) (0.619)
Match-issuer, EW 0.02 -0.D1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.001 0.940(0.901) (0.897) (0.539) (0.672) (0.670) (0.493)
Match-issuer, VW 0.05 0.15 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.060 0.649(0.792) (0.192) (0.102) (0.668) (0.006) (0.860)
(b) Utilities
Issuing firms, EW -0.20 0.42 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.42 0.608 0.000(0.291) (0.000) (0.236) (0.227) (0.000) (0.000)
Matching firms, EW 0.12 0.59 0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.46 0.533 0.256(0.545) (0.000) (0.667) (0.012) (0.068) (0.000)
Issuing firms, VW -0.02 0.44 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.45 0.591 0.000(0.937) (0.000) (0.360) (0.241 ) (0.000) (0.000)
Matching firms, VW 0.22 0.64 -0.00 -0.11 0.02 0.47 0.482 0.131(0.333) (0.000) (0.532) (0.004) (0.137) (0.000)
Match-issuer, EW 0.33 0.17 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.201 0.000(0.032) (0.001) (0.222) (0.001) (0.000) (0.319)
Match-issuer, VW 0.23 0.19 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.184 0.000(0.158) (0.001) (0.157) (0.001) (0.000) (0.503)
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('E\V') or value-weighted ('VW'). The 'Match-issuer' is a zero-
investment portfolio with a long position in the matching firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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firms.32
4.6 Conclusions
Capital market participants react to security issue announcements by revaluing the issuer's
stock price. This revaluation depends in part on the market's perception of the issuing
firm's objectives and in part on the nature of the information asymmetry between investors
and the firm concerning the true value of its securities. As surveyed Eckbo and Masulis
(1995), substantial empirical research has established that the market reaction to seasoned
security offerings is swift and consistent with the hypothesis that investors are concerned
with adverse selection.
However, recent studies of the long-run performance following security offers raise an
important question of whether this market reaction is unbiased. In particular, Loughran
and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995) find that firms making seasoned
equity offers have stock returns which systematically underperform a control group of non-
issuing firms over a long horizon; thus generating what has been termed the "new issues
puzzle" .
The results of this study raise doubts about the econometric foundation of the "new
issues puzzle". First, we draw on recent asset pricing econometrics to produce time-varying
expected return benchmarks for estimating long-run abnormal stock price performance.
This approach also alleviates a concern that risk factors constructed using broad-based
stock portfolios, such as those in the Fama-French model, are "contaminated" as they
themselves contain a large proportion of issuing firms. More specifically, Loughran and
Ritter (1999) argue that portfolios of small growth stocks (i.e., small size and low book-
to-market) contain a disproportionately large number of issuers and therefore should not
be used as a benchmark for abnormal return estimation. Since our factors are based on
macroeconomic variables, this criticism does not apply to our expected stock returns or
abnormal returns estimates.
Second, we examine a range of issue and issuer characteristics not presented in earlier
research on security offerings, including convertible and straight debt, in addition to ex-
amining equity offering flotation methods, and public utility issuers as well as industrial
issuers. Since characterizations of the nature of the market underreactions to security of-
32This conclusion receives indirect support from a recent study by Brous, Datar and Kini (1998) who
examine corporate earnings following SEOs. They report no evidence of significant abnormal earnings in
the five-year period following SEOs.
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ferings ought to be consistent across these various issue characteristics, this study furthers
our understanding of potential underperformance effects and thus reinforces our overall
conclusions.
Before making methodological improvements to the conventional procedures, we estab-
lish that our industrial sample of seasoned equity offers produces significant underperfor-
mance similar to Loughran and Ritter (1995) when using their estimation techniques. We
also document that utility issuers of seasoned equity offers exhibit significant underper-
formance, albeit of a lesser magnitude. We then show that, for industrial issuers, this
long-run underperformance is eliminated when employing either matching firm techniques
sorted on size and book-to-market, or time-varying multifactor expected return benchmarks.
This conclusion is also robust to the portfolio weighting procedure and the equity offering
flotation method chosen. Moreover, we find statistically insignificant long-run abnormal
performance following debt issues. Overall, the evidence in this paper is consistent with the
hypothesis that the typical market reaction to seasoned security offerings announcements
is unbiased.
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Chapter 5
Equity Flotation Method Choice
Eckbo and Masulis (1992) develop a model framework for firms equity flotation method
choice under adverse selection which captures a number of empirical regularities. This
chapter formalizes and extends the Eckbo-Masulis model to include private placements as an
alternative to rights and underwritten offerings, and to allow the possibility of issue rejection
by either the private placement investor or the underwriter. This extension produces a set
of empirical implications that are tested on the Oslo Stock Exchange where all methods
used to issue seasoned equity is in fact covered by the model. The model implications are
supported by the empirical results. The chapter also examines competing theories for the
announcement period returns. For example, there is no evidence that the positive market
reaction to private placements is due to increased monitoring by large shareholders.
5.1 Introduction
A company that wishes to raise new equity must decide on the flotation method. For public
equity offerings, flotation methods commonly used internationally include firm commitment
underwritten offering, rights offering with standby underwriting, and uninsured rights of-
fering. l If companies rank flotation methods using direct costs only (underwriterfees, legal
fees, mailing costs etc.), we should see strong preferences for the relatively inexpensive rights
lIn rights offers, current shareholders are given tradeable short-term warrants (rights) that prevent wealth
loss due to dilution either by allowing shareholders to maintain their ownership level by purchase new shares
at a discount, or obtain cash compensation by selling the warrants. Standby rights offers differ from uninsured
rights offers in that an underwriter (normally an investment bank) insure the issuer against offer failure by
committing to by a certain fraction of the issue. In a firm commitment underwritten offer, an investment
bank acquires the whole issue.
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offer method.f However, international evidence suggest that issuers prefer to raise equity
using the services of an underwriter, either in the form of standby underwriting or using
firm commitment contracts-despite the fact that these methods are substantially more
costly in terms of direct costs.P This puzzle is commonly referred to as the "rights offer
paradox".
The resolution of the rights offer paradox involves identifying indirect costs of rights,
or managerial benefits associated with underwriting, that may explain the observed trend
away from rights issues. Eckbo and Masulis (1992) develop theoretically and empirically the
hypothesis that observed flotation method choices in the U.S. are driven by adverse selection
in issue markets. Their model extends the basic Myers and Majluf (1984) adverse selection
argument (which focuses on direct public sales only) to a situation where the firm may
sell some or all of the issue to current shareholders and/or to an underwriter. Shareholder
takeup and sale to the public via an underwriter are modeled as substitute mechanisms for
reducing wealth transfers between current shareholders and outside investors. Assuming
exogenous shareholder demand for the issue, and imperfect quality certification by the
underwriter, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) characterize an equilibrium where only firms with
a high expected shareholder chose uninsured rights. Moreover, in this equilibrium, the
average issuer value in uninsured rights offers exceeds that in underwritten offers, and the
market reaction to the issue announcement is predicted to be inversely related to current
shareholder takeup.
These predictions are found to be consistent with the evidence in several empirical stud-
ies. Using samples of U.S. and Norwegian seasoned equity offerings, respectively, Eckbo and
Masulis (1992) and Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) find that the average announce-
ment period abnormal return for underwritten offerings is less favorable than for uninsured
rights offerings. The later study also documents that the probability that the issuer un-
derwrites a rights offer is inversely related to expected shareholder takeup, as predicted.
Moreover, Singh (1997) present additional evidence that adverse selection is greater among
standby rights offerings with low current shareholder takeup than for offerings with high
takeup.
2Eckbo and Masulis (1992) find that the average cost in percent of totaloffering proceeds is 6% for firm
commitment offerings, 4% for standby rights, and 1.5% for uninsured rights offerings by U.S. industrial
firms. The costs for public utilities are somewhat lower. See also Eckbo and Masulis (1995) for a survey.
3Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) have
over the post 1981 period almost exclusively have seasoned equity using firm commitment underwritten
offerings (See for example Eckbo and Masulis (1992)). In several other countries there is a trend towards
the exclusive use of underwritten offerings. See Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen. (1997) for Norway and Kato
and Schallheim (1995) for Japan.
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This chapter contributes to our understanding of the equity issue process in at least
three ways. First, the theoretical developments in Eckbo and Masulis (1992) are formalized
and extended to include private placements as an alternative to rights and underwritten
offerings. In this model, both the private investor and the underwriter have the ability to
partially reveal the true quality of the issuer, however, private placements are less expensive
in terms of direct issue costs. Negotiations with the private investor may fail, in which case
the firm has the option to withdraw the issue or to select uninsured rights or standby
underwriting. In equilibrium, the average firm quality is highest in the pool of private
placements and lowest in the pool of standby rights, with uninsured rights in between. While
not modeled explicitly, the choice of private placements may also be driven by corporate
control considerations. Contrary to rights offers, private placements create a large block
holder. This blockholder may increase monitoring of management or form an alliance with
management to extract corporate control benefits not available to other shareholders. If
the latter effect dominates, the market reaction to private placements is predicted to be
negative.
Second, the empirical analysis in Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) is extended to
include a comparison of rights and standby offerings with the population of private place-
ments on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). Since, on the OSE, all seasoned equity offerings
are issued using either rights, standby, or private placements, this extension allows more
powerful tests of alternative theories for the flotation method choice. The evidence in this
chapter also complements earlier studies of private placements by Wruck (1989) and Hertzel
and Smith (1993) on U.S. data, and it is the first to examine private placements decision
in the context of the remaining issue methods available to firms.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 develops a theoretical model
that seeks to explain what determines the choice of equity flotation method when the
available methods are private placement, standby rights offerings, and uninsured rights
offerings. Section 5.3 presents some descriptive characteristics of the sample of equity
offerings. Section 5.4 looks at the announcement period abnormal returns for private and
public equity offerings, and discusses the implications for the model developed in section
5.2. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Model
To focus on the choice among the equity offering methods described in the previous section,
it is assumed that firms face a short-lived investment project that must be financed using
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private placements, uninsured rights or standby rights. As indicated in the introduction,
these flotation methods comprise the entire choice set available to aSE-listed firms. In
a private placement a private investor agrees to fund the entire project in return for a
fraction of the post issue company. In a standby rights offering the underwriter provides
the issuer with a quality certification by committing to buy shares not taken up by the
market. In an uninsured rights offering the issuer sells shares at the price determined by
perfect competition among market investors. The current shareholders that subscribe to
the issue in rights offerings are regarded as market investors. The game between the issuer's
management and investors is modeled as depicted in figure 1.
Before the game starts, nature draws the issuer type from the discrete set 8. The
probability of drawing type O is denoted p(O). Thus, when investors are approached by
a firm seeking financing, they do not know the full information value of the firm. In the
first subgame, the issuer chooses the flotation method. If the issuer chooses a private
placement or a standby rights offering, the private investor or the underwriter inspects the
issuer. The inspection reduces but does not completely eliminate uncertainty about the
issuers full information value. Let q (O' I O) denote the prior probability of concluding an
inspection with "this is type O'" when the actual type is O (O, O' E 8). The prior distributions
p(.) and q(. I .) are common knowledge. Following inspection, the issuer and the private
investor/underwriter bargain over the offerprice (illustrated by the ovals in figure 1).4 The
bargaining proceeds as follows. The issuer suggests a price and the investor accepts or
rejects. The rejection decision is private information. If the investor rejects, the issuer
decides not to issue (forgoing the project) or tries another flotation method.
The second subgame (see figure 1) starts after the offerprice bargaining in private place-
ments or standby rights fails. This subgame is identical to the first subgame, except that
the remaining options are fewer. The third and last subgame is only reached if the issuer
is rejected twice, once by the private investor and once by the underwriter. Consequently,
there is only two options in this subgame, either issue using uninsured rights or not issue
at all.
The sequential equilibrium of Kreps and Wilson (1982) is used to characterize pure
strategy equilibria in this game. The optimal strategy in a sequential equilibrium must give
higher expected payoff than any other strategy given the beliefs of the players. In addition,
the beliefs of the players are formed using Bayes' rule and the equilibrium strategies.P The
4Giammarino and Lewis (1989) develop a theory of negotiated equity financing. The bargaining game in
their model is similar to the one used here. However, their model focuses on firm commitment underwritten
offerings and does not modelother flotation methods.
5Moreover, a sequential equilibrium specifies how to form beliefs whenan "off-the-equilibrium-path"
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next three paragraphs define strategies, beliefs, and payoffs in the game.
Before nature draws the issuer type, a pure strategy for this game specifies what the
issuer should do throughout the game conditional on all previous actions taken by either of
the players. In other words, a pure strategy maps possible types and action histories into
a particular action at the next step in the game. In the bargaining game that starts when
an issuer have decided on a private placement or a standby rights offering, a pure strategy
for the issuer maps inspection results into an offerprice while a pure strategy for investors
maps an offerprice into a decision to "accept" or "reject" the offer. Let a denote a pure
strategy for the issuer. 6
Given strategies and prior distribution of types, investors compute the probability of
facing a particular type when asked for project funding. Denote the probability of facing
type e given equilibrium strategy a by Jl-m(e I a), where m E {pp, sr, ur} indicates that the
beliefs are formed by the private investor if a private placement is chosen (m = pp), or by
underwriter if a standby offering us chosen (m = sr), or by market investors if an uninsured
rights offering is chosen (m = ur). For market investors Jl-(' I .) represent the equilibrium
beliefs about the issuer type. Private investors and underwriters use inspection results to
update Jl-(' I .) to form equilibrium (posterior) beliefs. Let 'l/Jm(e I e',a), m E {pp,sr}, be
the probability the investor put on type e in equilibrium given that inspection concluded
type e' and issuers follow strategy a.
Managers decision whether to issue or not, depends on the value of the fraction old
shareholders have in the post issue company. As in Myers and Majluf (1984), managers
only issue equity if old shareholders claim in the post issue company is worth more than the
value of the compa: .y when equity is not issued and the project :."dropped. Suppose the
assets in place are worth aØ for a type e issuer, the net present value of the project is bø,
the required level of investments is I, the direct issue cost is d (underwriter fees, legal fees,
mailing costs etc.), the post issue number of shares is S, the ratio of the new number of shares
to S is o, and the fraction of the issue taken up by current shareholders is k. 7 Thus, the
fraction of the post issue company held by new shareholders is b. == 0(1 - k), and managers
issue new equity and invest in the project only if (1- b.) (aø + bø + I - d) 2:: aØ + kl. When
action is observed. Strategies and beliefs in a a sequential equilibrium are consistent if beliefs after an "off-
the-equilibrium-path" action is formed assuming arbitrarily small "trembles" by all types that could possibly
reach the stage preceding the "off-the-equilibrium-path" action. The possibility of "trembles" implies that
all actions have positive probability, and therefore, Bayes' rule can be used to form beliefs.
6As an example, a pure strategy for the issuer could be: If type (J is draw, seek funding from a private
investor. If inspectionsaystype (J'; propose price P8" If private investor rejects, try an uninsured rights
offer. If inspection says type (J", propose price P8". If underwriter rejects, do not issue.
7Myers and Majluf (1984) assume k = 0, while Eckbo and Masulis (1992) allow k 5 1.
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this condition is satisfied the value of the claim old shareholders have in the post issue
company exceeds the value of the company without the project plus the funds provided by
old shareholders. Given the post-issue number of shares, let Pe(a) be the expected offerprice
for a type O issuer that follows strategy a.8 Rearranging the issue-condition gives:
be ~ d +~ [(ae + be+ I - d) - Pe(a)SJ. (5.1)
The rights hand side of equation (5.1) is the issue costs. The first term is the direct issue
costs, while the second term is the wealth transfer between old and new shareholders. If
the equilibrium price times the post issue number of shares is less than the full information
value of the post issue company, old shareholders experience a wealth transfer cost. The
issuer decides to issue as long as the net present value of the project exceeds the issue costs.
The direct costs for standby rights offerings exceed the direct costs for uninsured rights
offerings because the former include standby fees. The direct costs for private placements
do not include mailing costs and costs of administrating the rights offer subscriptions. Thus,
the direct costs for a private placement are less than the direct costs for uninsured rights."
Denoting direct costs by d(m), we have d(pp) < d(ur) < d(sr).
As in Eckbo and Masulis (1992) the significance of the wealth transfer between old and
new shareholders depends on the number of old shareholders that subscribe to the issue.
If old shareholders subscribe to the whole issue, the wealth transfer is zero. On the other
hand, if old shareholders do not participate in the issue (as in a private placement), the
wealth transfer is potentially large.
5.2.1 A sequential equilibrium
This section characterizes and discusses a sequential equilibrium that may occur m the
game between equity issuers and investors. Suppose the full information value of an issuer
can take on one of three values: V1, V2, and V3, with V1 < V2 < V3. Assume that there
are two different takeup levels Is.. and k, with Is.. < k. The set of possible types is then
T == {~1d!.2' l'.3, V1, V2, V3}, where ~j and Vj denote firms with full information value Vj and
takeup levels Is.. and k respectively (j = 1,2,3). The inspection is assumed to be informative
BThe offerprice is determined under the equilibrium beliefs of investors. For rights offerings, the offerprice
is the sum of the subscription price set by the issuer and the total market value of the number of rights
necessary to acquire one new share. In private placements, the offerprice depends on the outcome of the
bargaining game between issuer and investor.
9Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) report that the direct cost of uninsured rights offerings are about
70% of the direct cost for standby rights offerings. Moreover, they report that rights subscriptions are handled
by a bank that normally charges a fixed fee plus about 1.5% of the value of shareholder subscriptions.
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and symmetric in the sense of definition 1 and 2.
Definition 1 An inspection is said to be informative if q (Vi j vd > q (Vi I Vj) > q (Vi I Vk)
for i adjacent to j, and i not adjacent to k.
Definition 2 An inspection is said to be symmetric if q (Vi I Vj) = q (Vj I vd Vi, j.
Definition 1 says that the probability of concluding any particular type Vi decreases
with the difference in value between Vi and the type being inspected. Let the pure strategy
ao = {pPo, sro, uro} have the interpretation that a type {}issuer first approaches a private
investor and then follows the optimal strategy in this subgame. If the private investor
rejects the issuer, use a standby underwritten offering and follow the optimal strategy in
this subgame. If the underwriter rejects the offer, use an uninsured rights offering.
Taking the number of new shares as given, the bargaining subgame that starts after an
inspection can only succeed if the breach-price of the issuer (his lowest acceptable price) is
below the breach-price of the the private investor or the underwriter (their highest accept-
able prices). Denote the breach-prices of a type Vi issuer and the investor given inspection
result Vj as Bj1(vj) and Bm(vj), respectively (m = pp, sr and i,j = 1,2,3). The breach-
price of the issuer is determined by the expected price that he will get in the continuation
game that starts after a bargaining fails. The breach-price of the investor is determined
by the expected value of the issuer under the post-inspection equilibrium beliefs 'l/Jm(-).
Consider the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If the inspection is informative and symmetric, the following strategies are
part of a sequential equilibrium (i = 1,2,3 and m = pp, sr):
(b) If BfP({}) <= Bsr({}) then propose offerprice Bsr({}), otherwise propose offerprice
BfP({}).
(e) For the investors, "accept" all offerprices greater than or equal to Bm({}), "reject" all
offerprices lower than Bm({})
Proof By example •
Table 5.1 presents an example of an equilibrium that satisfies proposition 3. Any issuer
with low current shareholder takeup first tries to float the new equity using a private
placement. If the inspection by the private investor concludes type QJ, all types propose an
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offerprice of 185 to the private investor, which makes him indifferent between accepting and
rejecting the offer. If the inspection by the private investor concludes type ~2' the lowest
offerprice acceptable to the private investor is 136, while the highest offerprice acceptable
to the high-value issuer is 150. Thus, there exists no offerprice that is optimally proposed
by the issuer and that is accepted by the private investor. The reason is that using a
standby rights offer has expected issue cost for the high-value type of 6.98, which is less
than the 9.86 issue costs for private placement following the type ~2 inspection conclusion.
In the standby rights subgame, if the underwriter concludes the inspection with type 1L'l,
all issuer types propose offerprice 160, which is accepted by the underwriter. This gives the
high-value type issue costs of 6.23. If the inspection conclusion is type ~2' the high-value
type would experience issue costs of 12.98 when proposing the lowest acceptable offerprice
to the underwriter. This exceeds the net present value of the projects. Since the issue costs
for the high-value type in an uninsured rights offering will be 19.96, it is optimal for the
high-value type not to issue. Even if 1L'l foregoes the project, types ~l and ~2 optimally
propose an offerprice that the underwriter accepts. This results in costs of 1.41 for type ~2
in the standby rights offering. If the inspection conclusion is ~l' type ~2 is best off proposing
an offerprice that the underwriter rejects, and then using an uninsured rights offering to
save on the direct issue costs. This strategy yields expected costs in the uninsured rights
offer of 5.68, while the standby rights offer costs would have been 5.83.
Given equilibrium beliefs formed using the prior distribution of types, the equilibrium
strategies and inspection results, the proposed equilibrium is sustained if no type can ob-
tain lower issue costs by deviating. The intuition for the existence of this equilibrium is
explained in two steps. First, it is argued why low-k issuers follow the equilibrium strate-
gies [pps, sre, uro} and {pPo, sr»}, Second, the equilibrium strategy of high-k issuers is
explained.
Any optimal strategy that includes inspection, must have PPo as the first action. This
result rests on the assumption that private placement investors and underwriters have iden-
tical inspection ability, and that the issuer-investor bargaining situations are set up so that
the issuer gets all the bargaining power. These two assumptions imply that the expected
wealth transfers are the same for these flotation methods. Thus, a type that optimally
chooses to be inspected, selects a private placement first since this has the lowest direct
costs. Given that inspection is informative, high-value firms with low-k also prefer a private
placement to an uninsured rights offer. There are two reasons for this. First, informative
inspection increases the probability put on the high-value type relative to the prior distri-
bution. Second, in the proposed equilibrium, low-k issuers that use an uninsured rights
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Table 5.1
Example of equilibrium in proposition 3
The inspection performed by the private investor and the underwriter is informative and symmetric. The
direct costs are highest for standby rights and lowest for private placements. The probability private investors
and underwriters put on facing each type is consistent with Bayes' rule using the prior distribution, the
inspection ability, and the equilibrium strategy. The equilibrium beliefs are not reported for this example.
(a) Exogenous parameters
Types Prior Inspection Direct costs Investment Project NPV
VI = 100
V2 = 130
V3 = 200
k = 0.95
Is. = 0.30
P(!!I) = p(vd = 0.17
P(!!2) = p(V2) = 0.16
P(!!3) = p(V3) = 0.17
q(VI I vi) = 0.80
q(V2 I V2) = 0.70
q(V3 I V3) = 0.80
q(vi I V2) = 0.05
(b) Equilibrium private placement subgame
Type VI
Breach Expected Breach
prices cost if prices Issue
Type issuer rejected investor cost
!!I 106 -1.23 109 -1.75
!!2 122 1.39 109 4.01
!!3 ~ 6.98 109 17.46
(c) Equilibrium standby rights subgame
Type VI
Breach Expected Breach
prices costs if prices Issue
Type issuer rejected investor cost
!!! 107 -0.44 105 -0.15
!!2 106 15.681 105 15.83)
!!3 [EQJ 10.00 105 19.82
(d) Equilibrium uninsured rights subgame
Low takeup types (k)
dpp = 0.15
dur = 0.20
dsr = 1.10
30 10
Inspection conclusions
Type V2 Type !!3
Breach Breach
prices Issue prices Issue
investor cost investor cost
136 -5.55 185 -9.60
136 -0.92 185 -6.20
1136) 9.86 185 1.74
Inspection conclusions
Type v2 Type v3
Breach Breach
prices Issue prices Issue
investor cost investor cost
127 -3.55 160 -6.91
127 1.41 160 -2.97
[ill] 12.98 160 6.23
High takeup types (k)
Breach costs
Breach
Forgo Standby prices Issue
project rights investor cost
10 1.29 144 -0.26
10 1.33 144 0.06
10 [ill 144 0.79
Breach
Breach prices Issue
Type costs investor cost Type
!!I 10 103 -0.44 VI
!!2 10 103 5.68 V2
!!3 10 103 119.961 V3
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offer have been rejected both by a private investor and an underwriter. The probability
that this happens is much larger for a low-value type than for a high-value type. Thus,
the equilibrium beliefs of market investor when they observe an uninsured rights offer by a
low-k type put large weight on the low-value type.
If the issuer is rejected by the private investor, the optimal strategy specifies that all
low-k firms contact an underwriter in order to discuss terms for a standby rights offering.
Conditional on the inspection result, Qs foregoes the project if the inspection concludes with
a wrong type. This is optimal since underwriter in this situation puts very little probability
on type V3 when forming beliefs. Thus the wealth transfer cost for old shareholders out-
weighs the net present value of the project. For the remaining types :QI and :Q2 the optimal
strategy specifies that they propose an offerprice that will be accepted by the underwriter
if the inspection concludes V2 and an offerprice that will be rejected if inspection concludes
VI' This is optimal as long as the expected costs of a standby rights offering are less than
the expected costs of forgoing the project or using an uninsured rights offering for type :Q2'
This is more likely to be the case the higher the precision of the underwriter inspection.
More precise inspection has the direct effect of reducing the wealth transfer costs and the
indirect effect of reducing the attractiveness of an uninsured rights offer. The indirect effect
is caused by an increase in the equilibrium probability market investors put on the low-value
firm when they observe an uninsured rights offer with low current shareholder takeup. If
the inspection concludes type :QI such that the issuer also is rejected by the underwriter,
issuer types :QI and :Q2 choose an uninsured rights offering as long as the net present value
of the project is higher than the issue costs.
Since preemptive rights are not waived for firms with a high takeup level, the high-
k types {VI,V2,V3} cannot deviate from the equilibrium using private placements. The
high-value type V3 does not deviate using a standby offering since the low direct costs of
uninsured rights and the relatively low wealth transfer caused by a high takeup outweigh
the advantage of reducing uncertainty about the type through underwriter inspection. The
types VI and V2 do not deviate because inspection is informative, implying that the weight
underwriters put on the high-value type when they are asked to stand by the issue of types
VI and V2 is less than the prior probability of this type.
Finally, the equilibrium specifies that private investors and underwriters optimally ac-
cept all offers larger or equal to their breach-prices. This is optimal because investors are
indifferent between accepting or rejecting the offer at the breach price, but make a profit if
the offerprice exceeds the breach-price. It follows that it cannot be optimal for the issuer
to offer a price higher than the investor's breach price. When the inspection in the private
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placement subgame concludes that the issuer is the high-value type 1L3,the breach-price of
the investor exceeds the breach-price of all issuer types, causing Bm(V3) to be the optimal
offer for the issuer. On the other hand, if the private investor concludes that the issuer is
the medium-value type Q2' the breach-price of the investor is below the breach-price of the
high-value issuer. Thus, the set of offerprices that gives both players non-negative payoff is
empty. The optimal action for the issuer is thus to propose any price in [0,B:J, which caus-
es the investor to reject. A similar situation arises in the standby rights offering subgame.
If the inspection conclusion is type Q2' any issuer type optimally proposes the offerprice
Bm(V3). When the inspection conclusion is type QI' the breach-price of the medium-value
investor Q2 exceeds the breach price of the underwriter and the bargaining fails.
5.2.2 Empirical implications
Proposition 3 yields testable predictions concerning the relative magnitude and sign of
abnormal returns around equity issue announcements. Since inspections are informative,
the probability that the private investor will accept a request for funds by a high-value issuer
is larger than the prior probability of a high-value type. Thus, when a private placement is
announced, the market infers that the probability of a high-value type is larger than that
given by the prior probability, causing a positive market reaction around the announcement.
When a standby rights offering is announced, market investors infer that the inspection
result of the private investor was either QI or Q2. Again, since inspections are informative,
this is a relatively unlikely outcome if the type of the issuer is 1L3.Thus, the probability
that the type is 1L3in a standby offering is less than the prior probability p(1L3). This results
in a negative market reaction when a standby offering is announced.
The market reaction at the announcement of an uninsured rights offering depends on the
expected current shareholder takeup level k. If an uninsured rights offering is announced
and the market expects the issue to get a high current shareholder takeup, the market
reaction should be positive. The good news come from the fact that ex ante, the pool of
potential issuers {QI,Q2,1L3,VI,V2,V3} is priced with positive probability on the event that
the high-value type with low current shareholder takeup 1L3forgos the project in equilibrium.
Thus, given that the market expect k to be high, the set of potential issuers is reduced to
{VI, V2, V3}. However, since no inspection is performed, the market reaction should be
positive but closer to zero than the market reaction to private placements. On the other
hand, if the expected takeup level is low, the issuer has been rejected by both a private
investor and an underwriter-which is a much more likelyevent if the issuer is the low-value
type. Thus, the revised beliefs of the market put a relatively high probability on the low-
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value type, causing a negative market reaction when the issue is announced. Moreover, since
the revised beliefs are formed conditional on a rejection by the underwriter, the probability
of a low-value type is larger for uninsured than for standby rights offering. This implies
that the market reaction to an uninsured rights offering by a firm with low expected takeup
should be more negative than the market reaction to a standby rights offering.
Proposition 3 also predicts that the average current shareholder takeup should be higher
for uninsured rights offerings than for standby rights offerings. This is consistent with the
findings of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997).
5.3 Sample characteristics
The empirical analysis examines a total of 381 rights offers and private placements on the
OSE over the period 1980-1996. The rights offer sample consists of 200 cases compiled by
Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997) from the years 1980-1993,10 as well as an added 28
cases collected here. These 28 cases and the private placements are identified by reading
annual reports published by the OSE. The announcement dates are found in either the OSE
Daily Bulletin or in newspapers covering business in Norway."!
Table 5.2 and table 5.3 show some descriptive statistics for the sample of Norwegian
equity issues and issuers. The SEa sample contains the population of offerings during the
period 1980-1996. The sample of private placements includes all offerings made to outside
investors. Offerings made under employee stock ownership plans are excluded. This gives
a total of 153 private equity offerings over the years 1984-1996. If the private placement is
made as part of a merger or an acquisition, other means of floating equity might not be a
viable option. For example, if the financing package in an acquisition involves bidder shares,
a rights offer cannot be used. In the language of section 5.2, we want all the sample firms
to be from the same typespace e of potential issuers. For this reason, market reactions to
the announcement of private placements should be studied both including and excluding
mergers and acquisitions. However, data on the use of proceeds from private placements
are limited. Fortunately, data on all mergers and acquisitions on OSE is available. Private
placements that potentially have been made in a merger or an acquisition are identified
101 thank the authors for making their data available. Of the 200 announcements in the Bøhren-Eckbo-
Michalsen data, 2 were modified for use in this paper.
llThe newspapers searched for announcements are Dagens Næringsliv and Aftenposten. Aftenposten is
searched using the computer searchable full-text database Atekst. Some announcementdates for private
placements 1996-1995 are from Garberg, Gifstad and Henriksen (1998). The private placements are collected
in cooperation with Øyvind Bøhren and Ståle Legreid.
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as those with an announcement date closer than one year to the date of a merger or an
acquisition. Excluding these reduces the private placements sample to 126 observations.
The second column of Table 5.2 shows the number of issues as a percent of the number
of firms listed on the OSE. In 1980 the number of issues relative to the number of firms
listed is 3.2%, while in 1986 this fraction is as high as 30.2%. In most years, however, the
fraction is between 10% and 20%-which is very high compared to the U.S. Even in the "hot
issue" market during the first part of the 1980s, the fraction of issues relative tu che Humber
of firms listed on New York Stock Exchange and American Stock Exchange is only about
10%. For the public offering sample, there is a tendency towards the exclusive use of standby
offerings towards the end of the sample period. In light of Eckbo and Masulis (1992), this
could be explained by a reduction in the expected current shareholder takeup towards the
end of the sample period. Consistent with this view, Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997)
report lower average takeup in the subperiod 1985-1993 than in the subperiod 1980-1984.
Panel (a) in table 5.3 provides descriptive statistics for issuers and issues. The table
reports a total of 228 public offerings and 153 private placements over the sample period.
These offerings are made by 116 and 91 different firms respectively. Thus, firms that float
new equity using rights offers, have on average issued new equity twice during our sample
period. For private placements the average firm issues 1.7 times over the sample period.
However, the average firm is not representative in that there are firms that issue new
equity with some consistency, while the majority of firms issue only once. For both the
public offering and private placement sample, about 60 firms issue only one time during the
sample period. The largest number of issues are 7 for the public offering sample and 6 for
the private placement sample.
For public offerings the size of both the issuer and the issue is considerably larger for
standby offerings than it is for uninsured rights offerings. However, the numbers are in
nominal terms, so part of the difference reflects the fact that most uninsured offerings are
made during the first part of the sample period while most of the standby offerings are from
the later years. The average offersize in private placements is NOK 120 million, which is
about 20 million less than the average offersize for rights offerings. Looking at the average
equity market value of the offering firms, the average size of firms offering equity through
standby rights offers and private placements is about the same. Note that firms floating
new equity through a public offering have a larger book-to-market ratio than firms placing
private equity. To the extent that the book-to-market ratio is a measure of the value of
assets in place relative to the value of the growth opportunities, this is not consistent with
the idea that private placements are used to resolve the underinvestment of Myers and
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Table 5.3
Descriptive statistics for seasoned equity offerings by aSE-listed firms in the
sample, 1980-1996
Public equity offerings
Private
Total Total Standby rights Uninsured rights placements
(a) Issue and issuer characteristics
Number of observations 381 228 148 80 153
Amount offered (NOK millions) 136 146 190 65 120
Market value of equity (NOK millions) 749 667 856 316 870
Book-to-market ratio 1.01 1.15 1.22 1.04 0.79
(b) Ownership characterist ics"
Percent holding by the ten largest owners
at the beginning of the issue year
Percent holding by the ten largest owners
at the end of the issue year
Percent holding by insiders"
at the beginning of the issue year
Percent holding by insiders
at the end of the issue year
57.42 (81) 56.77 (19) 64.96 (77)
57.95 (98) 47.89 (28) 65.81 (66)
8.31 (115) 6.35 (66) 18.13 (88)
6.16 (117) 4.99 (74) 15.44 (74)
"Ownership information is from the companies annual reports. Numbers in parentheses are number of
observations
blnsiders include the CEO and members of the board of directors
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Majluf (1984). Underinvestment arises because the wealth loss incurred by old shareholders
from selling undervalued equity outweighs the gain from realizing a project with positive net
present value. The underinvestment problem, and the subsequent need to resolve it using
private placement, is more likely to occur if the value of assets in place is large relative to
the value of growth opportunities (i.e., when the book-to-market ratio is high).
Panel (b) in table 5.3 provides information about the ownership structure of the issuing
firm. The aggregated holdings of the ten largest shareholders reveal that Norwegian compa-
nies have a relatively concentrated ownership structure. It is interesting to see that there is
only a very small increase in average concentration for firms that do private placements of
equity. Together with the high concentration, this suggests that monitoring of management
hardly increases as a result of the private placement.
Table 5.4 describes takeup characteristics for the public offering sample. The takeup for
an issue is defined as the fraction of the issue acquired by the old shareholders of the issuing
company. In a rights offering, the current shareholders are given a short-term warrant for
each stock they own. Following Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), it is assumed that
each warrant is traded only once, so that takeup can be proxied by one minus the fraction
of warrants traded in the secondary market.
Consistent with the model developed in section 5.2, panel (a) of table 5.4 shows that
current shareholder takeup tends to be higher for uninsured rights offerings than for standby
offerings. The mean takeup for uninsured rights is 94.4% while the mean takeup for standby
rights is 84.8%. The corresponding numbers using median to measure differences are 96.4%
and 91.5%. Panel (b) and (c) show takeup in two subsamples created by splitting the public
offering sample according to whether or not the issue had a takeup above or below the
median takeup. As predicted by the model, a disproportionately large number of uninsured
rights offerings are in the subsample with above median takeup, and a disproportionately
large number of standby rights offerings are in the subsample with below median takeup.
The subsamples also reveal a "non-linearity" in the data. Panel (b) of table 5.4 shows
that issues with below median takeup exhibit the same tendency as the overall sample-
uninsured rights have a higher takeup than standby rights. However, panel (c) shows that
the takeup in the above-median subsample is similar for both offer types.
98 CHAPTER 5. EQUITY FLOTATION METHOD CHOICE
Table 5.4
Current shareholder takeup in seasoned equity offerings by OSE-listed firms in
the sample, 1980-1996
Takeup is defined as the fraction of the issue acquired by the old shareholders. Assuming that each warrants
issued in a rights offering only is traded once, takeup is proxied by one minus the fraction of warrants sold
in the secondary market.
N Mean STD 90% 75% 50% 25% 10%
(a) All issues
Uninsured rights 80 94.38 7.03 98.89 97.99 96.43 93.44 89.63
Standby rights 148 84.81 17.14 99.27 96.34 91.47 79.68 61.17
Total 228 88.17 15.11 99.08 97.34 93.93 84.77 69.40
(b) Issues with below median takeup
Uninsured rights 24 87.68 9.91 93.60 93.19 91.78 . 87.74 74.64
Standby rights 90 76.76 17.76 92.48 89.68 81.52 70.82 52.65
Total 114 79.06 16.98 93.43 91.51 84.77 73.11 55.27
(c) Issues with above median takeup
Uninsured rights 56 97.24 1.41 99.08 98.24 97.32 96.28 95.19
Standby rights 58 97.31 2.05 1.00 99.27 97.40 95.33 94.51
Total 114 97.28 1.76 1.00 98.00 97.34 95.80 94.98
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5.4 Announcement day abnormal returns
Six month abnormal stock price run-up and announcement day abnormal returns for issuer
i are computed using the following market model:
2
ru = ai + (3irmt +L "tijdjt + Eit,
j=l
where ru is continuously compounded daily return on firm i and Trnt is continuously com-
pounded daily return on a value weighted market portfolio of all OSE-listed firms. The
estimation period starts on trading day -310 relative to the announcement date and ends
on trading day +160 relative to the announcement date. Issues with less than four months
(82 trading dates) of data prior to the announcement are excluded from the analysis. This
reduces the standby- and rights offering samples with 5 and 4 observations respectively. The
private placement sample is reduced with 17 observations (14 observations if mergers are
excluded). The resulting estimation period is 471 trading dates (the maximum) for about
&8% of the issues, and the shortest estimation period is 244 trading dates. Two dummy
variables are included to capture abnormal stock price run-up prior to the announcement
and the announcement period return. The first dummy variable, dlt, takes on a value of
one on event dates days -130 through -4, and zero otherwise.V Announcement period
abnormal returns are estimated using both a two-day and a four-day window ending on the
announcement day. In the former specification, the dummy variable d2t takes on a value of
one on event dates -1 and O, and zero otherwise. The percentage abnormal return for a
w-day event window is w x "tij X 100. Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return,
the following test statistic converges in distribution to the standard normal distribution
I
N,
_ "tij
Zj - 1NLa'v IV i=l l)
where iij is the OLS estimate of "tij, and aij is the estimated standard error of this estimate.
Table 5.5 reports the abnormal stock price run-up and announcement day abnormal
returns for the public offering and private placement samples. Event studies of U.S. seasoned
equity offerings have typically used a two-day event window to measure the announcement
effect. However, event studies of private placements (e.g., Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and
Smith (1993)) use a four-day announcement window. The results for the present Norwegian
12Event dates are trading dates relative to the announcement date, which is defined to be event date O.
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samples are sensitive to this choice. Thus, table 5.5 report announcement period abnormal
return using both a two-day and a four-day event window.
The results for the public offering sample are very similar to the findings of Bøhren, Eck-
bo and Michalsen (1997). The two-day announcement period abnormal return for standby
rights offerings are negative but statistically insignificant, while uninsured rights offerings
show a positive abnormal return of about 1.0% (statistically significant at the 10% level).
The results for standby rights offerings remain unchanged when using a four-day announce-
ment window. Uninsured rights offerings, on the other hand, show a highly statistically
significant four-day announcement period return of about 2.1%. That is, uninsured rights
offerings outperform the market by on average 50 basis point each day in the four-day win-
dow ending at the issue announcement date.P The announcement period abnormal returns
for public offerings reported in table 5.5 are consistent with the model predictions from
section 5.2. Based on this model, the pool of issues that uses standby rights in equilibrium
has lower average value than the post issue pool of potential issuers. This cause a negative
market reaction when the standby rights issue is announced.
. The market reaction to uninsured rights offers are on average positive. This is also con-
sistent with the predictions of the model. However, the model also predicts that uninsured
rights offers by firms with low takeup should be met with a negative market reaction that is
larger than the negative market reaction for standby rights offers. Using observed takeup as
a proxy for the expected takeup, there is only weak evidence of this in the data. A regression
of two-day abnormal returns for uninsured rights offerings on current shareholder takeup
produces a negative and statistically significant coefficient (regression not reported.) When
the sample is divided in two using the median takeup, the high-takeup sample shows an
average two-day abnormal return of 1.33% and the low-takeup sample an average abnormal
return of 0.82%. However, the difference in average abnormal return between the groups is
not statistically different from zero using a standard t-test (t-test not reported.)
The announcement period abnormal returns for private placements resembles those for
uninsured rights. Using a two-day announcement period, the abnormal return is positive
but statistically insignificant. Adding another two days to the event window increases the
announcement day abnormal return to a statistically significant 2.7%-or almost 68 basis
13This effect ends with the four-day window. Increasing the window beyond four days decreases the daily
average abnormal return. There are several possible explanations for the finding that a four-day window
produces larger abnormal returns than the usual two-day window. The most likely explanation is that some
of the sample issuers experience infrequent trading such that there exists no price in the two-day event
window. However, it could be caused by either imprecise announcement dates or information leakage prior
to the official announcements.
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Table 5.5
Average pre-announcement date run-up and announcement-day abnormal
returns to OSE-listed firms making public and private equity
offerings, 1980-1996
Six month run-up and announcement day abnormal returns for issuer i are computed using the following
market model:
2
rit = Gi + f3irmt + L "'(ijdjt + fit,
j=1
where rit is daily return on firm i, rmt is daily return on a value weighted market portfolio of all OSE-
listed firms. The estimation period is a total of 471 trading dates, starting on trading day -310 relative to
the announcement date and ending on trading day +160 relative to the announcement date. The dummy
variable dit takes on a value of one on trading days -130 through -4. The dummy variable d2t takes on a
value of one in either a two-day or a four-day window ending at the announcement day. The percentage
abnormal return for a w-day event window is w x "'(ij X 100. Under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal
return, the following test statistic converge in distribution to the standard normal
IN,
'" "'(ijZj = r.r ~-:;-.
vN ;=1 (fij
Where "tij is the OLS estimate of "'(ij, and iTij is the standard error of this estimate. Returns are continuously
compounded. The parentheses contain number of observations and p-values. The p-values are for two-sided
tests.
Public equity offerings Private placements
Standby rights Uninsured rights Including mergers Excluding mergers
Six-months 4.60 9.15 18.52 20.32
runup (143; .004) (76; .028) (136; .000) (112 : .000)
Two-day announce- -0.58 0.95 1.39 1.00
ment return (143; .234) (76; .088) (136; .058) (112 : .318)
Four-day announce- -0.55 2.11 2.66 2.66
ment return (143; .502) (76; .000) (136; .022) (112; .050)
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point per day. These results are consistent with the findings of Wruck (1989) and Hertzel
and Smith (1993) on U.S. data and with Kang and Stulz (1996) on Japanese data.l" As
recognized by Wruck (1989), the announcement day abnormal return measures the combined
wealth effect for old shareholders of the new information and the effect of selling a fraction
of the company at a discount or premium. In other words, the announcement effect is the
information effect net of issue cost. The return to old shareholders due to the information
effect can be measured using an adjusted abnormal return:
AAR = (_1 ) AR _ (_8 ) (POffer - Pa-4),
1 - 8 1 - 8 Pa-4
(5.2)
where 8 is the fraction of the company owned by the new private investors after the pri-
vate placements, POffer is the offer price, Pa-4 is the market price four days prior to the
announcement day, and AR is the four-day abnormal stock return. To look at an example:
Suppose the private investor will own 20% of the shares after the issue (8 = .2), and the
average four-day announcement period abnormal return is 2.6% (AR= 0.026). In order for
"issue costs" to explain the positive announcement day effect, the issue must be placed at
a' premium of 13%. Table 5.6 reports AAR using the observations for which the placement
prices are available.
Looking at the first row of table 5.6, the average private equity placement gives the
new investors a holding of approximately 24% of the post issue company. Surprisingly,
the average holding is acquired at a premium of 3.5% when mergers and acquisitions are
included, and at a 0.9% premium when mergers and acquisitions are excluded. However,
neither of these numbers are significantly different from zero at conventional levels using
a standard t-test. J." a robustness check, the sample is trimmed by excluding extreme
observations. The weak trimming excludes observations with a discount less than 60%
or a premium higher than 60%, the medium and strong trimming use 40% and 20% as
cutoff percentages, respectively. The trimmed samples also exhibit a positive premium.
although smaller and still not statistically different from zero. Even though the average
premium is positive, the average adjusted abnormal returns (AAR) are positive and larger
than the average unadjusted abnormal returns (AR). This can only happen if the private
placements with a positive premium typically give new investors a smaller fraction of the
post issue company (i.e., 8 is low) than placements that are done at a discount. Computing
14Using a sample of 128 private placements, Wruck (1989) reports a four-day announcement period ab-
normal returnof about 4.4%, while Hertzel and Smith (1993) report a slightly lower abnormal return. Kang
and Stulz (1996) find a cumulated abnormal return of 2.13% in a sample of 69 private equity offerings in
Japan.
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Table 5.6
Average adjusted four-day announcement-day abnormal returns to OSE-listed
firms making private equity offerings,1984-1996
The return to old shareholders due to the information effect can be measured using an adjusted abnormal
return:
AAR= C~8) AR- C~8) (POff;a~:a-4),
where 8 is the fraction of the company owned by the new private investors after the private placements,
Poe« is the offer price, Pa-4 is the market price four days prior to the announcement day, and AR is
the four-day abnormal stock return. The sample trimming excludes extreme observations: weak trimming
exclude observations with a discount less than 60% or a premium higher than 60%, the medium and strong
trimming use 40% and 20% as cutoff percentages, respectively.
Including mergers Excluding mergers
Sample trimming N Prem 8 AR AAR N Prem 8 AR AAR
None 133 3.56 23.96 2.67 37.19 109 0.92 23.65 2.67 42.34
Weak [-60%, +60%] 115 0.41 20.79 1.81 5.85 94 0.81 20.13 1.49 5.58
Medium [-40%, +40%] 109 1.39 20.30 1.38 4.85 90 1.95 19.96 1.46 4.91
Strong [-20%, +20%] 87 0.70 17.99 1.07 2.29 72 1.06 16.60 1.37 1.79
an average premium by weighting each observation with 8 confirms this. Under the weak
sample trimming, the weighted average premium is -2.7% (i.e., a discount). The full sample
shows huge AARs, but looking at the trimmed samples, these seem to be driven by outliers
in the data. Nevertheless, the trimmed samples show AARs that are more than twice the
size of the unadjusted abnormal returns-implying a large positive information effect from
the announcement of private placements.
An alternative explanation ot the positive announcement period return for private place-
ments is that higher shareholder concentration increases monitoring of management. Panel
(a) in table 5.7 explores this hypothesis by dividing the sample in two groups based on
whether shareholder concentration increased or decreased over the year of the private place-
ment. There is no evidence of a differences in abnormal return in these groups. In fact,
the group of issuers that experienced decreased shareholder concentration in the offering
year have the largest announcement period returns. Panel (b) in table 5.7 reports the co-
efficients from a regression of abnormal returns on shareholder concentration and percent
insider holding. Under the monitoring hypothesis we should expect less abnormal perfor-
mance for highly concentrated firms, resulting in a negative 'Yl. The regression provides
no evidence to support this. Also note that the two-day announcement period returns are
positively related to the insider holdings at the beginning of the offering year. This is not-
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consistent with the hypothesis that private investors form an alliance with management to
extract corporate control benefits.
Table 5.7
Ownership structure and abnormal announcement period returns for
OSE-listed firms making private equity offerings,1984-1996
The regression variable, soxe and I~SIDE are shareholder concentration and insider holdings respectively.
Shareholder concentration is measured as the percentage total shareholdings of the ten largest stockholders.
Insider holdings include the shareholdings of the CEO and the board of directors. The regression in panel
(b) uses the concentration and insider holdings from the beginning of the offering year.
(a) Change in shareholder concentration and abnormal announcement period return
Including mergers Excluding mergers
Decreased Increased Test of Decreased Increased Test of
shareholder shareholder difference shareholder shareholder difference
concentration concentration (p-valne) concentration concentration (p-value)
Two-day announce- 3.02 1.16 .403 3.34 1.62 .491
ment return
Four-day announce- 4.23 2.75 .654 5.01 3.63 .696ment return
(b) Regression: AR = /'0 + /'1CONC + /'2INSIDE
Dependent
variable /'0 /'1 /'2 /'0 /'1 /'2
Two-day announce-
0.03 -0.05 0.097 0.04 -0.06 0.09
ment return
(.918) (.333) (0.041) (.260) (.287) (.082)
Four-day announce- -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.05
ment return (.831 ) (.520) (.532) (.999) (.607) ( .537)
The announcement period abnormal returns for private placements reported in tables 5.5
and 5.6 are to some extent as predicted by the model developed in section 5.2. Announcing
a private placement causes a positive market reaction. This is consistent with the idea
that (imperfect) inspection by the private investor certifies that the issuer is a high-value
company. The lack of any statistically significant discounts for the private investors may
indicate that the issuer has most of the bargaining power when the offerprice is determined.
This could be explained by competition among private investors to participate in private
placements. The model in section 5.2 also predicts that the announcement period abnormal
returns for private placements should be greater than the announcement periodabnormal
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returns for uninsured rights offerings. Based on a two-day announcement period, the data
gives no support for this prediction. At conventional levels of statistical significance, the
1.0% abnormal return for private placements (excluding mergers) is not different from the
0.95% abnormal return for uninsured rights offering. On the other hand, the adjusted four-
day abnormal returns reported in table 5.6 give some indications that the announcement
effect is larger for private placements than for uninsured rights.
In sum, announcing a standby rights offering seems to produce a negative market re-
action, while announcements of uninsured rights and private placements are regarded as
good news. Moreover, there is weak evidence of abnormal returns induced by the private
placement information effect that is larger than the abnormal returns for uninsured rights
offerings. These results are largely consistent with the model developed in section 5.2.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter develops a model of equity flotation method choice by extending the theoretical
developments in Eckbo and Masulis (1992). The model is specifically design to explain the
choice among private placements, standby rights offerings, and uninsured rights offerings-
which represent the complete range of flotation methods used on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
In the model, private investors and investment banks (underwriters) perform a private
inspection of the companies that seek project financing. The knowledge about firm quality
acquired during the inspection allows a credible quality certification of high-value firms.
Thus, these firms can raise funds at more favorable conditions than would have been possible
without the inspection. Firms that are rejected by a private investor, may withdraw the
issue or use uninsured rights or rights with standby underwriting. Since the rejection by the
private investor is based on an informative inspection, the expected issuer-value for private
placements exceeds that for uninsured rights and standby rights.
An event study of the market reactions to announcements of private placements, standby
rights, and uninsured rights largely produces results that are consistent with the model.
As in Bohren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), announcing a standby rights offering gives a
negative market reaction, while announcements of uninsured rights are regarded as good
news. Consistent with the findings of Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) on U.S.
private equity offerings, and Kang and Stulz (1996) on Japanese offerings, the announcement
of private placements on the OSE produces positive abnormal announcement period returns.
Since private placements have lower direct costs than standby rights and since the model
assumes that private investors and underwriters have equal inspection ability, the model
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implies that in equilibrium the pool of firms using private placements have higher average
value than the pool of firms that use standby rights. This prediction receives support
by the evidence, in that two-day abnormal returns following announcements of private
placements are positive and larger than the abnormal returns for standby rights offerings.
An alternative hypothesis for the positive announcement period abnormal returns observed
for private placements holds that higher shareholder concentration increases management
monitoring. However, there is no evidence that the announcement effect is greater for the
subsample of private placements with the greater increase in shareholder concentration over
the year of the issue. Overall, these results indicate that information asymmetry between
firms and investors is an important consideration when firms decide on cost efficient ways
to float new equity.
Chapter 6
SEQ performance: The Norwegian
evidence
Chapter 4 looked at insufficient control for risk as a potential explanation for the "new
issues puzzle". This chapter explores the timing hypothesis (or windows-of-opportunity
hypothesis) and the underreaction hypothesis as alternative explanations for the "new issues
puzzle". Empirical predictions of these hypotheses are tested using data on Norwegian
private and public equity offerings. The prediction that issuers with less timing incentive
should have better long-run performance than issuers with strong timing incentive and the
prediction that the announcement period abnormal return should be positively correlated
with the long-run abnormal return, are tested using severallong-run performance measures.
Neither the timing-hypothesis nor the underreaction hypothesis receive support by the
reported evidence.
6.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the market reaction to equity offerings in light of issue-timing and
investor overconfidence. The timing-hypothesis builds on the notion that investors are overly
optimistic about the prospects of issuing firms, and as a consequence do not fully incorporate
into prices managers incentive to time an equity issue. This results in initial overpricing of
issuing firms and a subsequent long-run underperformance when investors correct this initial
mispricing over time. Apart from the long-run underperformance prediction, this argument
implies that equity offerings where managers have less incentive to time the issue, should
have better long-run stock return performance than offerings where managers have a strong
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incentive to time the issue. If managers behave in the interest of current shareholders, the
incentive to time an issue should be less the larger the current shareholders takeup.
The overconfidence hypothesis of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) is closely
related, but is derived in a formal model and carries some explicit empirical predictions. The
overconfidence hypothesis is based on the assumption that investors are overconfident about
the precision of their private information, but not about the precision of public information.
Overweighting private information relative to public information causes underreaction to
new public information. Thus, the theory predicts that discretionary corporate events
(such as equity issues) associated with abnormal announcement period returns, on average
should be followed by long-run abnormal performance of the same sign as the average
announcement period abnormal return, and there should be a positive correlation between
the announcement period abnormal return and the long-run abnormal return.
Several empirical papers have explored different aspects of the timing- and overconfi-
dence hypotheses. Rangan (1995) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) look at discretionary
accruals in the years around an equity offering. The idea is that if investors are overly op-
timistic about the prospect of firms that issue equity, the optimism could potentially have
been induced by the issuing firms through reporting of inflated earnings. Both papers find
evidence of earnings management prior to seasoned equity offerings. For example, Teoh,
Welch and Wong (1998b) find that although cash flows from operations are declining prior
to the issue, the reporting of discretionary accruals leads earnings to peak around the is-
sue. Moreover, the amount of discretionary accruals prior to the seasoned equity offering is
negatively related to the post-issue long-run stock return performance. The authors view
this as evidence in favor of timing and overly optimistic investors.
Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) employ a direct test of the relationship between
the incentive to time an issue and the subsequent stock return performance. They study
voluntary and involuntary SEas by commercial banks. Capital regulations in the banking
industry state that banks are not allowed to have total capital ratios below a certain level.
If the total capital ratio falls below the regulated lower bound, a bank may need to issue
new equity to raise their capital ratio. Cornett, Mehran and Tehranian (1998) define an
involuntary SEa as an issue by a bank with capital ratio close to or below the required
minimum ratio. If timing is driving the long-run underperformance of SEas, we should
expect to see less or no underperformance for involuntary issues. The results support the
timing hypothesis, showing no abnormal three-year post issue stock return performance for
the involuntary issues, while the voluntary issues show significant underperformance.
Brous, Datar and Kini (1998) perform another test of the timing- and overconfidence
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hypotheses. They argue that if managers are timing equity issues and investors system-
atically underreact to the issue announcements, we should expect to see that investors
get disappointed when firms convey their post-issue earnings. That is, post-issue earnings
announcement should on average be associated with negative stock price reactions. The
results show no evidence of abnormal stock price reactions to the earnings announcements.
Kang, Kim and Stulz (1997) tests the overconfidence hypothesis using data on Japanese
public and private equity offerings. The non-negative announcement period abnormal re-
turn to Japanese equity offerings supports the view that equity offerings are regarded as
good news in Japan. Nonetheless, they document post-issue negative long run abnormal
performance. Taken at face value, this is evidence against the overconfidence hypothesis.
Using data on Norwegian public and private equity offerings, this chapter provides sev-
eral contributions to the long-run performance literature. First, although the Norwegian
stock market is of marginal importance for international investors, equity offerings in Nor-
way have some interesting institutional features that allow us to conduct experiments not
possible on U.S. data. In particular, almost all public seasoned equity offerings in Norway
are conducted using rights offers. This will allow a direct test of the timing hypothesis.
Assume that managers have approximate knowledge of the fraction of an issue that is going
to be taken up by current shareholders. If current shareholders will subscribe to a large
portion of the issue, managers have less incentive to time the issue in order to exploit tem-
porary overvaluation. Therefore, under the timing hypothesis, there should be less or no
long-run underperformance for these issues.
Second, this chapter provides the first evidence in the literature on the correlation
(or lack thereof) between announcement period abnormal returns and long-run abnormal
performance. This enables a direct test of one of the predictions of the overconfidence
hypothesis.
Third, as pointed out by Kang, Kim and Stulz (1997), knowledge of whether the neg-
ative long-run performance found in the U.S. also holds in other countries may shed light
on whether the U.S. results are due to chance (as argued by Fama (1998).) If the under-
performance found in the U.S. data is a result of chance, we should expect to find normal
pertorrnance for SEOs in other countries.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the relationship
between equity offering methods and the timing-incentive. Section 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 esti-
mate long-run performance for private and public equity offerings using the matching firm
procedure and the Jensen's alpha approach respectively. Section 6.4 concludes.
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6.2 Offertype and timing incentive
Assuming that managers behave in the interest of current shareholders, they have incentive
to time an equity issue with low expected current shareholder takeup to a period where the
company's stocks are overvalued.! On the other hand, as current shareholders are expected
to take up a larger portion of the new issue, the incentive to time the issue diminishes.
Thus, under the timing hypothesis, there should be less or no long-run underperformance
for issues with a high current shareholder takeup.
The model of Eckbo and Masulis (1992) and the model presented in chapter 5 imply
that firms are more likely to choose standby rights as the flotation method if the expected
current shareholder takeup is low. This relationship between takeup and flotation method
is supported by the empirical evidence in Bøhren, Eckbo and Michalsen (1997). They find
that the probability of choosing standby rights as the flotation method decreases statistically
significant with the expected current shareholder takeup. Since managers decision whether
or not to time an issue must be based on their predictions of current shareholder takeup, an
issue timed to exploit overvaluation is more likely to be floated using standby rights. Thus,
the timing hypothesis predicts that the long-run abnormal performance should be worse for
standby rights than for uninsured rights.
Chapter 5 documents statistically significant positive announcement period abnormal
returns for private placements. This is consistent with the findings of Wruck (1989) and
Hertzel and Smith (1993) for private placement of equity in the U.S., and Kang and Stulz
(1996) for Japanese private placements. Wruck (1989) presents evidence in favor of the
hypothesis that the abnormal returns are positive because a private placement aligns the
interest of managers and shareholders through more efficient monitoring or by increasing
the probability of a value-enhancing takeover. Chapter 5 and Hertzel and Smith (1993)
argue that the positive announcement effect for private placements may be explained by
the resolution of the "underinvestment" problem pointed out by Myers and Majluf (1984).
Under either of these theories, management is not able (or have no incentive) to time an
issue to a period of overvaluation. Thus, the timing hypothesis predicts that the long-run
performance of firms conducting private placements should be non-negative.
Table 6.1 sums up the theoretical predictions of the timing hypothesis and the underre-
action hypothesis.
lThe portion of the new shares purchased by current shareholders will be referred to as the current
shareholder "takeup" .
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Table 6.1
Theoretical predictions of the timing hypothesis and the underreaction
hypothesis
(a) The timing hypothesis
Long-run underperformance should be less for issues with a large current shareholder takeup ·"ar. f"f issues
with low takeup.
Long-run underperformance should be less for issues floated using uninsured rights than for issues floated
using standby rights offers.
Long-run underperformance should be non-negative for private placements.
(b) The underreaction hypothesis
If the announcement of an equity issues is associated with abnormal announcement period returns, the long-
run abnormal performance should on average be of the same sign as the announcement period abnormal
return, and there should be a positive correlation between the announcement period abnormal return and
the long-run abnormal return.
6.3 Results
Two procedures are implemented in order to estimate long-run abnormal performance.
First, under the matched control firm procedure, abnormal returns are estimated using the
realized stock return to a non-issuing firm matched to have similar risk characteristics as
that of the issuer. Second, under the factor model procedure, a multi-factor return generating
process il>used to form expected one-period returns for both issuing firms and non-issuing
matched-firms.
6.3.1 Performance using matched control firms as benchmark
The performance measures used in this section is similar to the one used by Loughran and
Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995). For a firm that announces an issue
in month t: a size- and book-to-market matched control firm is selected as follows: (1)
All firms on OSE are ranked based on market capitalization (size) in month t. Then all
companies with an equity capitalization in the interval [(vd1.3), 1.3vil are identified, where
Vi is the market value of the issuer's common stock at the end of month t. The company
within this size-interval with the closest book-to-market ratio to the issuer is then selected
as the matching firm, (3) the holding period returns for the issuer and the matching firm
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are computed between the month after the announcement day and the earlier of the three-
year anniversary date and the delisting date for the issuer, (4) if the matching firm delists
a new matching firm is chosen as described above but using the delisting date instead of
the announcement date, and (5) if the matching firm issues equity it is treated as if it was
delisted.
The first rows of panel (a) in table 6.2 report three-year holding-period return for the
sample of Norwegia •. public and private equity offerings when the matching firm is selected
based on size only. Both for public offerings and private placements, the issuing firms
have lower three-year holding period returns than their corresponding matching firms. The
average abnormal performance for public offerings is a statistically insignificant -7.1%,
while private placements show a negative performance of about 25 percent (statistically
significant at around the 8% level). However, results change when using size/book-to-market
as matching criteria. The first two rows of panel (b) of table 6.2 show that both offertypes
still have negative long-run abnormal returns, but with size/book-to-market matching the
underperformance of public offerings is more severe than the underperformance of private
placements. The average three-year holding period return for public offerings is 42.6%, while
matching firms have an average holding period return of 65.2%. The -22.6% abnormal
return is significant at the 10% level using bootstrapped p-values and at the 5% level
using a standard t-test. The private placement sample shows negative three-year abnormal
performance (-10.4%), but this is not statistically different from zero. Thus, the evidence
in table 6.2 shows that there is some evidence of a "new issues puzzle" for Norwegian
public equity offerings, especially when using sizejbook-to-market matched firms as the
benchmark. Given the difference in results using size and size/book-to-market matching,
the rest of the discussion of table 6.2 will mainly be based on the results using size/book-
to-market matching. There are two reasons for this. First, since we know that both size
and book-to-market ratio are related to the cross-section of asset returns, size/book-to-
market matching should give a better match than size matching only. Second, the findings
of Jegadeesh (1997) indicate that as long as one control for differences in book-to-market
ratio, adding other matching criteria only affects long-run abnormal performance marginally.
Next the results of table 6.2 is viewed in light of the timing hypothesis. As argued in
section 6.2, the incentive to time an issue is increasing in the current shareholder takeup.
Thus, under the timing hypothesis, the long-run performance should be worse for rights
offerings with below median takeup than for offerings with above median takeup. The results
in the last two rows of table 6.2 lend no support in favor of this argument. The three-year
holding period return for issuers with below median current shareholder takeup is 38.8%,
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Table 6.2
Three-year buy-and-hold returns (%) to OSE-listed firms making public and
private equity offerings, and their matched control sample, 1980-1993
The matches are chosen using size- and size/book-to-market matching. The size-matching is done using
the equity market value of the issuer in the month prior to the issue announcement. Size/book-to-market
matching is done by first selecting all companies that have an equity market value within 30% of that
of the issuer. Then the company with the closest book-to-market value is chosen as the matching firm.
Monthly book-to-market rankings in year t are created by dividing the end-of-year book-value from year
t - 1 with monthly market capitalizations for year t. Numbers in the columns marked "issuer" and "matcl."
are computed using: ~~ [It (1+ R,t) - 1] x 100
The p-values in the column marked p(t) are p-values of the t-statistic using a two-sided test of no difference
in average five-year buy-and-hold return for issuer and matching firms. The p-values in the column marked
p(N) are bootstrapped p-values of a two-sided test.
Issue type DifferenceN Issuer Match p(N) p(t)
0.640 00458
0.Q78 0.080
0.360 0.261
0.795 0.731
0.548 0.461
0.902 0.762
0.080 0.033
0.302 0.390
0.072 0.087
0.296 0.193
0.285 0.222
0.089 0.077
(a) Size matching
All public offerings
All private placements
Standby rights
Uninsured rights
Below Median takeup
Above Median takeup
227 44.5
150 20.4
147 31.8
80 67.9
114 39.7
113 49.3
(b) Size- and book-to-market matching
All public offerings
All private placements
Standby rights
Uninsured rights
Below Median takeup
Above Median takeup
221
147
42.6
20.0
51.6 -7.1
45.3 -24.9
45.5 -13.7
62.7 5.1
49.8 -10.1
53.4 -4.1
65.2 -22.6
30.4 -lOA
53.1 -22.2
87.4 -23.3
56.1 -17.3
74.4 -27.9
143
78
111
110
30.9
64.1
38.8
46.5
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while the corresponding return for matching firms is 56.1%. The -17.3% abnormallong-run
return is not statistically significant at conventionallevels. Issuers with above median takeup
experience an even worse negative long-run performance (-27.9%), statistically significant
at the 10% level using both bootstrapped and t-statistic based p-values. Moreover, using a
standard t-test of difference in means, the null hypothesis of no difference in the abnormal
long-run returns of the two median-divided subsamples cannot be rejected.
Under the overconfidence hypothesis, announcement period abnormal returns represent
an underreaction to the release of new information. Thus, given the sign of the abnormal
announcement period returns in table 5.5 and 5.6, the overconfidence hypothesis predicts
that the average abnormal long-run return of standby rights should be (weakly) negative,
while uninsured rights and private placements should show positive long-run abnormal
returns. The standby rights offerings show a weakly negative long-run performance, which
is consistent with the prediction of the overconfidence hypothesis. However, the uninsured
rights and private placements do not show positive long-run abnormal returns. Thus, the
results in table 6.2 lend only weak support in favor of the overconfidence hypothesis. In order
to test the prediction that announcement period abnormal return and long-run abnormal
return should be positively correlated, long-run abnormal returns are regressed on a constant
and the announcement period abnormal returns. Table 6.3 shows that the sign of the
relationship between the announcement day abnormal return and the long-run abnormal
return is as predicted for standby rightsofferings and for private placements, but not for
uninsured rights. Given that none of the coefficients are statistically different from zero,
the regressions in table 6.3 cannot support the overconfidence hypothesis.
Overall, the timing and overconfidence hypotheses receive little support from the evi-
dence on long-run performance using the matching firm benchmark. However, as shown in
chapter 4, long-run performance evaluation is very sensitive to the benchmark. Therefore,
the next section explores the performance of the Norwegian issuers using a factor-model
benchmark.
6.3.2 Performance using a factor-model as benchmark
Factor model procedures assume that expected returns are generated by a set of K pre-
specified risk factors. Following a tradition started by Jensen (1968), the abnormal return
of portfolio p is estimated by regressing the returns of portfolio p on a constant term ap
and the K risk factors. The estimated constant term is "Jensen's alpha" and represents
the average abnormal return on portfolio p over the estimation period. The expectation of
Jensen's alpha equals zero for passively held portfolios provided the specified factor model
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Table 6.3
The relationship between announcement period abnormal returns and
three-year buy-and-hold returns for OSE-listed firms making public and
private equity offerings, 1980-1996
The long-run abnormal returns are computed using size/book-to-market matching. Announcement period
returns are computed over a four-day window ending at the announcement day. The regression model is:
LRAR; = /30 + /31AR4i + €i,
where LRAR is percent long-run abnormal returns for issuer i and AR4 is percent four-day announcement
period abnormal return. Numbers in parenthesis are p-values.
Offer type N Average LRAR Average AR4 Intercept (/30) /31
Standby rights 135 -2l.9 -0.5 -2l.4 (.069) 1.12 (.488)
Uninsured rights 72 -22.3 2.1 -18.6 (.339) -1.87 (.476)
Private placements 129 -10.8 2.9 -12.3 (.312) 0.58 (.575)
adequately captures the pervasive risk factors underlying the economy. Jensen's alpha is
estimated using the K-factor model developed in chapter 3:
(6.1)
where rpt and Trnt. are portfolio return and returns on factor mimicking portfolios in excess
of the return on the risk free asset, the K-vector bpQmeasures average factor loadings, the
K L-vector bpI is designed to pick up predictable time-variation in factor loadings. The
motivation for the conditional model framework is the growing evidence that expected
returns are predictable using publicly available information.e In the presence of time-
varying expected returns. an estimate of Jensen's alpha derived from an unconditional
model is a biased measure of the true abnormal performance, and our conditional factor
model estimation represents an attempt to correct for this bias.
The dependent variables in the factor model regressions are the monthly returns to
equal- and value-weighted portfolios of security issuers. To illustrate, the value-weighted
private placement portfolio is constructed as follows: Invest one dollar in the stocks of the
2Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Evans (1994) argue that time-variation in conditional betas for passive
portfolios is economically and statistically small in the U.S. However, Ferson and Schadt (1996) find that
time-varying betas are important in theirmeasurement of the performance of managed U.S. mutual funds.
Moreover, it is commonly accepted that conditional expected risk premiums tend to vary with economy-wide
factors such as the business cycle.
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first firm that announces a private placement. At the beginning of the first month after
the second private placement announcement, the portfolio is rebalanced to include the new
company using current value-weights. This process is continued as additional firms issue
securities, until the first firm reaches its three-year anniversary or a firm in the portfolio
is delisted, at which point it is removed and the portfolio is again rebalanced using value-
weights. Dividing the sample by offering type (standby rights/uninsured rights/private
placements), by the takeup (above and below median), and using equal and value weights
result in ten such "issuer portfolios". Similarly, ten "match-portfolios" are constructed
using the corresponding set of size/book-to-market matched firms identified in the preceding
analysis. Finally, six "zero-investment" portfolios are constructed by selling issuer-portfolios
short to finance a long position in the match-portfolio, and two zero-investment portfolios
are constructed by going short in below median takeup issuers and long in above median
takeup issuers.
The four risk factors used in the conditional expectation models are described in panel
(a) of Table 6.4. The excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the differ-
ence between the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on
l-month NIBOR. The term structure factor (.6.Term) is computed as the change in the yield
on long-maturity government bonds (from OECD) and the yield on 3-month NIBOR. The
exchange-rate factor (.6.USD/NOK) is computed as the change in the NOK/USD exchange
rate. The oil-price factor (.6.Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend (crude oil) spot price.
The three factors that are not return on portfolios (.6.Term, .6.USD/NOK, and .6.Brent)
should ideally have been represented by factor mimicking portfolios. However, it turned
out to be hard to accomplish this in a meaningful way. The factor mimicking procedures
of Breeden, Gibbons and Litzenberger (1989) and Lehmann and Modest (1988) using ei-
ther decile portfolios or the 30 largest companies each year to mimic the factor time-series,
generated factor returns that had very low correlation with the original macro economic
variables. Thus, the factor model uses the macro economic variables .6.Term, .6.USD/NOK,
and .6.Brent directly as factors.i'
The information variables are the return on the Morgan Stanley World Index in excess
of the return on the l-month NIBOR (MSWI excess return), the dividend yield on the
3\Vhen factors are not returns on portfolios, theyenter the asset return generating process as deviations
from their conditional expected value (See Shanken (1992)). In order to test the sensitivity of our results
to the model misspecification that arises because ÅTerm,ÅUSD/NOK, and ÅBrent are not measured as
"the deviation from their respective expectations, the regressions are also run with ÅTerm,ÅUSD/NOK,
and ÅBrent measured as the deviation from the time-series mean. The results using this specification are
virtually identical.
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Table 6.4
Summary statistics on risk factors and information variables used in the
conditional factor models of expected returns
The excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference between the return on the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on l-month NIBOR. The term structure factor (~Term)
is computed as the change in the yield on long-maturity government bonds (from OECD) and the yield
on 3-month NIBOR. The exchange-rate factor (6USD/NOK) is computed as the change in the NOK/USD
exchange rate. The oil-price factor (~Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend (crude oil) spot price. The
information variables are: The return on the Morgan Stanley World Index in excess of the return on the
l-month NIBOR (MSWI excess return), the dividend yield on the Morgan Stanley World Index (Dividend
Yield), a dummy variable that takes on the value of one in Januaryand zero otherwise (January Dummy),
and real per capita growth rate of industrial production (Industrial Production Growth). Except for the
January dummy, the numbers in panel (a) and (b) are percentages.
Mean Min Max Std.
(a) Risk factors in the conditional factor model
RM 0.50 -26.59 20.20 6.29
~Term 0.00 -0.29 0.36 0.06
6NOK/USD 0.23 -6.14 7.56 2.40
~Brent 0.37 -28.51 53.86 9.76
(b) Information variables Zt-l
MSWI excess return 0.31 -18.13 10.40 4.09
Dividend Yield 3.26 0.39 6.05 1.21
January dummy 8.06 0.00 1.00 27.28
Industrial Production Growth -0.17 - 3.14 2.31 0.69
(c) Correlation matrix for risks in the conditional factor model
RM u Term ~l\"OK/USD
R~1 1.00
uTerm 0.12 1.00
~~OK/VSD 0.07 0.02 1.00
ÅBl~nt 0.14 -0.03 0.04
~Brent
1.00
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Morgan Stanley World Index (Dividend Yield), a dummy variable that takes on the value
of one in January and zero otherwise (January Dummy), and real per capita growth rate
of industrial production (Industrial Production Growth). Except for the January dummy,
the numbers in panel (a) and (b) are percentages.
Table 6.5 reports the results for portfolios of standby rights offerings, uninsured rights
offerings, and private placements. The rows labeled "EW issuer" or "VW issuer" contain
results for equally- and value weighted issuer portfolios respectively. The rows labeled "EW
M- I" contain the results for zero-investment portfolios that sell issuer portfolios short in
order to finance a long position in the matching firm portfolios. The last column of table
6.5 reports the p-values for an P-test of the null hypothesis that none of the elements in bpI
are statistically different from zero. In other words, a test of the time-varying beta model.
Except for the equally weighted standby rights portfolio, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at the 5% level for any of the portfolios. That is, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that betas are constant over time. The betas reported in the columns marked RM, .6.Term,
.6.USD/NOK, and .6.Brent in table 6.5 and 6.6 are computed as bpo+bpIZ, where Z contains
the time series means of the information variables, where bpo is the estimate of bpo, and bpI
is the estimate of bpI.4 The p-values for the betas are from an P-test of the null that the
scalar bjop and the L-vector bj1p (j = 1, ... K) are both zero.
Panel (a) and (b) oftable 6.5 reports Jensen's alpha for the standby- and uninsured rights
portfolios. The 0.7% average monthly abnormal return for value weighted standby rights
issuers represents a three-year abnormal return of about 29%. The portfolios of rights issuers
have positive alphas, indicating that these are overperforming relative to the benchmark.
However, except for the value-weighted standby rights issuer portfolio, the alphas are not
different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. The evidence of no
abnormal performance for rights issuers are reinforced by the results for the zero-investment
portfolios. The zero-investment portfolios have positive but statistically insignificant alphas.
These results are consistent with the evidence in chapter 4 on long-run performance of
SEOs by firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX). Since both the timing-hypothesis and the overconfidence-hypothesis
predict abnormal performance for the issuer portfolios, the evidence in panel (a) and (b) of
table 6.5 do not support these theories.
Turning to the private placements portfolios, panel (c) shows underperformance for the
equally-weighted issuer portfolio and the equally-weighted zero-investment portfolio. The
4The mean of the January dummy has no economic meaning. Replacing the mean with zero or one has
virtually no effect on the results.
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Table 6.5
Jensen's alpha for private and public equity issuer using a conditional
multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return benchmark
The four risk variables in Tm are the excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference
between the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on l-month NIBOR. The
term structure factor (~Term) is computed as the change in the yield on long-maturity government bonds
(from OECD) and the yield on 3-month NIBOR. The exchange-rate factor (~USD/NOK) is computed as
the change in the NOK/USD exchange rate. The oil-price factor (~Brent) is the change in the Brent Blend
(crude oil) spot price. The information variables Zt-l are listed in table 6.4. The model
Tpt = ap + b~oTmt + b~l (Zt-l ® Tme) + ept
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator
of White (1980). The column labeled Adj.-R2 contains adjusted R2 for the regression. The numbers in
parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt-l
Portfolio" O:p RM ~Term ~USD/NOK ~Brent Adj._R2 F(Z)
(a) Standby rights
EW issuer 0.20 (0.551) 1.03 (0.000) 34.86 (0.000) 0.16 (0.080) -0.05 (0.702) 0.684 0.003
VW issuer 0.70 (0.030) 1.15 (0.000) 7.55 (0.490) 0.21 (0.062) -0.09 (0.151) 0.753 0.231
EWM-I 0.65 (0.154) -0.19 (0.195) -15.33 (0.104) 0.14 (0.948) -0.04 (0.590) 0.035 0.756
VWM-I 0.34 (0.416) -0.18 (0.050) -5.08 (0.502) -0.04 (0.480) 0.05 (0.205) 0.061 0.239
(b) Uninsured rights
EW issuer 0.21 (0.730) 0.62 tO.Ol,,)) -2.95 (0.994) -0.04 (0.631) -0.08 (0.320) 0.198 0.563
VW issuer 0.59 (0.327) 0.72 (0.000) -2.39 (0.942) -0.08 (0.934) -0.03 (0.647) 0.237 0.653
EWM-I 1.06 (0.130) 0.00 (0.005) 11.99 (0.773) 0.03 (0.791) 0.02 (0.688) 0.040 0.062
VWM-I 0.86 (0.261) -0.06 (0.022) 8.84 (0.961) -0.08 (0.710) 0.01 (0.423) 0.022 0.135
(c) Private placements
EW issuer -0.91 (0.038) 0.94 (0.000) 21.50 (0.031) -0.08 (0.406) 0.02 (0.768) 0.567 0.361
VW issuer 0.33 (0.371) 1.16 (0.000) 5.37 (0.302) 0.Q1 (0.313) -0.02 (0.385) 0.692 0.290
EW M-I 1.00 (0.051) -0.10 (0.704) -4.75 (0.584) 0.12 (0.294) -0.08 (0.588) -0.027 0.794
VWM-I 0.16 (0.782) -0.16 (0.581) -10.86 (0.057) -0.13 (0.090) -0.04 (0.472) 0.039 0.230
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('EW') or value-weighted ('VW'). The 'M-I' portfolios are zero-
investment portfolios with a long position in the matching firms and a short position in the issuing firms.
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Table 6.6
Jensen's alpha fer portfolios of issuers with below and above median takeup
using a conditional multi-factor asset pricing model as an expected return
benchmark
The four risk variables in Tm are the excess return on the market portfolio (RM) is computed as the difference
between the return on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) total index and the return on I-month NIBOR. The
term structure factor (ÅTerm) is computed as the change in the yield on long-maturity government bonds
(from OECD) and the yield on 3-month NIBOR. The exchange-rate factor (ÅUSDjNOK) is computed as
the change in the NOKjUSD exchange rate. The oil-price factor (ÅBrent) is the change in the Brent Blend
(crude oil) spot price. The information variables Zt-l are listed in table 6.4. The model
Tpt = op + b~oTmt + b~l (Zt-l 0 Tmtl + ept
is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are computed using the heteroskedasticity consistent estimator
of White (1980). The column labeled Adj.-R2 contains adjusted R2 for the regression. The numbers in
parentheses are p-values.
Betas at mean Zt-l
Portfolio" RM ÅTerm ÅUSDjNOK ÅBrent Adj.-R2 F(Z)
(a) Below median takeup
EW issuer 0.53 (0.188) 0.88 (0.000) 25.28 (0.000) -0.03 (0.929) -0.04 (0:640) 0.522 0.087
VW issuer 0.81 (0.032) 1.01 (0.000) 3.83 (0.505) 0.12 (0.647) -0.07 (0.516) 0.629 0.006
(b) Above median takeup
EW issuer 0.23 (0.545) 0.71 (0.000) 33.40 (0.000) 0.20 (0.007) -0.06 (0.595) 0.443 0.018
VW issuer 0.90 (0.014) 0.82 (0.000) 10.13 (0.544) -0.01 (0.489) -0.08 (0.166) 0.498 0.663
(c) Zero investment portfolios (Above-Below)
EW A-B -0.29 (0.577) -0.18 (0.107) 7.64 (0.536) 0.23 (0.032) -0.02 (0.955) 0.022 0.280
VWA-B 0.06 (0.909) -0.18 (0.005) 5.36 (0.898) -0.12 (0.626) -0.02 (0.900) 0.032 0.255
"Portfolios are either equal-weighted ('EW') or value-weighted ('VW'). The 'A-B' portfolios are zero-
investment portfolios with a long position in the above median takeup portfolio and a short position in the
below median takeup portfolio.
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equally-weighted private placement portfolio underperforms the factor model benchmark
by 0.91% on average over the sample period. This is comparable to a three-year abnormal
holding period return of about -39%. The 1.0% average monthly abnormal return for the
equally-weighted zero investment portfolio shows that most of this abnormal performance is
generated by the short position in the issuing firms. The performance of the private place-
ments change dramatically when the portfolio returns are computed using value-weights.
The issuer portfolio now shows a statistically insignificant positive alpha (0.33%) and the
abnormal performance of the zero-investment portfolio is dramatically reduced. This im-
plies that the abnormal performance observed for the equally-weighted portfolio is driven
by the performance of small firms. The underperformance for the small private placements
could be taken as evidence in favor of the timing-hypothesis. If the managers that place
equity privately have the same incentives as managers that place equity using a public of-
fering, such that the theories of private placements discussed in chapter 5 and in section
6.2 of this chapter is wrong, the timing-hypothesis predicts a negative abnormal long-term
performance also for private placements. For the overconfidence hypothesis, on the other
hand, the evidence of underperformance for private placements is just the opposite of the
prediction.
Panel (a) and (b) of table 6.6 report the performance of portfolios constructed based on
the current shareholder takeup. Firms with below median takeup is placed in one portfolio
while firms with above median takeup is placed in another portfolio. Using either equal
or value-weights, both below-median and above-median portfolios show positive abnormal
performance (significant at the 5% level for the value weighted portfolios.) In order to test
whether or not the below-median portfolio have performance significantly different from
the performance of the above-median portfolio, a zero-investment portfolio is constructed
by selling the above-median portfolio short and using the proceeds to finance a long posi-
tion in the below-median portfolio. As shown in panel (c) of table 6.6, one cannot reject
the hypothesis that the equally and value-weighted zero-investment portfolios have normal
returns.
Overall, based on table 6.5 and table 6.6, it seems fair to conclude that this section does
not lend any convincing support in favor of either the timing hypothesis or the overconfi-
dence hypothesis.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter explores the timing hypothesis and the overconfidence hypothesis as alternative
views of the market reaction to equity announcements. These theories are motivated by the
"new issues puzzle", and therefore predict that the long-run abnormal stock return after
equity issues should be negative. The analysis indicates a possible Norwegian "new issues
puzzle" when using a matching firm benchmark. The average three-year holding period
return for the sample of public offerings is 42.6%, while the associated matching firms have
an average holding period return of 65.2%. However, this underperformance disappears
when using a factor model benchmark. The overconfidence hypothesis has the additional
prediction that the abnormal announcement period returns on average should be followed
by long-run abnormal performance of the same sign. The results also fail to support this
prediction.
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